Commodify在2022-01-17~2022-01-23的言论

2022-01-22 作者: Commodify 原文 #Reddit 的其它文章

35: What were the main factors that led to the French losing against the Việt Minh during the First Indochina War?, submitted on 2022-01-17 03:16:59+08:00.

—– 35.1 —–2022-01-17 05:05:06+08:00:

That they were basically fighting China. The book Building Ho’s Army goes into this in detail. The French War in Indochina had roughly two phases. From 1946 to 1949, things were going fairly well. Come the end of the Chinese Civil War, you see the newly formed PRC send an almost endless supply of food, munitions, rifles, and money to the Viet Minh. Noting the deficiency of his forces up to that point, Ho Chi Minh subordinated his generals to a group of PLA officers known as the Chinese Military Advisory Group. That group started planning operations using their experience in the Chinese Civil War, starting with Route Coloniale 4 and culminating in Dien Bien Phu.

The extent of this support and the kind of army it allowed the Viet Minh to build is difficult to understate. So often the First Indochina War falls under the same imagery as later COIN wars - a small group of guerrillas blending into the population and conducting hit and run attacks until the occupier is exhausted. Nothing could be further from the truth. By the start of the Siege of Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh was a conventionally superior force to the French army and was physically in control of the vast majority of the country.

As soon as the Nationalists lost across the border, French defeat was essentially a given. Even if Dien Bien Phu had been their most decisive victory since the days of Napoleon, the Viet Minh would simply rebuild. China was giving them a blank check to cover all their expenses, more guns and ammunition than they had men to use, and some its best officers on loan. The only way the French could have won was by killing every Vietnamese male of age to deny the Viet Minh a source of recruits. The other option was to disrupt the Viet Minh’s rear areas and securing territories along the Chinese border. The French did attempt this and it was working in some places, but it ultimately culminated in Dien Bien Phu.

—– 35.2 —–2022-01-17 12:50:00+08:00:

The PLA were involved in building the Viet Minh’s capabilities after 1949. Prior to that the PLA could provide little to no aid. But the Viet Minh proved highly capable even when left to their own devices. The DRV in the north mobilized their population to an enormous degree and while they lacked arms and experience, they still proved a formidable barrier to the French army winning. Sure, the French won most of their battles in the north; but drew or lost plenty more. Such that by 1947 that the DRV in the north could hold their own against even the largest French offensives.

That’s the thing though - they were restricted to the North when they had at one point controlled the majority of the country, losing it to a mix of Japanese (post-surrender), British, and French forces up 1947 and seeing their main force confined to a mountainous pocket in the north. Combat performance improved significantly after 1949 and they regained the majority of Vietnam again.

No, it really wasn’t. Operation Lea in 1947 is a good example of just how much trouble the French were in. Operation Lea’s goals was to: (a) capture the Viet Minh leadership; (b) seize a large base of operations; and (c) surround and destroy the Viet Minh forces in the region. The French with 15,000 men (including paratroops) with a vast superiority in artillery, armored vehicles and aircraft faced off against twice their number of Vietnamese with no heavy arms and achieved none of their goals.

It was a strategic failure, but a considerable tactical success and certainly didn’t speak highly to Viet Minh combat abilities at the time, just their capacity to maneuver (relatively) more quickly than the French in the North. Operation Lea involved a march all the way from Lang Song, through Cao bang and connecting with the French frontline at Yen Bai in the West. It divided the Viet Minh base area in two and involved a pursuit of the main Viet Minh force over more than 200 km of dense mountains.

This was followed by Operation Ceinture the goal of which to seize control of territory between major French positions in the north and to destroy the Viet Minh forces operating there. The French sent out 25,000 men, failed to connect and after a month abandoned all their gains because they didn’t have the men to hold them down. The French lacked the men to hold down Vietnam and they knew it. The entire conducted of the war in the north was essentially dictated by that fact. The French mobile elements were repeatedly thrown at the Viet Minh to no strategic effect. The only real strategic successes of the French after the initial seizure of the cities were their offensives aimed at improving their defensive positions to reduce the number of men needed for garrison duty. In short, the French were well aware from 1946 things were not going well and things which had hitherto been “impossible” like granting Vietnam a measure of independence, something that the French had denounced in 1946 as radical nonsense, was accepted reality by 1948. If the French had granted Vietnam limited independence in 1946, the Viet Minh would have agreed to peace. When the French finally got around to doing this in 1948, the Viet Minh turned their noses up at it, seeing it as a desperate measure, and demanded even more substantive concessions.

This is very true. The French were an order of magnitude less powerful, both in terms of resources and deployable manpower to the Americans in the second war and quickly realized the elimination of the Viet Minh was not a possibility - only their containment and a negotiated solution.

