Annex I

China Strategic Analysis Center’s

Proposal

to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

on Political Reform and Adjustment of Foreign Policy and International Strategy

on the Occasion of the 100th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China

January 1, 2021, New York

Beijing

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Mr. Xi Jinping, General Secretary,

Today is New Year's day in 2021. By July 1, the Communist Party of China will have been founded for 100 years.

In this special year, we, as a think tank composed of a group of Chinese intellectuals with a liberal constitutional philosophy, would like to share with you, through this public proposal, our views on the current situation, the centennial history and the future of China, and propose a series of major institutional and policy recommendations that will help your party to cope with the current situation, deepen political reform, unburden itself of its history, make a magnificent turnaround and introduce major institutional and policy changes for a peaceful transition. We hope that your party will respond positively to the good advice and make proactive changes that are in line with the general trend of history.

As we have pointed out, in the text of the Manifesto on China-U.S. Relations and the Future of Humanity, since 1840, China has faced two major historical missions (arising from the national awakening and the desire to integrate into the mainstream of the world): 1) to build an independent, unified and powerful modern national state to stand on its own in the world; 2) to build a good constitutional democratic system to complete the transformation from the former imperial autocratic system to a modern democratic system. One hundred years have passed and judging from the progress of these two major historic tasks, the CPC has made great achievements in leading the Chinese people to build a national state, and China's overall national powerhas grown tremendously, for which we give full recognition. However, in the 70 years since the success of the 1949 revolution and the establishment of the new government, the modernization of the Chinese political system has taken many twists and turns, and many efforts to correct these distortions are still underway. This has given rise to many real contradictions and dilemmas andhas led to a long period of tension in international relations.

At the same time, we believe that China's nation-state building is far from being truly complete.The reunification with Taiwan is not yet complete, Hong Kong is in turmoil, the situation in some ethnic regions is tense, and there is still the possibility of China's division in the future. China's external environment is also insecure, with the United States and other Western countries applying pressure and playing the games of ideology and geopolitics. It is clear that China needs to speed up the democratization process to address these challenges.We believe that, a democratic China will be better able to deal with internal conflicts and resolve internal crises, thus improving the promotion and development ofnation-state building; a democratic China will also be applauded by the world, because only when all major countries in the world establish democratic systems will global governance become smoother and less obstructive, and the common home of mankind will have a better future.

We look forward to the Communist Party of China, which is already 100 years old, complying with this historical requirement and completingits magnificent transformation of China.

In this proposal, we will discuss the following issues: the reform of the CCP itself; advancing the transformation of the political system; some misconceptions that should be clarified; challenges facing China today; options for cross-strait reunification; solutions to the ethnicissues; and reorientation of foreign policy and international strategy. Finally, we will summarize the policy points raised in this proposal.

1. The Reform of the CCP itself

Since the 18th Communist Party Congress, the party has been emphasizing reform and arguing that deepening economic reform and expanding openness are the most important means of promoting innovation and achieving a high level of modernization, and that there has indeed been greater progress in reform and opening up at the economic level. This is true. But also, since the 18th National Congress political reform has hardly been mentioned, and some aspects of the political system have even regressed, such as the emphasis on "the Party is the leader of all four corners" has brought backthe problem of "replacing government with the party" which had been gradually solved in the 1980s. The country has become a "party state" in the style of the Kuomintang rule criticized by the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s, if not worse. This problem has also become a trigger for many domestic and international conflicts. We understand the need to centralize power when dealing with major risk issues such as the pandemic, but centralizing power is not the same as totalitarianism, let alone autocracy. Massive party substitution and interference in governance will make China's political system less and less trusted by the international community, and the world will wonder whether it is dealing with a country or a political party with a completely different philosophy. This would actually undermine national security and China’s sovereign status in the international arena, putting the country at undue international risk (the term "Chinese Communist State" is already in vogue overseas).

Since the 18th Communist Party Congress, not only has political reform no longer been mentioned, but reform of the Party itself has never been on the agenda. In our opinion, to democratize the country's politics, the ruling party's own reform is the starting point for all reforms. Only with its own reformation can the ruling party become an important driving force in China's democratization, we have absolutely no doubt about that.

Of course, according to the deeper thinking of the CCP: "you’ve fought for the territory, you should hold on to your prize", the party's own reform and ahistoric and magnificent turnaround would be considered as a "disruptive mistake". In fact, this is a big fallacy. The test of a party or a leadership group's visionand ability to make real achievements in history is precisely whether they can break out of the limitations of history and break free from the cocoon of tradition they have wovenfor themselves.

The Chinese Communist Party was founded on the basis of Marxism, and for more than 100 years, Marxism, as a Western left-wing theory, has been fully absorbed by Western social democratic parties and become the core of democratic socialism (guaranteeing the rights of workers and peasants, fighting for equality and freedom of expression, etc.). And Marx's vision of communism has been proven by human practice (including that of the Soviet Union and China) to be an ideal utopia. His path to communism through class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat has also been proven in practice to be a "devil's solution" with enormous destructive consequences. This doctrine can be used as a mobilization tool for the revolutionary party to carry out radical class struggle, but not to build a nation. China's 40 years of reform and opening up have been successful only on the premise of a de facto abandonment of the Marxist communist utopia. For today's Chinese Communist Party, communism no longer has a scientific and idealistic meaning, but is only a signboard.

As we can see, the program of the early Chinese Communists originally included the demand to end the "semi-colonial" state and to achieve national independence and liberation, but this nationalist demand was included in the overall logical framework of the communist revolution. Now, in the context of China's rise, the CCP has made "achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" its main slogan and goal, which is in fact a repositioning of the party, i.e., a magnificent transformation from a party that pursued class revolution and communism to a party that is dedicated to national rejuvenation. Although this repositioning has delicate considerations of legitimacy of government, we do not oppose, or even encourage, such a repositioning. After all, it means that the CCP is giving up the communist world fantasy and returning to reality, to China proper, and that party members no longer have to report to Marx when they die. Chinese people, whether they are Party members or not, should report their souls after death to the imperial sky and to their ancestors. To report to a foreigner after death is actually a betrayal of the Chinese nation. Moreover, for many years the CCP was considered by the Kuomintang and certain overseas opposition and public opinion as an alien regime representing a foreign spirit (Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism) and that foreign institutions (the Communist International and the Soviet Communist Party) were ruling China. Being labeled as such isunfavorable to your party's leadership of the national revival.

The belief that Marx and communism should be reveredas "gods" is because his theories allude to the Chinese peasants' social ideals of equalization of land, low taxation and unequal distribution of wealth, as well as what Marx called (and what the Chinese peasants preferred) the "subaltern dictatorship" governance model.One pole of which was the supreme imperial power, the other pole being a sea of small peasants supporting the imperial power. The emperor and the peasants together "fought against feudalism" (destroying the middle class of the pyramidal social system - merchants, gatekeepers, warlords and local feudal forces, etc.), together maintaining the central imperial dictatorship. The 1949 revolution, led by the CCP with Marxism, actually alluded to another peasant revolution in Chinese history that changed the dynasty and unconsciously reverted to an imperial dictatorship (Mao's imperial-like demeanor plus theocratic rule) without knowing it. Many Marxist theorists in your party, after the calamity of the Cultural Revolution, still do not reflect on this, and their ideological undertones are still in defense of imperial dictatorship - albeit with a Marxist-Leninist veneer - which is why they have created difficulties for the democratization and reform of the country.

