川普和美国人是怎么想的？
It was late November 2016, and my Chinese counterpart, Vice Premier Wang Yang, was visiting Washington, D.C. Over the course of my tenure as U.S. Secretary of Commerce, the vice premier and I had developed a warm and candid relationship.
2016年11月末，时任中国国务院副总理汪洋访问华盛顿，在我任美国商务部长期间，我和副总理建立了良好且坦诚的关系。
Since this was to be our last official meeting, I decided to do something a bit different: take him to rural Virginia for a traditional Thanksgiving meal.
因为这是我们最后一次正式会晤，我决定来点不一样的：我带他来到弗吉尼亚乡下，共进传统的感恩节大餐。
While we were surrounded by our usual phalanx of security, we effectively sat alone, with the exception of our two closest aides. Shortly after we were seated, the vice premier leaned in close and almost whispered to me, “Can you explain what just happened in your presidential election?” Clearly, the Chinese were just as surprised by the results as we were.
虽说身边有一干例常的安保人员，我们还是设法单独坐下来，只有两个最贴身的翻译。刚刚坐定，副总理就欠过身来，几乎同我耳语说，“你能解释一下你们总统大选是怎么回事吗？”显然，这位中国人同我们一样，对大选结果感到吃惊。
I told the vice premier that we were still trying to understand the outcome ourselves, but that it was important for him to appreciate that China had played a significant role in the election.
我对副总理说，我们自己还在试图理解这个结果，但要明白的是，中国在选举中扮演了重要角色。
As the translator spoke into his ear, he shot me a somewhat surprised look. I explained that then-candidate Donald Trump’s “tough on China” rhetoric had tapped into an underlying strain of thought in the U.S. that Wang and other Chinese leaders needed to understand.
翻译对他耳语后，他有点吃惊地看着我。我解释说，当时还是候选人的唐纳德·特朗普说“给中国来硬的”，这种措辞说到美国心坎上去了，汪和其他中国领导人要明白。
For years, Americans were told that China was a developing country and shouldn’t necessarily be held to the same standard as developed nations such as the U.S. But China’s success had severely undercut that line of reasoning.
多年来，美国人被告知说中国是一个发展中国家，没有必要以美国这样的发达国家标准要求中国，但中国的成功严重搅乱了这种逻辑。
The Chinese economy was growing at 6 percent or more annually. Chinese cities, roads, ports and bridges were rising seemingly overnight. The world’s low-cost manufacturer was rapidly becoming a global technology hub. And the Chinese government was investing billions of renminbi in support of its “Made in China 2025” industrial plan. The disconnect between rhetoric and reality was profound and growing by the day.
中国经济年增长6%还多。中国的城市、道路、港口和桥梁感觉一夜之间就冒出来了。世界的低成本制造国正迅速成为全球技术中心。中国政府投资数十亿元支持《中国制造2025》产业计划。这种言行不一很明显且与日俱增。
At the same time, Americans felt that at least some of China’s success had come at their expense. They were seeing their middle-class jobs and once-prosperous lifestyles disappearing. China wasn’t playing fairly; it was consistently violating its international commitments and tilting the playing field to advantage Chinese firms. Economic complexities aside, the fact that Americans were, in part, paying the bill for such behavior had begun to sink in with millions of my fellow citizens.
另一方面，美国人感觉，至少中国的部分成功让他们付出代价。他们眼看自己的中产阶级岗位和富裕的生活方式消失了。中国的做法不公允，总是违反国际承诺，偏向中国公司。不说经济的复杂性，美国为这些行为支付部分账单，这一事实开始让成百上千万美国同胞感同身受。
Candidate Trump, of course, didn’t create these imbalances; he was simply very effective at tapping into this growing resentment. With or without Trump, the U.S.-China relationship was moving quickly toward a crossroad.
当然，候选人特朗普并未制造这些失衡，他不过是利用了这种日益增长的怨恨之情。不论有没有特朗普，美中关系都在快速驶向十字路口。
The point I was making to the vice premier is that, as China has risen to become a global power, the dynamic between the two countries has unquestionably changed. Meanwhile, too many Chinese actions and policies have not.
我想对副总理说的是，中国已经成为全球强国，两国之间的动态关系毫无疑问已经发生了改变。可另一方面，中国太多做法和政策并没有改变。
In fact, Chinese officials still frequently rely on the outdated rhetoric that China is merely a developing country.
事实上，中国官员仍然常常使用过时的话语，说中国还是一个发展中国家。
The developing nation narrative is clearly at odds with the observable reality of modern China, and it logically runs counter to China’s lofty goal of establishing a “new model of great power relations” between the U.S. and China — a dynamic focused on fostering cooperation and competition but avoiding confrontation, which, historically, has been the defining feature of relations between existing and rising powers.