36: Why did the US Navy lose as many Cruisers as they did in the Guadalcanal campaign?, submitted on 2022-01-17 22:48:21+08:00.

—– 36.1 —–2022-01-18 00:15:37+08:00:

The majority of the CAs were lost in a single battle: the engagement around Savo Island. During this battle, a Japanese cruiser force noticed a group of American cruisers at night and attacked it. Night battles tend to favor the side that lands a shot first, since the fires silhouette the enemy ships and make them easier to hit, and nighttime drill was a huge emphasis for the IJN and a non-emphasis for the USN. The Japanese also had a better torpedo and generally better naval gunnery. Put together, these factors turned the battle into a slaughter.

Japanese and American cruiser losses for the rest of the campaign were roughly equal.

37: Was battle of Imphal winnable?, submitted on 2022-01-18 16:08:00+08:00.

—– 37.1 —–2022-01-18 23:48:44+08:00:

Only if the British had made the same mistake they were making for three years before that and placed their depots closed to the front. The British decision to hold supply deep in the rear essentially doomed the Japanese offensive from the start. There was absolutely zero way the IJA could have scored even an operational success at that point (as u/124876720 brought up, a strategic success was out of the question), since there was no avoiding starvation. The argument is sometimes made by Japanese historians that Mutaguchi should have waited for more food, but no such food was forthcoming because of submarine warfare. More, it had been an established assumption of the IJA since Malaya that, when fighting Europeans, you didn’t have to worry about supplies because you could just take them. This is one of the few campaigns in WW2 where we can confidently say the outcome was predetermined and nothing could have changed it.

38: Machiavelli fought for Florence to revive the citizen legions of ancient Rome, but forces raised long these lines were catastrophically defeated at Prato in 1512. Was Machiavelli’s idea implausible, or was it merely not given enough time?, submitted on 2022-01-19 08:51:40+08:00.

—– 38.1 —–2022-01-20 02:54:58+08:00:

Basically Machiavelli’s premise was wrong regarding mercenary competence. Machiavelli believed that mercenaries at the time (called condottieri) were unreliable charlatans that fight for the highest bidder and would frequently change sides since they owe no loyalty to their employer but fight merely out if financial obligation. Now, I’ve never seen any statistics regarding the reliability of paid soldiers in the Italian Wars period. But to reduce them to merely unreliable turncoats ignores a very important fact: these were professional soldiers.

To expand on this, Stephen Turnbull’s The Knight Triumphant spends a whole page going through times Machiavelli claimed there were few or no deaths in mercenary battles, but in fact hundreds of mercenaries died for their employers in each engagement.

Machiavelli was a member of the popolo class of Italy, a rising professional-mercantile bourgeois class. They resented the lords and their mercenary armies. Like virtually everyone else in the middle ages, Machiavelli was relying on a mix of unreliable field reports and rumor to derive his conclusions about battles. It’s almost certain that he and his fellow popolo revolutionaries actually believed the mercenaries were a bunch of overpaid cowards whom “properly motivated citizens” could defeat.

—– 38.2 —–2022-01-20 03:03:03+08:00:

A lot changed by then. For one armor and melee combat were no longer important for victory. Contra popular belief, armored, mounted soldiers were not at their nadir in Machiavelli’s age but at their peak. The knights who were getting mowed down by English longbowmen in the Hundred Years War were largely wearing chainmail and partial plate. By Machiavelli’s time, full plate had become a widespread innovation and essentially rendered its users invulnerable to arrows and sharp or piercing weapons. It’s no surprise in light of this that half the French army that invaded Italy during Machiavelli’s lifetime were mounted knights - fifty years after they had supposedly performed “disastrously” in the Hundred Years War. In the same way tanks culminated with the modern MBT, the technology of armor only reached perfection towards the end of its useful life.

By Napoleon’s time, battles were being fought by unarmored men in formations drilled to perform the very simple task of reloading and firing in volley. The role that required the most skill in an army was that of the skirmisher, but this too was infinitely less complicated than the intricacies of being a soldier in Machiavelli’s time. Knowing how to aim, reload, and fire a musket is much less complicated than learning to fight with weapons and wrestle (the second being decisive in all fights between two armored men).

We have no sources that go into detail as to why Machiavelli’s soldiers were crushed by the armored Spanish and their mercenaries, but I think it’s pretty obvious when you look at the training and equipment of the two sides.

—– 38.3 —–2022-01-20 03:53:32+08:00:

Absolutely critical skills which a wealth of primary source evidence says can be drilled into men in a quarter or less. Try learning wrestling in that time.

—– 38.4 —–2022-01-21 00:11:18+08:00:

Agincourt for one - the whole thing was settled with a scramble in the mud.