In our opinion, it is not necessary for a political party, if it is not a religious party, to demand and emphasize the beliefs the party and its members should hold. Political parties should not have faith, but only talk about the party's political ideals and the blueprint for governing the country. Believing in social ideals can become a religious obsession - as Mao Zedong demonstrated when he had to achieve a communist utopia, which resulted in a huge disaster for society. By not treating ideals as faith, one can keep up with the times and adjust one's model of social ideals to the changing reality, making them more in line with the possibilities and evolutionary laws of society. A party that speaks of faith becomes stubborn and rigid, becomes accustomed to forcing others to obey it, and also sticks to its ways. Besides, it is too metaphysical to treat communism as faith ("free association of people," common ownership of the means of production, and distribution according to needs). Faith is a spiritual matter and should not be materialized. According to the CCP's new positioning of itself, it has actually returned to its national orientation, so it is time to say goodbye to these "party gods" - Marx, Lenin and Mao. At least two of the four basic principles (adherence to Marxism and dictatorship) can be abandoned immediately, and the other two, especially the one-party monopoly of public power, should be reformed.

We believe that in order to promote the democratization in China, the CCP should complete two transformations: conceptual transformation and organizational transformation. Specifically, these include:

• Conceptual transformation: This refers to the Chinese Communist Party's abandonment of the Marxist cognitive framework, as well as the Leninist logic of autocracyin favor of the universal values of constitutional democracy and the replaceability of public power as the rightful basis of modern human evolution and political civilization.

• Organizational transformation: This refers to theChinese Communist Party, through its own efforts, gradually deconstructing the original Leninist party structure and organizational system and implementing organizational restructuring in accordance with the principles of political parties in modern democratic societies, so that the Party becomes a brand-new party that can operate and act within the framework of a constitutional democratic system.

• In order to achieve a new life and a magnificent transformation of the party, it is possible to consider changing the name of the party. We recommend two options: one is to change to "Chinese Symbiotic Party" to emphasize the party's identity as an advocate and leader of national rejuvenation; the second is to change to "Chinese Social Democratic Party" to retain the party's left-wing characteristics while asserting its unique presence in the future Chinese constitutional system. The name "Communist Party" should no longer be used. Since the reform and opening up of the market economy and the party's commitment to national rejuvenation, the continued use of the Marxist name "Communist" has obscured the party's rebirth and authenticity and has caused the world to misunderstand the CCP as a Cold War relic that is in opposition to the West, causing unnecessary hostility and conflict. After becoming a nationalist party, the ostensible cause of conflict is gone. The next questions may still focus on autocracy or democracy (an issue that will continue to be further reformed), and conflicting geopolitical interests. But it is much better than retaining a communist shell and always being under suspicion.

• Accomplish the following historic work at the 20th Communist Party Congress (no later than the 21st Congress): 1. Form the third "Historical Resolution" in the history of the Party, re-examine the 100-year history of the CPC, and make a new and accurate summary of the history of the CPC. 2. To vindicate the June Fourth Incident in Tiananmen Square, restore the reputation of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang as General Secretaries, and maintain the integrity and authenticity of the Party's history. At the same time, request the relevant departments to withdraw the arrests of all those involved in the June Fourth Incident, and remove all historical burdens thereof. 3. Complete the renaming of the Party and amend the Party constitution, so that the Party can start to develop a constitutional democracy. 4. Move Mao's body out of the Memorial Hall and return it to Shaoshan for burial. Change the memorial hall to the "National Pantheon". 5. Stop hanging the portraits of leaders in Tiananmen Square to show that the Party and the country will end their personal worship from now on.

1. Promote the transformation of the political system

Political transformation is a cause for the whole nation that requires joint efforts from both inside and outside the system. China's civil liberals have been fighting for this for years. However, we also acknowledge that in a mega-state like China, with its extremely complex national conditions and a large national elite gathered within the system, if the CCP agrees to initiate its own reforms, it will create the favorable conditions for a more comprehensive political transformation of China.

We would like to reiterate that democracy is a gradual process and cannot be rushed, but neither can it stand still. We are opposed to a radical "overthrow" or "knockdown" or an external "imposition", which would not only not contribute to democratization but would also poison the atmosphere of reform and political transformation. This is an irresponsible approach to this historical process. China's reform must still be driven by interaction between the top and bottom of the system. We look forward to a situation in which the whole society will work together to promote and speed up democracy after the "name change reform" of the Communist Party of China.

We believe that the key areas for the transformation of the political system include, as a minimum:

• Gradually liberalizing of the controls on speech to allow constructive opinions,independent of official claims, to enter public discussion. Of course, we do not advocate unrestrained liberalization all at once, as populist hostility and the venting of all kinds of complaints through the Internet and other social media would only damage the healthy atmosphere of the public sphere. It is the responsibility of intellectuals and the media to guide the formation of a constructive public sphere, and it is also a test of the wisdom of those in power.

• End the strict controls in education, the humanities and social science research. The party-oriented education currently being promoted in schools and universities (including the cult-like glorification of current leaders, the indoctrination of a monopolistic monolithic view of history, and the unquestionable interpretation of China's current policies) is contrary to, and incompatible with, the cultivation of the independent personalities needed in modern society. This issue, which concerns the spiritual construction of the Chinese nation and the future of national culture, cannot go on like this. Without a spirituallysound nation, there will be no healthy democracy.

• As the CCP initiates its own reform, it needs to push forward the reform of the legislature and political consultative bodies at all levels. Reform of the NPC system includes: changing the method of selecting candidates for NPC deputies from one based on "organizational recommendations" by the CCP to one based on recommendations by the CCP, other political groups, and citizens, and gradually changing the election of NPC deputies at the municipal level and above to direct elections. Over time, the NPCs at all levels will become truly representative bodies of public opinion that can accommodate the views of all parties and different interest groups. Such a body would lay the foundation for the transition to an elected house under the future constitutional system. This elected house could still be called the National People's Congress, or it could be renamed the National Assembly. The reform of the CPPCC system includes that it should no longer serve as a place for the eight democratic parties to participate in politics (these parties should gradually complete their own transformation and compete as independent parties in the future elected house) butshould become a supra-party deliberative body. The CPPCC should be composed of sages from the intellectual, educational, business, and civic sectors, with a view to balancing any short-sightedness of the elected House with the long-term interests of the country. This body, which would embody intellectual principles and would be super partisan, could be renamed as the Senate or the Council of the Wise in the future constitutional system. It should have the power to impeach the executive and judicial heads, the power to appoint the Supreme Court and the prosecutor's office, and the power to arbitrate investigations into the truth and reconciliation of historical issues.

• The core of judicial reform remains the issue of judicial independence. The problem of party power interfering with legal power cannot be sustained in the long run. Otherwise social justice cannot be guaranteed at the source. The reform of judicial procedure and justice has been carried out well in recent years, which we acknowledge, but it should still be further deepened. At the same time, we should encourage the development of intermediate social organizations and civil society to realize social autonomy.

• Gradually construct a new central-local relationship in accordance with the principle of dual-track republicanism and improve local autonomy and large state governance. The so-called dual-track republican system refers to the retention of the traditional centralized system, which can effectively deal with the risks of national or cross-regional public affairs and resolve many conflicts caused by regional imbalances, and the development of local autonomy to make up for the shortcomings of China's civil rights traditions. In other words, the dual-track republic equals centralized power plus local autonomy. In the future, China's administrative divisions can be adjusted to contain about 50 provincial units and 1200 to 1500 county and municipal units. The reduction of the size of provinces and the expansion of the size of counties and municipalities will be conducive to the construction of graded and rational local autonomy, the improvement of administrative efficiency and the reduction of administrative costs, plus the better functioning of regional economic integration.

• All the above reforms should be confirmed by amending the current constitution or making a new one when conditions are conducive.

