• 40: The Bomb Will Backfire on Iran: Tehran Will Go Nuclear—and Regret It, submitted on 2021-10-18 22:57:41+08:00.
• 41: The Technopolar Moment: How Digital Powers Will Reshape the Global Order, submitted on 2021-10-19 23:44:41+08:00.
• 42: The New Cold War: America, China, and the Echoes of History, submitted on 2021-10-21 02:05:25+08:00.
• 43: Madeleine Albright: America’s Opportunity to Lead the Fight Against Authoritarianism, submitted on 2021-10-22 23:42:38+08:00.

40: The Bomb Will Backfire on Iran: Tehran Will Go Nuclear—and Regret It, submitted on 2021-10-18 22:57:41+08:00.

—– 40.1 —–2021-10-18 22:59:59+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations]

Once Iran goes nuclear, however, neutralizing the impact of an Iranian bomb should not be Washington’s sole mission: the larger goal should be to finally craft a global consensus against the Islamic Republic. The United States and its allies will have to levy harsh sanctions against the regime and further isolate it by pushing for the United Nations to formally censure Iran. Washington will need to persuade its European allies to sever diplomatic relations with Tehran. Those steps would not shut off all avenues of commerce with Iran: China would continue to purchase some of its oil, for one thing. But Japan and South Korea would need to cease doing so. The United States would also need to further restrict Iran’s commercial relations by stripping the regime of its ability to use the international banking system and repatriate its money from abroad. That would have the effect of reducing the regime to bartering, and a nation of 85 million people cannot live that way forever. The Islamic Republic would not bend—but it might break.

Some might object that a similar strategy has not broken the regime in North Korea, which defied the world by going nuclear in 2006 and has managed to stay in power despite economic and political isolation. But that comparison ignores the vast differences between the two countries. Unlike North Korea, Iran has a rich history of protests and revolutions that have toppled governments. Politics and society in Iran are not nearly as regimented as in North Korea. The regime in Tehran is brutal and oppressive, but it does not exercise the same level of control as the regime in Pyongyang.

41: The Technopolar Moment: How Digital Powers Will Reshape the Global Order, submitted on 2021-10-19 23:44:41+08:00.

—– 41.1 —–2021-10-19 23:46:02+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Ian Bremmer, President of Eurasia Group.]

States have been the primary actors in global affairs for nearly 400 years. That is starting to change, as a handful of large technology companies rival them for geopolitical influence. The aftermath of the January 6 riot serves as the latest proof that Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Twitter are no longer merely large companies; they have taken control of aspects of society, the economy, and national security that were long the exclusive preserve of the state. The same goes for Chinese technology companies, such as Alibaba, ByteDance, and Tencent. Nonstate actors are increasingly shaping geopolitics, with technology companies in the lead. And although Europe wants to play, its companies do not have the size or geopolitical influence to compete with their American and Chinese counterparts.

Most of the analysis of U.S.-Chinese technological competition, however, is stuck in a statist paradigm. It depicts technology companies as foot soldiers in a conflict between hostile countries. But technology companies are not mere tools in the hands of governments. None of their actions in the immediate aftermath of the Capitol insurrection, for instance, came at the behest of the government or law enforcement. These were private decisions made by for-profit companies exercising power over code, servers, and regulations under their control. These companies are increasingly shaping the global environment in which governments operate. They have huge influence over the technologies and services that will drive the next industrial revolution, determine how countries project economic and military power, shape the future of work, and redefine social contracts.
It is time to start thinking of the biggest technology companies as similar to states. These companies exercise a form of sovereignty over a rapidly expanding realm that extends beyond the reach of regulators: digital space.

42: The New Cold War: America, China, and the Echoes of History, submitted on 2021-10-21 02:05:25+08:00.

—– 42.1 —–2021-10-21 02:13:04+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Hal Brands, Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University and John Lewis Gaddis, Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University]

It’s no longer debatable that the United States and China, tacit allies during the last half of the last Cold War, are entering their own new cold war: Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared it, and a rare bipartisan consensus in the United States has accepted the challenge. What, then, might previous contests—the one and only Cold War and the many earlier cold wars—suggest about this one?
The future is, of course, less knowable than the past, but it’s not in all respects unknowable. Time will continue to pass, the law of gravity will still apply, and none of us will outlive our physiological term limits. Are similarly reliable knowns shaping the emerging cold war? If so, what unknowns lurk within them? Thucydides had such predictabilities and surprises in mind when he cautioned, 24 centuries ago, that the future would resemble the past but not in all respects reflect it—even as he also argued that the greatest single war of his time revealed timeless truths about all wars to come.

43: Madeleine Albright: America’s Opportunity to Lead the Fight Against Authoritarianism, submitted on 2021-10-22 23:42:38+08:00.

—– 43.1 —–2021-10-22 23:56:41+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Madeleine Albright. She served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from 1993 to 1997 and as U.S. Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001.]

Because people today are more connected and demanding than ever before, governing is harder than it has ever been. Compared to in the past, younger generations have easier access to education, more awareness of one another, less respect for traditional hierarchies, and an ingrained belief in their own autonomy. People of all ages observe what others have—and want more. Technology has created in many a thirst for speed and a dearth of patience. Citizens increasingly question what leaders say and are drawn to voices that reject present conditions and promise something better.
These factors have fueled the rise of demagogues, but they can also undermine the staying power of authoritarian regimes old enough to embody the status quo. There is a limit to how long an autocrat can sustain popularity simply by comparing himself to a despised predecessor. In Russia, Putin is rarely contrasted anymore with the hapless Boris Yeltsin; in Venezuela, few remember the ineffectual civilians who governed before Hugo Chávez; Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega can hardly justify his broken promises by pointing to Anastasio Somoza, who was deposed in 1979. Hungary’s Orban has ruled for more than a decade, and Turkey’s Erdogan for nearly two, so neither can easily escape responsibility for the beleaguered condition of his country…
Today, more talented women and men are striving in more places on behalf of democratic principles than ever before. The National Democratic Institute, a nongovernmental U.S. organization that supports democratic institutions overseas, is working with around 28,000 local partners in more than 70 countries on five continents. Despite democracy’s struggles, popular participation in shaping public agendas is up, not down. Strides toward gender equality have contributed to this rising level of commitment, as has the fact that a record percentage of today’s young adults grew up in relative freedom. They consider self-expression a right to be exercised regularly and regardless of obstacles. Far from giving up on democracy, they are generating a steady stream of proposals for its improvement, including more rigorous term limits, reforms of campaign financing, equal access for candidates to the media, ranked-choice voting, citizen assemblies, referendums, shorter campaigns, and steps to make it simpler or more complicated to establish new political parties. Not all such ideas are likely to prove both practical and beneficial, but the energy they attract is evidence of a hunger that no dictator can satisfy.