ForeignAffairsMag在2021-06-21~2021-06-27的言论
- 7: Xi Jinping’s Race to Consolidate Power in China, submitted on 2021-06-23 03:31:43+08:00.
- 8: A Measure Short of War: The Return of Great-Power Subversion, submitted on 2021-06-25 00:03:12+08:00.
7: Xi Jinping’s Race to Consolidate Power in China, submitted on 2021-06-23 03:31:43+08:00.
—– 7.1 —–2021-06-23 03:38:36+08:00:
[SS from the essay by Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.]
By narrowing his vision to the coming ten to 15 years, Xi has instilled a sense of focus and determination in the Chinese political system that may well enable China to overcome long-standing domestic challenges and achieve a new level of global centrality. If Xi succeeds, China will position itself as an architect of an emerging era of multipolarity, its economy will escape the so-called middle-income trap, and the technological capabilities of its manufacturing sector and military will rival those of more developed countries.
Yet ambition and execution are not the same thing, and Xi has now placed China on a risky trajectory, one that threatens the achievements his predecessors secured in the post-Mao era. His belief that the CCP must guide the economy and that Beijing should rein in the private sector will constrain the country’s future economic growth. His demand that party cadres adhere to ideological orthodoxy and demonstrate personal loyalty to him will undermine the governance system’s flexibility and competency. His emphasis on an expansive definition of national security will steer the country in a more inward and paranoid direction. His unleashing of “Wolf Warrior” nationalism will produce a more aggressive and isolated China. Finally, Xi’s increasingly singular position within China’s political system will forestall policy alternatives and course corrections, a problem made worse by his removal of term limits and the prospect of his indefinite rule.
8: A Measure Short of War: The Return of Great-Power Subversion, submitted on 2021-06-25 00:03:12+08:00.
—– 8.1 —–2021-06-25 00:19:49+08:00:
[SS from the essay by Jill Kastner, an independent researcher based in London and William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.]
The 2016 election may have been a rude wake-up call, but no one should have been surprised. Russia’s operation was just the latest instance of a pattern that stretches back in history as far as the eye can see. Subversion—domestic interference to undermine or manipulate a rival—has always been a part of great-power politics. What stands out as an anomaly is the brief period of extraordinary U.S. dominance, beginning after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the United States appeared immune to malicious meddling by peer competitors, in large part because there weren’t any. Now, that dominance is beginning to wane. Great-power competition has returned—and with it, so has great-power subversion.
There’s a reason states have turned to subversion so often throughout history: it’s much less costly and risky than conventional statecraft. Subversion to weaken a rival is a cheap alternative to balancing and war. Subversion to change a rival’s policy is a cheap alternative to coercion, deterrence, or diplomacy. Why raise an army and invade an adversary when you can spread propaganda, pay off politicians, or dispatch Internet trolls to achieve subtler but still tangible gains? Why entangle yourself in risky alliances or bankrupt yourself building up the means to contain a rival if you can simply join forces with a faction on the inside, eager for your help and intent on directing that rival’s power elsewhere? Even when subversion achieves less than traditional statecraft would, it can still be attractive. After all, in the competitive environment of great-power rivalry, each state faces incentives to weaken the other. And since great powers dominate international politics, even a small effect on a big target might be worth the effort.
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