Further reforms in the economic sector are also important. We support the 14th Five-Year Plan recently proposed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the economic strategy that focuses on the internal economy and promotes both internal and external economic cycles simultaneously. The most important thing is to reform the distribution system, improve the worsening trend of the Gini coefficient, and gradually move toward wealth equality. It is hoped that the Gini coefficient can be reduced to below 0.4 in about 10 years. A multi-pronged approach should be taken to gradually narrow the gap between the rich and the poor in terms of taxation (introducing taxes on the rich, inheritance taxes, and consumption taxes on luxury goods), supporting the private economy, reducing the monopoly of state-owned enterprises, increasing transfer payments to poor regions, opening up more employment channels, raising average wages, further liberalizing household registration controls in second- and third-tier cities, and reducing the size of government. Let the internal economy, i.e., the domestic market-based strategy, have more people with the ability to pay to support it. This aspect will be specifically reported by this think tank in the future and will not be elaborated on here.

III. Several notions that interfere with political transformation need to be clarified

We note that since China's rise, China's economic and governance achievements have often been interpreted as "the advantages of socialism with Chinese characteristics" to justify the CCP's rejection of democratization. Many of these perceptions and ideological arguments are untrue. To advance the two major historical tasks, especially democratic transformation, we must first deconstruct these false claims. Let's start with the most recent ones.

• On the fight against the pandemic

It is a fact that China has achieved extraordinary success in the fight against the novel coronavirus pandemic. We applaud the central government's efforts in leading the nation’s fight against the pandemic, but it is an inappropriate summary to attribute the success first and foremost to "the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the remarkable advantages of our socialist system”. When the pandemic began, it was clear that the CPC Central Committee did not pay enough attention to it, and the local government's "admonishmentof whistle blowers" such as Li Wenliang exposed the existing system's traditional problem of "top-oriented" and strict control of public opinion at every turn. This is not a "system advantage", but rather a system disadvantage. The fact that the professionals' warnings were seen as "affecting the overall social stability" led to the loss of precious time in fighting and preventing the pandemic, which led to the closure of the whole of Wuhan city after the spread of the pandemic. This human error in the early days of the pandemic, which cost a great number of lives, needs to be carefully summarized and properly learned from. But we have seen no such indication from the CPC Central Committee Early mistakes were completely overshadowed by the later successes. The failure of the U.S. to fight the pandemic seems to be given as more evidence of the superiority of the Chinese "system," although this assertion may not hold water. It would be interesting to scientifically analyze the different outcomes and causes of the pandemic responses in China and the United States, such as the comparison of the response and mobilization capacity of centralized administrative systems and U.S.style decentralized federal systems in the face of public health emergencies, the policy and ethical boundaries of the use of big data, and the different roles of cultural factors in the face of pandemic attacks. In these areas, countries could have had in-depth exchanges, but the Chinese Communist Party, by attributing all its achievements to its own political system, has blocked all such exchanges from being possible. Of course, we understand that such propaganda is aimed first and foremost at the domestic public. Using every occasion to glorify one's achievements and cover up one's past mistakes is a common tactic used only by rulers who lack legitimacy. The Chinese Communist Party, which has been in power for 70 years and has indeed made its mark in the fight against the pandemic, did not have to do so.

• "China Model" and "China Solution"

In the last decade, with the rise of the country, false pride has come to the fore. The success in the fight against the pandemic has only fueled this arrogance. It is not difficult to find many scholars advocating the "China model"; national leaders have also publicly declared on various occasions that they want to provide the world with a "China solution". The implication is that the Western approach is no longer viable, and that China is taking a different path from the West so that the world can choose.

It is true that there are indeed many problems with the Western democratic system, and we live in the United States and know this well. But do the problems of American democracy prove the success of the Chinese system? We don't think so. The American people elected Trump as president, and what Trump has done has caused great damage to American democracy and exposed many weaknesses in the American constitutional structure, which needs to be reflected on by the American academia and political circles. But after all, the American people corrected this mistake through the new election, which proved the resilience of American democracy. So, the United States is a matter of a democratic system that needs constant improvement and refinement. China, on the other hand, has not yet established a democratic system and urgently needs to continue working in that direction. The problem in China is that those in power are denying that China should follow the path of constitutional democracy because of its nation-state building achievements. But the Chinese Communist Party also advocates in international forums "harmony and difference" and "democratization of international relations," which are important elements of the "Chinese program" for a "community of human destiny”. People may ask: Why can't these good-sounding principles be implemented at home first? "Harmony and difference" means respect for dissent, and "democratization of international relations" should be preceded by "democratization of domestic relations".

• “The Historical Narrative of "Standing Up, Getting Rich and Getting Strong”

It should be said that, at the level of nation-state growth, this narrative is not entirely wrong: China has indeed made great progress in the past 70 years, and the ruling Communist Party of China has to be given credit for this. But this statement does not in turn prove that "without the Communist Party, there would be no new China”. Both the Beiyang Government and the Nanjing Nationalist Government had the mission of "reviving China" as their own. Had there been no foreign invasion, the Nationalist government would have been able to achieve success in modernizing China. The first time China "stood up" was not in 1949, but in 1945, when it gained the respect of the world as one of the four victorious countries in the Second World War.

The monopoly of historical interpretation and the monopoly of historical views originates from the monopoly of public power. The saying that "the victor writes the history" is in fact only the result of this monopoly. We think that the Chinese Communist Party, which has been in power for more than 70 years and was founded 100 years ago, still does not allow open discussion of history, still does not want to face those historical facts that seem to be unfavorable to itself, and still carries out propaganda to the public that "to love the country, one must love the Party", which shows that the Party lacks self-confidence in the legitimacy of its monopoly of public power. This is the crux of the problem. Is it really in the long-term interests of the country to have a political group monopolize public power for a long time or permanently (in whatever name it is called)? When the country is already leading the world in high-tech fields like 5G, but is still asking its subjects to sing "O party, dear mother," does the paradox between the two historical tasks not seem extremely stark?

1. The internal and external challenges facing China today highlight the urgency of political reform

In our view, many of the challenges that China still faces today are caused precisely by the fact that the Chinese Communist Party refuses constitutional reform and insists on a one-party monopoly of public power. Here are just a few examples:

• Corruption issue

We do not deny that since the 18th Communist Party Congress, the CPC Central Committee has made significant efforts and achievements in the fight against corruption. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee also proposed "forming an effective mechanism that dares not, cannot, and does not want to corrupt" as an important goal of the Communist Party of China's construction of a clean government and the fight against corruption. We think that the idea of "not wanting to be corrupted" is naive, as corruption is a matter of human nature, and it is absurd to allow Communist Party members to even think as such. The bigger question is, can this approach to anti-corruption, which relies on self-discipline by the group in power, really work in the long run?

Looking back at the imperial era of China's history, conflicts between the government and the people due to corruption were almost cyclical, and even a competent emperor could hardly ensure that a clean officialdom would be maintained for 20 years. Only 10 years after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the reform and opening up, official corruption had already become a trend.It was an important background for the people's active participation in the Tiananmen democracy movement for the "overthrowing of officialdom" in 1989. After June 4, the marketization continued while the political reform stagnated, and in less than 20 years corruption has spread everywhere and has created a terrifying situation. The "new era" since 2013 of anti-corruption achievements, no matter how great, can only temporarily restrain the corrupt behavior, and sooner or later there will be a resurgence. In this regard, the logic of party power is no better than the logic of imperial power. Only if public power is not monopolized by a single group, or if public power is replaceable, can there be an ultimate solution to the problem of official corruption. This replaceability (regular election of new trustees of public power through open competition) will truly bring power under popular supervision, and its corresponding institutional facilities (such as judicial independence, civil society, and free media supervision) will help form an "effective mechanism that dares not and cannot corrupt," which is a reliable and long-term anti-corruption mechanism.