发展中国家这种说法显然与现代中国表现出来的真实不相符，逻辑上也与中国构建美中两国“新型大国关系”的伟大目标相悖，这一目标主张构建合作与竞争关系，避免对抗，从历史上看，这只用来形容现存和崛起大国之间的关系。
It is hard to be both a poor, developing nation and the other party to a “new model of great power relations.” The formulation assumes the existence of two great powers.
你不能一边是个贫穷的发展中国家，另一边又参与到“新型大国关系”中来，后者的前提是两个强国。
In the modern world, though, being a great power requires leadership. It requires being a good steward of the global economy, not just benefiting from it. It requires playing by the same rules and competing fairly, not relying on state resources to support domestic industries and innovation. If China wants to be the world’s other great power, it is manifestly in its interest to start acting like one.
可在现代世界，一个强国需要有领导力，应该是全球经济的优秀管理者，而不仅是受益者。这就要求用同一套准则行事、参与公平竞争、不依赖国家资源支持国内行业和创新。如果中国希望成为世界的另一个强国，显然表现地像一个大国才符合其利益。
To be fair, we have seen China emerge as a global leader on certain issues — such as climate — and, in recent months, President Xi Jinping has spoken consistently about China assuming a larger role in world affairs. In other areas, however, particularly those tied to economic and trade policy, the rhetoric continues to surpass the policies.
实话实说，我们的确看到中国在部分问题上表现出全球领袖的样子，例如气候变化，最近几个月，中国领导人多次提到中国要在世界事务中扮演更大角色。可在另外一些领域，尤其与经济和贸易有关的领域，不过动动嘴，没有政策配套。
In part, it was this disconnect between words and reality that gave Trump his political resonance in the U.S. China is a great power. China has risen and, in so doing, has lifted 800 million people out of poverty. But, if China doesn’t change its approach to economic competition, I fear that today’s trade war will be nothing compared to the heightened tensions to come. Frankly, our domestic political system will demand action and President Trump will look like the mild first incarnation of a trend rather than an outlier.
在某种程度上，正是言行脱节让特朗普在美国收货了政治同情。中国是一个强国。中国已经崛起了，让8亿人民脱贫。可如果中国不去改变其参与经济竞争的方式，我担心日后会面临更大挑战，相比而言，今天的贸易战算不了什么。坦率的说，我们的国内政治体制会要求美国有所行动，特朗普总统将是这种趋势的第一个温和化身，而非不受欢迎的局外人。
The irony, of course, is that in so many important respects the economic and personal ties between the U.S. and China are deeper than ever:
当然，讽刺的是，在许多重要的方面，美中两国间的经济和民间联系都比以前更紧密了：
- The U.S. hosted roughly 130,000 Chinese graduate students during the 2016-2017 academic year. On average, each of those Chinese students spends more than $26,000 per year in the U.S.
- 2016到2017学年，美国有13万中国研究生。平均每个中国学生每年在美消费26000美元。
- Chinese direct investment in the U.S. expanded dramatically to $46 billion in 2016, before a steep decline in 2017. That investment has hyper-charged a range of sectors in all corners of our country.
- 2016年，中国在美直接投资迅速增加到460亿美元，2017年出现大滑坡。投资充盈到全国各地的各种经济部门。
- In less than 10 years, spending from Chinese tourists in the U.S. has more than quadrupled to over $20 billion annually. Xi and then-President Barack Obama agreed to offer new 10-year tourist visas to citizens of both countries, so we can expect that number to grow.
- 不到十年间，中国在美观光支出增加了三倍，达到每年200亿美元，两国推行10年旅行签证后，预计这一数字还会增加。
In large part, China’s progress wouldn’t have been possible without the stable global economic order that the U.S. has underwritten and secured for the last 70 years. In that time, this system has limited conflict and led to the greatest increase in prosperity the world has ever seen.
很大程度上，没有美国建立并在过去七十年保护的全球稳定经济秩序，中国不可能取得如此进步。这期间，这一全球秩序减少了冲突，让世界经历前所未有的繁荣。
Without question, particularly over the last two decades, China has reaped the benefits of this rules-based order not just by competing aggressively but, it must be said, at times exploiting the existing system. That must change.
毫无疑问，尤其在过去二十年，中国从这种法治秩序中收益，不仅通过积极参与竞争，而且必须指出，有时还利用了现有的体制，这必须改变。
If it doesn’t, I fear that the stated goal of this “new model of great power relations” — competitive cooperation — will fall victim to China’s inability to change course. Then the politically plausible options for navigating China’s rise over the decades to come will be narrowed down to one: confrontation.
如果不改变，我担心竞争性合作的“新型大国关系”目标将受害于中国不能改弦更张。然后，指引中国在过去几十年崛起的各种看起来政治合理的选项只会收窄为一种，那就是对抗。
出处 : 英文联播
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