• 14: Becoming Strong: The New Chinese Foreign Policy, submitted on 2021-07-12 22:57:52+08:00.
• 15: Antimonopoly Power: The Global Fight Against Corporate Concentration, submitted on 2021-07-14 01:28:20+08:00.
• 16: Hong Kong and the Limits of Decoupling: Why America Struggles to Punish China for Its Repression, submitted on 2021-07-15 04:14:11+08:00.
• 17: Japan Is Indispensable Again: The Need for Economic Security Is Reviving Washington’s Alliance With Tokyo, submitted on 2021-07-16 12:45:13+08:00.

14: Becoming Strong: The New Chinese Foreign Policy, submitted on 2021-07-12 22:57:52+08:00.

—– 14.1 —–2021-07-12 22:59:04+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Yan Xuetong, a Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University.]

Biden’s election initially raised hopes among Chinese officials and media that Washington’s China policies were due for a fundamental rethink. That optimism quickly faded. Instead of a radical break, Biden’s policies to date are in many ways a continuation of his predecessor’s confrontational approach. As a result, U.S.-Chinese relations are unlikely to grow any less tense or competitive than they have been in recent years.

The Biden administration’s forays into exclusive multilateralism—that is, its attempts to form issue-based coalitions in opposition to China on technology and human rights—are bound to be a particular source of tension in the years ahead. Beijing views this as the most serious external threat to its political security and the biggest obstacle to its national rejuvenation. U.S.-led anti-China technology coalitions are an obstacle on China’s path to technological superiority, and similar ideological coalitions will encourage secessionists in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Both involve core interests on which China will not make concessions.

15: Antimonopoly Power: The Global Fight Against Corporate Concentration, submitted on 2021-07-14 01:28:20+08:00.

—– 15.1 —–2021-07-14 01:37:05+08:00:

[SS from the article by Barry C. Lynn, Director of the Open Markets Institute and the author of Liberty From All Masters: The New American Autocracy vs. the Will of the People.]

The United States should begin to use the principles and tools of competition to limit its dependence on any single foreign source of the goods and services on which Americans depend. U.S. officials should use similar tools to eliminate the ability of technology monopolists to disrupt news and information systems in the United States and abroad. Such an approach would force Americans to relearn the core paradox of liberalism: that although liberalism aims to limit the role of government in the political economy and maximize individual liberty, it is a system that must be imposed on corporations and other nations and then protected with the full power of the state. From the first days of the republic, antimonopolism has been the key to the United States’ strategic vision—the broad tool that the country has used to build and protect liberal democracy at home and around the world.

16: Hong Kong and the Limits of Decoupling: Why America Struggles to Punish China for Its Repression, submitted on 2021-07-15 04:14:11+08:00.

—– 16.1 —–2021-07-15 04:15:30+08:00:

[SS from the article by Kurt Tong, a Partner at the Asia Group and served as U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong from 2016 to 2019.]

The urge in Washington, London, and other capitals to punish China for what it has done in Hong Kong is natural and palpable, but outside powers lack leverage to influence Chinese policy. The uncomfortable truth is that Hong Kong, despite the hollowing out of its democratic system, remains tremendously useful to the United States and other Western powers, and its continued success as a financial market and economic gateway to China remains important for the global economy.
Washington and its partners should lower their expectations and abandon the illusion that the right mixture of punishments will prompt a reversal in Chinese policy.
The goal of leading democracies should instead be to highlight to the rest of the world that China broke its promises, which will have the effect of sowing doubt about Beijing’s trustworthiness and credibility. After all, if it broke its promises to Hong Kong, why believe it won’t do the same elsewhere?

17: Japan Is Indispensable Again: The Need for Economic Security Is Reviving Washington’s Alliance With Tokyo, submitted on 2021-07-16 12:45:13+08:00.

—– 17.1 —–2021-07-16 12:49:25+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Akira Igata, Executive Director and Visiting Professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University and Brad Glosserman, Deputy Director and Visiting Professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University]

That heightened economic competition with China has helped Japan reinvigorate its alliance with the United States is not an accident. Over the last several years, the Japanese government—first under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and then under Suga—has honed a new brand of economic statecraft designed to protect the country’s economic interests, limit China’s creeping influence in Asia, and bolster Japanese soft power. Through a combination of enhanced economic intelligence, tighter trade restrictions, and better stewardship of data and emerging technologies, Japan has become a force for economic security in Asia and reinforced its position as an indispensable U.S. ally.