• “Succession” issue

The issue of succession involves the stability and continuity of power. In the imperial era, this stability was achieved through bloodline succession. In the party-state system since the modern revolutionary parties took power, no party has openly continued this pre-modern practice, except for the Kim regime in Korea, which adopted blood succession. However, the party-state system has created the problem of unstable "successors". In a democratic system, leaders are replaced by popular elections. In a party-state system, the leadership is replaced by "designation" or by internal games at the top. This de facto irregularity of power succession is a huge potential problem for power stability. It is often extolled that China's one-party system is more stable and efficient than the Western party rotation system, reflecting higher government effectiveness. This is only one side of the coin. It is true that the change of government and party rivalry in Western multi-party systems often leads to a shift in the focus of governance and a lack of long-term policy continuity, something that China's future constitutional system should try to avoid. However, competitive democratic elections guarantee the procedural and public opinion legitimacy of the trustees of public power and the openness and transparency of the election process, which is the most reliable method to support the stability of public power. Therefore, it will not have any "successor" problem. This is where the strength of democracy lies. As far as China is concerned, what we are worried about is that within the framework of the existing party state, regardless of the fact that the top leader is still young and powerful, the dilemma of "successors" lies ahead, Mao and Deng are the previous experience. Are the Chinese destined to get caught in the same trap again and again?

• Cultural Creativity

China's economic rise is exciting, but can China achieve the same cultural rise? The answer is clearly not promising. Over the past 10 years, we have seen an increase in the phenomenon of “writing to order", and the independence styles of intellectuals have been lost. Officials have been emphasizing the importance of "cultural soft power" and have added "cultural confidence" to "road confidence, theory confidence, and system confidence". However, if we look at history, we cannot help but admit that it was definitely in the first 30 years of the Chinese Communist Party's rule that traditional Chinese culture was most destroyed. The revival of what is still alive in traditional culture requires an in-depth cultural inventory and an open and extensive public discussion, including a serious reflection on the cultural tragedies that have occurred over the previous 30 years. However, all of this cannot be discussed in the current political climate. Officials seem only too keen to use "culture" as yet another means to justify their own legitimacy (in domestic contexts) and as a "basis" (in international contexts) for the uniqueness of China's path and solution.

At the level of the people, strict control and subtle guidance of public opinion are shaping a socially infantilized cognitive atmosphere. The classic Orwellian forced suppression of the individual by the state is being accompanied by the satisfaction of petty bourgeois consumerism. It is eroding the demand for serious culture, giving rise to pan-entertainment, and de-criticizing, fragmenting, and withering the national spirit as a whole. The "refined egotism" of the elite class is mirrored by the "small time" tendency of popular culture. How can such a low level of culture be commensurate with the rise of a great nation?

• Basic Rights of Citizens

Since the Chinese Communist Party still monopolizes all power, civil rights only exist on paper in many cases. The Chinese tradition of "officialdom" is both long-standing and current. The country still operates in a state of strong government and weak society. It is still very difficult for the people to take their grievances to court. Freedom of speech, especially in politics, is far from being realized, and there are still many cases of people being convicted for their words. Laws protecting citizens' freedom of speech, publication, association and assembly are inadequate, and the provisions written into the Constitution have not been substantially implemented. The right to monitor the media, the fourth power of social supervision, is also far from being implemented, and a press law has been left in limbo for many years.

We understand that the Communist Party's own interpretation of "socialist democracy" differs from international standards. This difference was not self-justified even in the relatively closed era. Now that China has become an important member of the international community in the era of globalization, it should keep pace with international standards in building a democratic system. Democracy can take many forms and needs to be explored. But no matter what the specific form of democracy is, its core principle is that it is the "people", not "government", and not "the party",making decisions for the people –and this will not change. What China needs is checks and balances on power, not party dominance.

• Ethnic Issues

The instability of ethnic regions is a particularly acute challenge for China nowadays. We are well aware of the strategic importance of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia to China's economic construction and national security, and we also know that the central government has invested heavily in ethnic regions in the past decades, providing central government aid to Tibet and Xinjiang, but why has it been ineffective? Why can't we buy the hearts and minds of the people in ethnic regions after spending so much money? The core problem is that the party-state system cannot accommodate genuine autonomy for ethnic regions, nor can it accommodate religious freedom in ethnic regions. It is a natural weakness of the party-state system to see religion as another organized, systematic force and to fear that it poses a threat to the regime, rather than understanding it as an important part of the spiritual life of the people in ethnic areas and a contribution to social stability.

In recent years, the "re-education camps" in Xinjiang have attracted a great deal of international attention, and many international organizations have criticized the human rights disaster unfolding in the region. The Chinese government has justified its mass detentions on the grounds of "anti-terrorism" and "anti-extremism”. We do not deny that terrorist activities in Central Asia and other regions can have an impact on Xinjiang, and that appropriate precautions are necessary. But we must also point out that the root cause of instability and growing ethnic conflict in ethnic areas lies within our existing system. If we do not consider changing the system at the root and truly implementing the right to autonomy and freedom of religion for the people in ethnic areas, there will be no improvement in the governance of the frontier. Hundreds of thousands of task forces will not be able to bring real peace to the border areas.

• Hong Kong and Taiwan Issues

Since the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the "one country, two systems", "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" and "a high degree of autonomy" stipulated in the Hong Kong Basic Law had been relatively well implemented. However, in recent years, due to the delay in the implementation of the "dual universal suffrage", the people of Hong Kong have expressed strong dissatisfaction and continued resistance, which eventually led to the promulgation of the national security law of Hong Kong in June 2020 andled the island of Hong Kong into a state of extermination. We understand that no government will allow premeditated and organized acts of secession, and we do not approve of all kinds of "Hong Kong independence" ideas either. However, Beijing has no intention to fulfill its solemn promise of "dual universal suffrage" in Hong Kong and ignores the general public opinion seeking democracy in Hong Kong, which is the root cause of the tension. In addition, the political and ideological confrontation between Beijing and Western governments and the vicious fight between them on the basis of this confrontation are also important reasons for the current situation in Hong Kong. The U.S. has introduced a series of sanctions against Hong Kong, and Beijing has resisted and imposed counter-sanctions on the grounds of defending the dignity of the nation-state, all of which have further complicated the issue.

The same reasoning explains the increasing tensions in the Taiwan Strait in recent years and the implications therein. As the text of the manifestostates, we highly affirm that cross-strait reunification is a mission that must be accomplished for the nation-building of the Chinese people and the rise of the Chinese nation. But this reunification should be a reunification on a democratic basis, or at least one that accommodates Taiwan's democracy. The existing political system in mainland China is the main reason why the 23 million Taiwanese people are afraid of reunification. Even a tentative demonstration of willingness for political reform by those in power in mainland China would help reduce such fears in favor of opening the door to cross-strait peace talks.

• The external environment of conflict

China's external environment is not secure. The reasons for this insecurity are both ideological rivalries and the rivalry at the nation-state level following China's rise. We, as Chinese, certainly want to defend legitimate Chinese nation-state interests. But as constitutional liberal intellectuals, we must at the same time point out that the incongruity or even conflict between China's existing party-state system and modern democracy as the mainstream of human civilization is an important cause of instability in the world today, and an important cause of China's own insecurity. The party-state government has spent a lot of national power counteracting the United States, and it is making plans all over the world, certainly for the defense of the nation-state, but also for regime security and ideological security. We are all intellectuals with many years of experience in the system, and we are fully aware of the calculations of the decision-making body of the CPC Central Committee. But is this game really meaningful and has a way out? Do China and the United States really have to be enemies with each other?

