• 33: Fiona Hill: The Kremlin’s Strange Victory. How Putin Exploits American Dysfunction and Fuels American Decline, submitted on 2021-09-28 22:57:08+08:00.
• 34: The Age of America First: Washington’s Flawed New Foreign Policy Consensus, submitted on 2021-09-29 22:48:45+08:00.
• 35: Latin America Needs a New Social Contract: The Region Can’t Go Back to the Grim Pre-COVID Status Quo, submitted on 2021-10-01 23:03:31+08:00.
• 36: Latin America Needs a New Social Contract: The Region Can’t Go Back to the Grim Pre-COVID Status Quo, submitted on 2021-10-01 23:53:02+08:00.

33: Fiona Hill: The Kremlin’s Strange Victory. How Putin Exploits American Dysfunction and Fuels American Decline, submitted on 2021-09-28 22:57:08+08:00.

—– 33.1 —–2021-09-28 23:15:24+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Fiona Hill, author of There Is Nothing for You Here: Finding Opportunity in the Twenty-first Century]

The current U.S.-Russian relationship no longer mirrors the Cold War challenge, even if some geopolitical contours and antagonisms persist. The old U.S. foreign policy approach of balancing deterrence with limited engagement is ill suited to the present task of dealing with Putin’s insecurities. And after Trump’s disastrous performance at Helsinki, it is also clear that the arms control summitry that took the edge off the acute phase of the Cold War and nuclear confrontation can provide little guidance for how to anchor the future relationship. The primary problem for the Biden administration in dealing with Russia is rooted in the domestic politics of the United States and Russia rather than their foreign policies. The two countries have been heading in the same political direction for some of the same reasons over the last several years. They have similar political susceptibilities. The United States will never change Putin and his threat perceptions, because they are deeply personal. Americans will have to change themselves to blunt the effects of Russian political interference campaigns for the foreseeable future. Achieving that goal will require Biden and his team to integrate their approach to Russia with their efforts to shore up American democracy, tackle inequality and racism, and lead the country out of a period of intense division.

The polarization of American society has become a national security threat, acting as a barrier to the collective action necessary for combating catastrophes and thwarting external dangers. Partisan spectacles during the global covid-19 pandemic have undermined the country’s international standing as a model of liberal democracy and eroded its authority on public health. The United States’ inability to get its act together has hindered the projection of American soft power, or what Biden has called “the power of our example.” During my time in the Trump administration, I watched as every peril was politicized and turned into fodder for personal gain and partisan games. Successive national security advisers, cabinet members, and their professional staffs were unable to mount coherent responses or defenses to security issues in the face of personalized, chaotic, and opportunistic conduct at the top.

34: The Age of America First: Washington’s Flawed New Foreign Policy Consensus, submitted on 2021-09-29 22:48:45+08:00.

—– 34.1 —–2021-09-29 22:51:15+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations]

At first glance, the foreign policy of U.S. President Joe Biden could hardly be more different. He professes to value the United States’ traditional allies in Europe and Asia, celebrates multilateralism, and hails his administration’s commitment to a “rules-based international order.” He treats climate change as a serious threat and arms control as an essential tool. He sees the fight of our time as one between democracy and autocracy, pledging to convene what he is calling the Summit for Democracy to reestablish U.S. leadership in the democratic cause. “America is back,” he proclaimed shortly after taking office.
But the differences, meaningful as they are, obscure a deeper truth: there is far more continuity between the foreign policy of the current president and that of the former president than is typically recognized. Critical elements of this continuity arose even before Trump’s presidency, during the administration of Barack Obama, suggesting a longer-term development—a paradigm shift in the United States’ approach to the world. Beneath the apparent volatility, the outlines of a post–post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy are emerging…

The hold of this emerging nationalist approach to the world is clear, accounting for the continuity across administrations as different as those of Obama, Trump, and Biden. Whether it can produce a foreign policy that advances American security, prosperity, and values is another matter entirely.

35: Latin America Needs a New Social Contract: The Region Can’t Go Back to the Grim Pre-COVID Status Quo, submitted on 2021-10-01 23:03:31+08:00.

—– 35.1 —–2021-10-01 23:05:43+08:00:

[Un párrafo del articulo:]

For an example of voters turning to an ill-prepared outsider candidate, consider the recent elections in Peru, Latin America’s fifth most populous country. Eighteen people ran for president and no candidate won more than 20 percent of the vote, forcing a runoff between the two leading vote getters. Ten political parties won seats in the unicameral legislature, with no party securing anywhere near a majority. The country’s political parties are little more than election vehicles. Their bland names—Free Peru, Popular Force, Popular Renewal—hint at the absence of an ideological or programmatic commitment.

36: Latin America Needs a New Social Contract: The Region Can’t Go Back to the Grim Pre-COVID Status Quo, submitted on 2021-10-01 23:53:02+08:00.

—– 36.1 —–2021-10-01 23:56:32+08:00:

[SS from the article by Jorge Castañeda, Professor of Latin American politics at NYU and Forrest Colburn, from CUNY and INCAE Business School]

To foster growth, Latin American governments would do well to take a page from the countries of East Asia, which have prospered by strengthening their industrial sectors and diversifying their economies. Latin America could adapt that strategy by developing exports other than commodities and increasing the national content of manufactured exports. Growth is just part of the equation, however. To build more equitable societies, Latin American governments will need to increase their rates of tax collection.