• 44: The International Order Isn’t Ready for the Climate Crisis: The Case for a New Planetary Politics, submitted on 2021-10-28 00:39:32+08:00.
• 45: The International Order Isn’t Ready for the Climate Crisis: The Case for a New Planetary Politics, submitted on 2021-10-28 01:32:57+08:00.
• 46: The Fall and Rise of Techno-Globalism: Democracies Should Not Let the Dream of the Open Internet Die, submitted on 2021-10-29 01:26:51+08:00.
• 47: The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics, submitted on 2021-10-30 02:28:12+08:00.

44: The International Order Isn’t Ready for the Climate Crisis: The Case for a New Planetary Politics, submitted on 2021-10-28 00:39:32+08:00.

—– 44.1 —–2021-10-28 00:44:32+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow in Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations.]

Planetary politics cannot succeed without multilateral institutions and global governance that can foster the unprecedented international cooperation demanded by the intertwined climate and biodiversity crises. The most pressing near-term priority is to close the yawning gap between the desultory negotiating process hosted by the UN and the stark reality outlined by the organization’s own Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which envisions catastrophic warming unless the world takes immediate, dramatic steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There is no conceivable way for the world to meet the emission targets established by the UN’s 2015 Paris climate accord, however, without massive investments in terrestrial and marine ecosystems capable of serving as carbon storehouses. Accordingly, governments should make expanding such carbon sinks a centerpiece of their contributions to the Paris goals.
Trade is another area in which global governance must adapt. One path forward would be to reform global trade rules to allow countries committed to decarbonization to discriminate against countries that insist on conducting business as usual, without running afoul of the World Trade Organization. The most effective solution would be for WTO members to adopt a blanket climate waiver that permits so-called border adjustments for carbon in the form of taxes on imports and rebates on exports. This would permit EU countries, for instance, to penalize imports of carbon-intensive cement from Russia and Turkey and reward other trading partners that use greener production methods. Such an arrangement would encourage the formation of “climate clubs,” made up of countries committed to reducing emissions and thus eligible for nondiscriminatory treatment.

45: The International Order Isn’t Ready for the Climate Crisis: The Case for a New Planetary Politics, submitted on 2021-10-28 01:32:57+08:00.

—– 45.1 —–2021-10-28 01:33:05+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow in Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations.]
Planetary politics cannot succeed without multilateral institutions and global governance that can foster the unprecedented international cooperation demanded by the intertwined climate and biodiversity crises. The most pressing near-term priority is to close the yawning gap between the desultory negotiating process hosted by the UN and the stark reality outlined by the organization’s own Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which envisions catastrophic warming unless the world takes immediate, dramatic steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There is no conceivable way for the world to meet the emission targets established by the UN’s 2015 Paris climate accord, however, without massive investments in terrestrial and marine ecosystems capable of serving as carbon storehouses. Accordingly, governments should make expanding such carbon sinks a centerpiece of their contributions to the Paris goals.
Trade is another area in which global governance must adapt. One path forward would be to reform global trade rules to allow countries committed to decarbonization to discriminate against countries that insist on conducting business as usual, without running afoul of the World Trade Organization. The most effective solution would be for WTO members to adopt a blanket climate waiver that permits so-called border adjustments for carbon in the form of taxes on imports and rebates on exports. This would permit EU countries, for instance, to penalize imports of carbon-intensive cement from Russia and Turkey and reward other trading partners that use greener production methods. Such an arrangement would encourage the formation of “climate clubs,” made up of countries committed to reducing emissions and thus eligible for nondiscriminatory treatment.

46: The Fall and Rise of Techno-Globalism: Democracies Should Not Let the Dream of the Open Internet Die, submitted on 2021-10-29 01:26:51+08:00.

—– 46.1 —–2021-10-29 01:28:46+08:00:

[SS from the essay by Graham Webster, a Research Scholar at the Stanford University Cyber Policy Center, and Justin Sherman a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative.]

The recent statements and actions at the Quad and beyond suggest that many long-standing supporters of a global Internet now have moved toward a new vision of technological development: a world fractured between competing national or ideological blocs, each relying on its own trusted hardware and software suppliers to defend against malign interference. To abandon the global ideal in favor of clubs of techno-democracies or techno-autocracies, however, is to abandon a crucial recognition of the Internet age—that despite real divides, humanity and its technologies are stubbornly interconnected.
A permanent technological divide is unlikely, costly, and impractical. Moreover, it is undesirable. Without interdependence, rivals will treat each other with less restraint, increasing the likelihood of serious confrontation. The United States already has a special responsibility to think in global terms about the Internet and digital technology; from Facebook to Google, American titans of industry bestride the world. The Internet’s ability to advance human rights may have been hugely exaggerated, but its capacity to do harm has not, and Washington must think and act globally in keeping its technology giants in check.

47: The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics, submitted on 2021-10-30 02:28:12+08:00.

—– 47.1 —–2021-10-30 02:29:14+08:00:

[SS from the article by John J. Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago]

China is acting exactly as realism would predict. Who can blame Chinese leaders for seeking to dominate Asia and become the most powerful state on the planet? Certainly not the United States, which pursued a similar agenda, rising to become a hegemon in its own region and eventually the most secure and influential country in the world. And today, the United States is also acting just as realist logic would predict. Long opposed to the emergence of other regional hegemons, it sees China’s ambitions as a direct threat and is determined to check the country’s continued rise. The inescapable outcome is competition and conflict. Such is the tragedy of great-power politics.
What was avoidable, however, was the speed and extent of China’s extraordinary rise. Had U.S. policymakers during the unipolar moment thought in terms of balance-of-power politics, they would have tried to slow Chinese growth and maximize the power gap between Beijing and Washington. But once China grew wealthy, a U.S.-Chinese cold war was inevitable. Engagement may have been the worst strategic blunder any country has made in recent history: there is no comparable example of a great power actively fostering the rise of a peer competitor. And it is now too late to do much about it.