What the world needs today is not confrontation, but cooperation. But the system is different, cooperation naturally adds obstacles. For example, one might think that the rhetoric of "community of human destiny" put forward by the leader of an authoritarian regime is weak and even hypocritical. How can a regime that does not even respect the basic rights of its own citizens really promote the building of a "community of human destiny"? Western scholars may also question Beijing's interpretation of "culture". When the Chinese government resists universal values, "culture" is special, so it can't "interfere in internal affairs" and "respects the right of all countries to choose their own development path"; yet when the Beijing regime wants to "coordinate with all nations," culture is universal, so the “China plan"becomes a model for all countries to follow. In short, everything depended on the needs of the Party. Against this background of ideological confrontation, how is it possible for China to cooperate on a deeper level with the world's democracies?

To sum up, while China has made great progress in its first historical task – rebuilding a strong nation-state, its second historical task – democratizing its political system, is still a long way off. China's national unity, ethnic harmony, security in border regions, friendship with the world, and role as a great power all require that China go further in its political transformation and democratization. In terms of China's domestic reforms, to paraphrase the words of the old ancestors, the land under the heaven is a land and world of the people. Public power should not be monopolized by one family name, nor by one party. In terms of the world at large, humanity must find a symbioticway to live together, not continue confrontation, and China's democratization will provide a whole new basis for human cooperation.

1. Cross-Strait Unification Alternatives

Cross-strait reunification is the trend of the times. How to unify is a test of the wisdom of politicians on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We believe that the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, on either side of the Taiwan Strait, represent the two legal systems in the history of modern China. There is only a difference in timeline but there is not something superior or inferior between them. Both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party have worked hard for the progress of the nation-state. The DPP and other political parties that emerged from the democratization process in Taiwan have also made important contributions to Taiwan's democracy.

We look forward to when the people and politicians on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will face up to history and reality and achieve political reconciliation with a generous and tolerant heart. Consideration should be given to signing a cross-strait peace agreement first. Then, on this basis, open negotiations for peaceful reunification.

We propose the following three solutions for peaceful reunification for the reference of those on both sides of the Taiwan Strait:

Solution 1: Chinese Confederation

The main point is that the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China should jointly form a "Chinese Confederation" to achieve nominal reunification and request the United Nations to admit both the Chinese Confederation and the Republic of China as member states, giving two UN seats to the Greater China project. The PRC's status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council would remain unchanged. It also opens up room for international survival for the Republic of China, as a member of the Chinese Confederation. If this confederation idea can be realized, Beijing's dream of reunification will be basically realized, the crisis in the Taiwan Strait will be lifted, and future peace in the Taiwan Strait can be guaranteed.

Solution 2: The Third Republic of China

If the political transformation of mainland China starts in due time, the reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can also be achieved in the form of a direct merger of the two historical legal systems and the establishment of a third republic. The First Republic refers to the Republic of China created by the Xinhai Revolution, and the Second Republic refers to the People's Republic of China created by the 1949 Revolution, while the Third Republic would represent the simultaneous succession of the two historical legal systems. The Third Republic of China could be called "China", and "China" would inherit the seat of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council.

Solution 3: Taiwan Special Autonomous Region

If mainland China's political transition is later than cross-strait reunification, then reunification could take the form of a special autonomous region in Taiwan. Mainland China would promise that Taiwan's existing political system (including a multi-party electoral system, parliamentary system, and independent judiciary), economic system, and social system would remain unchanged after reunification, that Taiwan would retain its own currency and independent customs status, and that Mainland China would only take over Taiwan's national defense and foreign affairs. Taiwan's former garrison would be replaced by a local National Guard, which would be responsible for local security. The connotation of one country, two systems, as practiced by the mainland for Taiwan should be reinterpreted along these lines, i.e. (unlike Hong Kong) the equivalent of a republic with a high degree of autonomy.

Any of thesesolutions would require the DPP to abandon its demands for "Taiwan independence" and the Chinese side to reduce its deterrence by force in order to build the mutual trust necessary for the two sides to negotiate a peace agreement and, consequently, cross-strait reunification.

The Taiwan issue is also the core issue of the five major geopolitical conflicts between the United States and China. The United States has used Taiwan to restrain the mainland for many years with three intentions: 1) Taiwan is the core fulcrum of the United States' first island chain to contain China; 2) the United States is committed to not abandoning old friends; and 3) the United States values Taiwan's democratic system. Therefore, if the mainland wants to solve the problem of unifying Taiwan, it cannot avoid the presence of the U.S. factor. Each of the above solutions would address both the U.S. and the island's concerns about Taiwan's democracy. Other factors will be discussed in Section VII.

1. Solutions to Ethnic Issues

In the text of the manifesto and in this annex, we have already talked about ethnic issues several times. The solution to ethnic issues is related to both the first historical task (implementing China's border security as a multi-ethnic state and freeing China from the threat of secession once and for all) and the second historical task (implementing democratic politics and making China truly unified as a constitutional and rule of law community as well as a multi-ethnic cultural community). We would like to emphasize that only the promotion of democratization and transformation can be the fundamental way of solving the problem of national harmony and border security. At the same time, given the potential risks of secession facing the country, it is again necessary to retain a strong central government throughout the political transformation process. The resolution of ethnic issues and the implementation of ethnic autonomy must be carried out under the premise of national unity.

We believe that the general principle of the current Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional Ethnic Autonomy is good: "Regional ethnic autonomy is the implementation of regional autonomy, the establishment of autonomous organs, and the exercise of the right of autonomy in places where various ethnic minorities live together under the unified leadership of the state. The implementation of regional ethnic autonomy embodies the spirit of the State fully respecting and guaranteeing the right of each minority nationality to manage its own internal affairs and reflects the State's insistence on implementing the principles of equality, unity and common prosperity of all ethnic groups." This law also emphasizes the need to "guarantee freedom of religious belief for citizens of all nationalities."

Currently, the most sensitive ethnic issues are in Xinjiang and Tibet. The reason for this is, first of all, the lack of genuine implementation of the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy at all levels of government, from the central to the local level. For this we strongly appeal for:

• Respect for the religious freedom of Tibetans, Uighurs and other ethnic minorities, and restrictions and suppression of independent religious activities should be stopped.
• The "re-education camps" in Xinjiang should be stopped immediately. Stop punishing and suppressing human rights criticism in the name of "anti-terrorism" and "anti-extremism", which is creating a new human rights disaster.
• Respect the language and cultural traditions of ethnic areas and the right to cultural transmission. Bilingual education in primary and secondary schools should be preserved, and the promotion of learning the national language (Chinese) should not be accompanied by the banning of local ethnic languages.
• The cadres in ethnic areas should be trusted and used, and the right to autonomy in ethnic areas should be truly implemented.

In addition to the above appeals, we would like to propose the following adjustments to the administrative divisions of the Xinjiang and Tibetan regions for the long-term peace and stability of these two regions:

• Xinjiang:

The current Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region should be abolished, and the former autonomous region should be divided into three parts: a Uighur autonomous province should be established in the south with Kashgar as the center; a Kazakh autonomous province should be established in the northwest with Ili as the center; and Urumqi should be established as a central municipality with a multi-ethnic population. The existing Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps to be abolished, and each agricultural division could be turned into a local administrative institution at the county level.

• Tibet

Retain the existing Tibet Autonomous Region and rename it as Weizang Autonomous Province; set up Kangba Autonomous Province in Tibetan areas of Sichuan and Yunnan; set up Anduo Autonomous Province in Tibetan areas of Qinghai and Gansu; and set up Xining as a central municipality with a multi-ethnic population. We suggest that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China should instruct the diplomatic department to negotiate with India for the recovery of the Dawang region in southern Tibet (the rest of southern Tibet can be ceded to India in exchange for the recovery of the Dawang region) as a Tibetan autonomous special administrative region, and welcome those Tibetans in exile to return from India and implement the democratic system of the former Tibetan government-in-exile in the special administrative region and gradually extend it to other Tibetan regions.

We also propose the implementation of religious autonomy for the whole of Tibet and the return of the autonomy of religious affairs to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, inviting him to return to the Potala Palace. The administration of Tibet should remain the responsibility of the autonomous provinces, but the policy of regional national autonomy should be further implemented.

VII. Reorienting Foreign Policy and International Strategy

As shown in the text of the manifesto, as China has not yet achieved democratization, China's relationship with the United States and other Western countries is doubly tense because of the ideological confrontation and the geopolitical conflict between China and the United States as the "No. 2" and "No. 1" countries. Moreover, with the rise of China, China's internal problems, such as the Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan issues listed above,have also become highly externalized. We do not deny the complexity of the issues at hand. On some occasions, China's rise as a nation-state has collided with the suppression of the world's "No. 1", the United States, and this nation-state and its geopolitical level of suppression is hidden under the guise of democracy, claiming that it is the opposition of a democratic state to a totalitarian state, which seems to occupy the moral high ground. On the other hand, we must acknowledge that the current one-party autocracy in China is indeed an obstacle to China's integration into the world's democratic family, and to the achievement of more effective global governance. This double contradiction must be resolved. We hold that the two issues - defending the legitimate right of nation-states to rise peacefully and confronting the urgent need for democratic political construction - should be confronted head-on and together. On the one hand, we should negotiate with the United States and the West on the issue of geopolitical and economic interests and fight for the legitimate rights of the nation-state in a direct manner; on the other hand, China should take the initiative to take a step forward in the construction of democracy and start the great process of democratic transformation. In this way, this double international contradiction can be resolved in one fell swoop, bringing new opportunities to the world and long-lasting peace to China. This is the general idea that we hope will lead the Chinese Communist Party to change its international strategic thinking.

In terms of relations with the West, we suggest:

• Stop regarding Western democracies such as the United States as ideological enemies. It is true that the language of Chinese diplomacy has long since stopped expressing itself in this way, and instead often accuses the other side of "Cold War mentality" in its human rights criticism. But as intellectuals with long experience in the system, we know that it is precisely the Chinese Communist Party itself that has maintained a "Cold War mentality” instead. Once the political transition begins, such traditional thinking should also be changed.

• There are many cultural elements or administrative experiences in China's national governance that go beyond the party-state political system, and they are a valuable asset to the world. Exchanging these useful experiences will only be possible after the completion of China's democratization. In this regard, Chinese diplomats and foreign policy makers need to have a longer-term perspective. When dealing with Western countries, they should practice broad-mindedness and ambition.

• Once China transforms into a democracy, the world’s political landscape will be fundamentally changed. Although this does not mean that China's geopolitical conflicts with Western countries will no longer exist, the convergence of social systems will indeed facilitate better cooperation with countries or regions such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Australia, and will also be conducive to the construction of China's peripheral security as a nation-state.

The following section will focus on how to break the five major geopolitical interest chess games between China and the United States. It should be emphasized that when geopolitical interests are entangled with institutional conflicts, we should take the lead in solving our own institutional problems mentioned above, so that we can fundamentally resolve the deep-seated contradictions in geopolitical conflicts.

There are actually five major strategic chess games being played between China and the United States in Asia, namely the Taiwan issue (see Section V above for solutions), the issue of Sino-U.S.-North Korea relations, the issue of Sino-U.S.-Japanese relations, the issue of the South China Sea, and the issue of Sino-U.S.-Indian relations. It also indirectly involves the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and Australia, in thestrategic security of both the U.S. and China in the entire Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, in order to fundamentally solve the problemsthat arise from these five major geo-interest chess games, all issues must be considered in an integrated way and solved in a joint manner. For the U.S., it is the question of its traditional strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region with China, and for China, it is the question of achieving the security of strategic resource transportation as well as homeland security with the U.S. here. To put it bluntly, it is a conflict between the U.S.’s desire to maintain its traditional strategic encirclement of China, and China's desire to break out of this strategic encirclement. This issue was not evident at the end of the last century, but during this century, and especially in recent years, China and the United States have been playing a fierce game, which could even evolve into a hot war on any one of these issues. In order to avoid conflict, we have arrived at the moment when both powers have to re-examine this issue. Between the great powers, it is difficult to concede interests, but interests can be exchanged, substituted, and a win-win situation rather than a zero-sum game created. In the following, we will try to resolve the chess game and see if the following scenario can untangle the knot between the two sides and let them move towards each other.

The core of the five games seems to be a simple issue of geopolitical conflict, but in fact it contains the meaning of institutional evolution. We understand that the Chinese Communist Party is promoting the "China model" and striving to expand Chinese influence. But from another perspective, this is actually the CCP's strategic response to U.S. threats and containment. This security dilemma is a two-way interaction. We believe that as long as China has security on its periphery, the CCP will be less likely to suppress internal dissent and internal institutional reform will be more likely to be on the agenda. As the middle class grows, the issue of domestic affirmative action will inevitably become more prominent, and China will not violate the historical rule that "the middle class brings democracy”. China's efforts to change its own system are the key to making these five games work. Specific moves are only tactical responses. The core of geopolitical strategy and great wisdom is to turn enemies into friends, as Mao Zedong did in attracting Nixon, to bring the United States into China's circle of friends, and to establish good neighborly relations with Japan and South Korea.

• North Korea issue

General judgment: The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula affects the security of all of East Asia. A complete resolution of this issue is in China's national interest, in the interests of all East Asian countries, and in the interest of the United States. At a time when the U.S. and China should move from strategic confrontation to strategic cooperation, it is possible for the two countries to give full play to their unique strengths on the North Korea issue and join hands to resolve this persistent problem.

• China and the U.S. first achieve a strategic consensus on resolving the nuclear issue on the peninsula, and on that basis jointly restart the Six-Party Talks on North Korea.
• The U.S. side agrees to include North Korea in China's nuclear protection, and China agrees that the U.S. side will continue to provide nuclear protection to Japan and South Korea.
• China persuades the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons and have them destroyed under the supervision of the five parties; at the same time, in order to meet the DPRK's legitimate security concerns, the U.S. announces its plan to withdraw its troops in South Korea and gradually reduce and eventually completely remove U.S. troops in South Korea.
• China to persuade and help the DPRK to initiate reform and opening up by proposing a 20-year investment and development plan for the DPRK and its general integration into China's northeastern economic sphere, providing the DPRK with a new strategic market and source of investment. The U.S., Japan, South Korea, and Russia could all join the DPRK's reform and opening process by establishing their own cooperative Free Trade Zone in the DPRK. The DPRK's nationwide infrastructure construction would be competitively bid for by all five parties, with equal benefits.
• China, the U.S., Russia, and Japan express their simultaneous hopes for the south and north of the peninsula to start the process of peaceful reunification of the DPRK when the economic level and social management of the north reaches about half of that of the south after 20 years of reform and opening up, and the international community should support this.
• As the denuclearization and reform and opening up of the peninsula begin, Japan-Russia relations (the Four Northern Islands issue), Japan-Korea relations (the comfort women issue and the Takeshima/Dokdo issue), inter-Korean-Japanese relations (the history and the abducted Japanese issue), and Sino-Japanese relations (the Diaoyu Island issue, discussed in detail in the next subsection) are also expected to be advanced, resolved, or improved at the same time, encouraged by the resolution of the denuclearization of the peninsula, laying the foundation for the realization of permanent peace in East Asia.
• While North Korea starts the process of economic reform and opening up, China and the U.S. can further push it to carry out democratization and reform.

• Diaoyu Islands Issue and China-Japan-U.S. Relations

The Diaoyu Islands involve a territorial dispute between China and Japan that has not been resolved so far. China considers the Diaoyu Islands as inherently Chinese territory and part of the islands attached to Taiwan, which have been included in the scope of maritime defense since the Ming Dynasty and were explicitly placed under the administrative jurisdiction of the local government of Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty. Japan claims that the Senkaku islands have always been a part of the southwest islands of Japanese territory in history. Since 1885, the Japanese government, through the Okinawa prefectural government and other means, has conducted several field surveys of the Senkaku Islands and carefully confirmed that they were not only uninhabited, but also that there was no trace of Qing rule, and on this basis, they were officially incorporated into Japanese territory on January 14, 1895. The Japanese side particularly emphasized that the Senkaku Islands were not included in the cession of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan by the Qing Dynasty under Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki concluded in April 1895. What Japan did not mention was that the Ryukyu Islands, which constituted Japan's "southwestern islands," were originally a Chinese tributary state, and the Japanese Satsuma clan conquered the Ryukyus in 1609 but maintained the apparent tributary relationship between the Ryukyus and Beijing. Due to the declining power of China, Japan officially entered the Ryukyus in 1875, terminated its tribute relationship with Beijing, and changed the Ryukyus to the Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. This led to the subsequent story of the discovery and "identification of the Senkaku Islands" by the Okinawa prefectural government, according to Japan. The Diaoyu Islands also have a relationship with the United States. Under the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan agreed to the United States of America proposing to the United Nations that the southwestern islands, south of 29 degrees north latitude, be placed under a trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole governing party. In 1971 the United States transferred authority to Japan and committed itself to security obligations in the area in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, signed in 1960, "to act in response to a common danger" (Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty). Since then the Diaoyu Islands have been under Japan's de facto control. After the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and Japan in 1972, the Chinese side had a long history of low-profile handling of the Diaoyu Islands issue due to the general situation of Sino-Japanese relations.

In 2012, Japan's Tokyo Metropolitan Government tried to buy the Diaoyu Islands to force the Japanese central government to "nationalize" the islands, leading to a rapid escalation of the sovereignty dispute between China and Japan over the islands. China established the East China Sea Identification Zone in 2013 and stepped up patrols of the Diaoyu Islands. Although the United States does not take a position on the sovereignty of the islands, it is de facto involved in this conflict as an ally of Japan and has treaty obligations.

We believe that in the face of a territorial dispute such as the Diaoyu Islands, China and Japan, as two great powers and close neighbors, should show the strength of theirwisdom and temperament, as there is no need to jeopardize the overall relationship between the two countries over an uninhabited island. China has no desire to pursue the historical entanglement of Okinawa, and we share this attitude. We also believe that the strategic focus of the CPC Central Committee is to recover Taiwan and it may not wish to have a conflict with Japan in the East China Sea. If the sovereignty issue cannot be solved for a while, it is a good idea to "put aside the dispute and develop together". But the premise is to build trust. China and Japan need to build trust, and China and the United States also need to build trust.

（3）South China Sea issue

The complexity of the South China Sea issue lies in the fact that there are many sovereignty claimants who are involved in this huge maritime area, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, China and other countries. The "U-shaped line" defined by the Chinese, was created in the Republic of China era (mapped into the Chinese maritime border in 1934 and formally established in 1948, first as the eleven-section line, and then in 1953 China ceded two sections to Vietnam, while the ROC government on Taiwan still insisted on the eleven-section line) and is now known as the "South China Sea maritime rights and interests boundary line". After the huge economic value of the South China Sea was discovered in the 1970s, Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries started to fight for the Nanshaislands and reefs before China joined them in the late 1980s, and now each of these countries controls severalNansha islands and reefs. To resolve disputes in the South China Sea and find ways for countries to live together peacefully, on November 4, 2002, China and the foreign ministers and representatives of ASEAN countries signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, willing to seek ways to build mutual trust in a spirit of cooperation and understanding, including cooperation on marine environmental protection, search and assistance, and combating transnational crime.

Since 2013, China has accelerated the expansion and militarization of the Nansha islands, a move related to the overall strategy of defending China's maritime transportation routes and the strategic goal of resolving the Taiwan issue, rather than focusing solely on economic interests in the South China Sea. However, these initiatives have naturally caused discontent among countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, and on July 12, 2016, an international arbitration tribunal ruled that the PRC's conflicting maritime sovereignty claims with the Philippines had no basis in international law, but this ruling was rejected by the Chinese government. In recent years, China and the parties concerned have been promoting consultations on the "Code of Conduct for the South China Sea" in the hope of controlling the situation in the South China Sea and maintaining peace and security in the region. The recent signing (November 15, 2020) of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement between the ten ASEAN countries and 15 other countries, including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, marks the largest free trade agreement in the world and should contribute to the geopolitical stability of the region.

We believe that China, as a regional power, should first practice the spirit of joint consultation, mutual understanding and accommodation that it has always advocated, and reasonably resolve the relevant issues in the South China Sea sovereignty dispute in accordance with international law. If a solution is not possible, the idea of "setting aside disputes and joint development" can be adopted. When the military threat from extraterritorial countries decreases, the militarization of China's Spratly islands and reefs should also be slowed down or stopped in order to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation with neighboring countries in the South China Sea.

（4）India Issue

India and China are both great powers in Asia. The territorial dispute between India and China has historical roots in the British Empire's covetousness and ambition for China's Tibetan region when it ruled India, and the 1914 "McMahon Line" was a product of this ambition. After India's independence, it maintained its territorial claims from the Anglo-Indian era, and although India and China had good relations in the 1950s, a large-scale armed conflict broke out on the border in 1962 over the territorial issue. Until recently, tensions and military confrontations have continued to occur in several key disputed areas along the Sino-Indian border.

Sino-Indian relations have been further destabilized by the recent efforts of the Trump administration to forge a "Four Nations Alliance" between the United States, Japan, Australia and India. In theory, this is a strategic alliance based on a rallying cry of shared values. Not long ago (October 27, 2020), Secretary of State Pompeo visited India and stated that "the United States and India must work together to address the threats to security and freedom posed by China”. However, in our view, such a call is dangerous. The conflict between India and China has never been about regime nature or ideology, but rather about territory and borders in the sense of nation-states, and at most is an economic and geopolitical game between the two powers. Pompeo's appeal is undoubtedly telling the Chinese that the United States is on India's side in the territorial and border disputes between China and India and is "pulling the strings”. We do not believe that such an approach will really contribute to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

We believe that it is in the interests of both sides for China and India, as nation states, to get along amicably. China and India should strengthen cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS countries. Regarding the border issue, we know that 90,000 square kilometers of land in the eastern section of the Sino-Indian border is actually under the control of the Indian side. We also know that in the 1960s, the Chinese government offered the Indian government a deal to give up 90,000 square kilometers of land in the eastern section in exchange for recognition of the land under Chinese control in the western section of Aksai Chin, but the Indian side did not accept the offer. Now that time has changed, both China and India should show generosity over the territorial issue. We suggest that the Chinese government no longer demand the recovery of all the Indian-controlled land in the eastern section, but only demand the recovery of the Dawang region as a special administrative region for the Chinese government to welcome those Tibetans in exile who would return to China from India and continue the democratic system of the former Tibetan government-in-exile there. This would also serve as a good model for the democratic transition in other regions of China.

Finally, with regard to "building a community of human destiny," we believe that such a community of human destiny will only be possible when all major countries in the world have established modern democratic systems. China's current declaration of a "community of human destiny" is still more rhetorical in terms of the party-state’s valuesdiplomacy. For such rhetorical elements to become real elements, and for China's diplomacy to become a genuine moral pursuit, China's democratic transformation is imperative.

After democratization, China's values diplomacy will more authentically reflect the fine heritage of Chinese cultural traditions, and in so doing will be dedicated to contemporary humanity. We believe that at that time, China, as one of the representatives of the ancient civilizations of the East, will complement the modern Western civilizations and together support the edifice of a truly modern human civilization. China's relations with Russia, with the countries of the Middle East, with Central and Southern Europe, with Africa, and with Latin America will also find their place in such a new pattern.

VIII. Summary

The main points of this proposal can be summarized in 17 points as follows:

• The two major historical tasks of China in modern times should be the general basis for summarizing China's history, judging the current situation, evaluating progress and failures, and defining the future direction. The 100 years of the Chinese Communist Party should also be evaluated within this framework.
• The CPC has made great achievements in leading the Chinese people to build a nation-state and accomplish its first historical task. However, China's nation-state building is far from truly complete. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not yet unified, Hong Kong is in turmoil, the situation in ethnic areas is tense, and there is still a possibility that China will be divided in the future. China's external environment is also insecure, and China is in a dual, tense, ideological and geopolitical competition with the United States and other Western countries.
• Only by advancing democratization and completing its second historical task can these challenges be truly resolved. A democratic China will be better able to deal with internal conflicts, resolve internal crises, improve nation-state building, and promote nation-state development. A democratic China will also be applauded by the world, because only when all major countries in the world have established democratic systems will global governance become smoother and less obstructive, and the common home of mankind will have a better future.
• Don't be afraid to make "disruptive mistakes". The test of whether a party or a leadership group is visionary and capable of achieving truly great achievements in history is precisely whether they can break through the limitations of history and break free from the cocoon of tradition they have woven.
• The CCP's own reform should complete two transformations: conceptual transformation and organizational transformation. The conceptual transformation refers to the CCP's abandonment of the Marxist cognitive structure and the Leninist logic of dictatorship in favor of the universal values of constitutional democracy and the interchangeability of public power as a proper part of modern human evolution and political civilization. Organizational transformation means that the CPC, through its own efforts, gradually deconstructs the original Leninist party organizational structure and organizational system and implements organizational restructuring according to the principles of political parties in modern democratic societies, so that the party becomes a brand-new party that can operate and act within the framework of a constitutional democratic system.
• Accordingly, the party may also consider changing its name. There are two options: one is to change the name to "Chinese Symbiotic Party" to emphasize the party's identity as an advocate and leader of national rejuvenation; the other is to change the name to "Chinese Social Democratic Party" to retain the party's left-wing characteristics, while manifesting its unique presence in the future Chinese constitutional system.
• Gradually liberalize speech to allow constructive opinions independent of official ideas to enter into public discussion. End strict controls in education, the humanities and social science research. Cultivating a healthy national spirit and character is an important foundation for political transformation.
• Advance the reform of the legislature and political consultative bodies at all levels. The future elected house can still be called the National People's Congress, or it can be renamed the National Assembly. The National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference should be reorganized into a super-party body based on the principle of intellectual knowledge, and in the future constitutional system, it can be renamed the Senate or the Committee of the Wise.
• The core of judicial reform remains the issue of judicial independence. The problem of party power interfering with legal power cannot be sustained in the long run.
• Construct a new central-local relationship according to the principle of dual-track republicanism and improve local autonomy and large state governance.
• The key to the reunification of the two sides of the Strait is that the people and politicians on both sides of the Strait can face up to history and reality andachieve political reconciliation with a generous and tolerant heart. There are three solutions: "Chinese Confederation", "Chinese Third Republic", and "Taiwan Special Autonomous Province".
• There must be respect for the religious freedom of Tibetans, Uighurs and other ethnic minorities, and a stop to restricting and suppressing independent religious activities. The "re-education camps" in Xinjiang should be stopped immediately. No more punishment and suppression of human rights criticism in the name of "anti-terrorism" and "anti-extremism, to avoid the creation of a new human rights disaster.
• The resolution of ethnic issues and the implementation of ethnic autonomy must be carried out on the premise of preventing national division and ensuring national unity.
• Defending the legitimate right of nation-states to rise peacefully and recognizing universal values and facing up to the urgent need for democratic political construction should be the new starting point for the CPC to adjust its international strategy and formulate foreign policy.
• Once China transforms into a democratic state, the world political landscape will undergo a fundamental change.
• The domestic political transformation will also promote China's national security, build a friendlier neighboring environment, and defuse tensions in Northeast Asia and the whole Asian region.
• China's current declaration of a "community of human destiny" is still more rhetorical in terms of the party-state’s values diplomacy. To turn such rhetorical elements into real ones, and to turn them into the real moral pursuit of Chinese diplomacy, China's democratic transformation is also imperative. After democratization, China's values diplomacy will more authentically reflect the fine heritage of Chinese cultural traditions, and in so doing will be dedicated to contemporary humanity.

It is not difficult to see that this proposal is a moderate political gradualistor reformist proposal. We do not want to see another revolution in China at any point in the future. Many revolutions in China's history have in fact had difficulty establishing and consolidating advanced institutions and have fallen into a historical cycle of dynastic change or mere social destruction by the rebellions at the bottom. We think that the Chinese Communist Party and society as a whole should think beyond revolution and aim at constitutional democracy to promote social progress and gradually improve the democratic system through fine social improvements.

This proposal is also a proposal to affirm national revival. However, we still have to mentionthat nationalism is a double-edged sword, which helps to rally people's minds and unite them in a struggle; but when used too much, it can also develop into the chauvinism of great powers. China should step out of its far-left or far-right philosophy, stop following far-left communism, and not allow itself to fall into Nazi-style far-right nationalism, populism and racism. We should return to the traditional Chinese concept of the Middle Way. The Middle Way philosophy is an attempt to take into account the various interests of, and respond to the concerns of, various groups about China's problems. We believe that the two major historical tasks and expectations for the transformation of the CCP represent the voices of the majority of the people and party members, and also include the demands of constitutional democrats, the demands of liberal intellectuals, the demands of civil rights groups and lawyers, the voices of those who are looking forward to the vindication of the June Fourth Incident, the voices of those who are looking forward to the protection of Taiwan's hard-won democratic system in the process of reunification with the motherland, the calls for religious freedom and a high degree of autonomy for ethnic regions, and so on. We believe that this proposal accommodates the demands of the people of Taiwan. We also believe that this proposal accommodates the legitimate concerns of the West, especially the United States, about China's democratization and regional securitization.

However, we oppose the following positions - and thus will not represent their demands: 1) the claims of the Maoist Left regarding the New Cultural Revolution; 2) the extreme nationalist positions of the New Left and the Maoist Left (duel with imperialism, rush to armed reunification with Taiwan, etc.); 3) the positions of Hong Kong and Taiwan independence; 4) the positions of extreme anti-communist and anti-China factions at home and abroad that seek to draw in foreign enemies to invade; 5) the positions of Tibetan independence, Xinjiang independence, and all kinds of dismemberment and division of China; and 6) all kinds of reverse racist positions that disdain Chinese culture and ethnicity.

The world is facing a great change that has not been seen in the 500 years since the Great Age of Navigation.

An ancient Eastern nation is rising.

Its democratization will benefit itself as well as mankind.

We hope that the Communist Party of China will seize the opportunity of history and take advantage of the momentum of transformation to lay the foundation for the Chinese nation to be safe, strong and "harmonious" in the world, and to let the light of democracy and freedom shine on the Chinese land.

Yours sincerely,

China Strategic Analysis Center

January 1, 2021, New York, USA

Written by: Li Weidong, Zhang Boshu

Panelists: Li Weidong, Zhang Boshu, and Deng Yuwen

Acknowledgement of scholars who participated in the discussion: Liu Yawei, Chen Jun, GuWeiqun, Rong Wei, Zhang Aimei, and others.