—– 38.5 —–2022-01-21 00:19:14+08:00:

They did: the Spanish eventually introduced disciplined pike squares which had first been in use by the Swiss. This innovation was decisive.

—– 38.6 —–2022-01-21 01:45:36+08:00:

They mostly didn’t do any one thing because all medieval battles involved soldiers deploying a combination of skills. The only place to find a fight that involved only jousting, shooting, swordplay, or wrestling was a tourney.

39: Russia/USSR sold weapons to China which Beijing went on to copy. Despite Russia’s anger, they continue to sell weapons to China. Is this common in arms trade?, submitted on 2022-01-19 15:28:00+08:00.

—– 39.1 —–2022-01-20 02:52:00+08:00:

Great post. To expand upon the licenses post, today China and Russia have settled on a fairly reasonable agreement where China is effectively allowed to reverse engineer platforms but is not allowed to export them, usually given the PR wrapping of “sale of licenses”. This is one of two reasons (the other being their unwillingness to alter production lines for foreign orders) that China is not a major arms exporter. It’s effectively Russia acknowledging that a country as large and industrially strong as China is not going to settle on being an arms importer and allowing them to build domestic lines as long as they don’t compete with Russian products internationally.

40: Why are things between Russia and Ukraine escalating NOW?, submitted on 2022-01-20 00:38:46+08:00.

—– 40.1 —–2022-01-22 00:34:28+08:00:

They’re changing tactics, just like they did in the early 2000s, because the old playbook wasn’t working. Putin and co. designed the hybrid warfare playbook long before it became a term. They did this in response to a perception of conventional weakness facing the West, laid bare in the decisive Western triumphs in Iraq and Yugoslavia in contrast with their own abject failures in Chechnya. Per this playbook, Russia would wage limited, short, and sharp wars and use separatists in post-Soviet countries as tripwires for “Kosovo-style” intervention. The threat of breakup would, in their minds, keep the CIS in their pocket.

Over the next two decades, Putin’s clique embarked on ambitious military reforms, coupled with “live testing” of their new weapons and doctrines that breathed new life into the Russian army. While some areas are still extremely deficient - Russian AA, for example, has proven defective in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh - the Russian army is the best conventional force in Europe and maybe the world owing to its massive self-propelled artillery park and its advanced methods for target acquisition.

While the improvements have occurred, the proxy war situation turned decisively against Russia. Orange revolutions brought about changes in a number of CIS countries and the collapse has only intensified in recent years. Even “safe” Belarus and Kazakhstan attempted to overthrow their pro-Russian autocrats. Meanwhile, while the United States has not gotten much better at winning hybrid wars, its allies have picked up the slack. Turkey and Israel have proven extremely successful in undermining and defeating Russian proxies, their support being decisive in the Azeri war against Armenia. Moreover, Turkey achieved total victory in Libya over the Russian-backed Haftar, acquired connection to Central Asia through the Azeri-Armenian peace agreement, and has started supporting Ukraine.

Putin sees himself under siege by two encroaching forces - Orangism to the West and pan-Turkism to the South. While the autocrats of many countries still inside the Russian sphere favor Russia, it’s clear from recent events in Belarus and Central Asia that the hearts and minds of the satellite people have been lost. Time is not on Russia’s side and the leadership perceives the need for decisive action if they want to acquire critical mass to resist the West.

There is one thing going for Putin in the past 2 years, and that has likely motivated this as well. The likes of Lukashenko and Nazarbayev acted as “middlemen” between Russia and their people and sometimes distanced themselves from the Kremlin. The recent unrest in Belarus, and later Kazakhstan, reduced the leadership of both countries to, essentially, Russian satraps. The “Eurasian Union” Putin always dreamed of but which was constantly vetoed by Nazarbayev is now a possibility. More, adding Belarus to his “solid sphere” gives him more military options in Ukraine: from Belarus, he can circumvent the Dnieper just as the Red Army did in 1943. A victory in Ukraine, if he can acquire one, could very well be the impetus Putin needs to formally absorb Belarus.

41: Suppose a garrison in the Russian Far East in 1812. When do they hear that Napoleon is invading Russia in the west? Can they be mobilised to defend Moscow? How would they even get there?, submitted on 2022-01-20 23:20:53+08:00.

—– 41.1 —–2022-01-21 00:47:04+08:00:

They would likely be ordered to stay put, if they hear at all. All the most valuable parts of the Russian far east today - Vladivostok and the area up the Amur - was not part of Russia in 1812, but only became part of Russia during the Taiping rebellion. The Russian Far East at the time was a barren, inhospitable, and scarcely populated territory with only minimal garrisons. The only significant conflicts in that area were the Russian-Qing border wars more than a century earlier, in which both sides deployed troop numbers in the low thousands.

Logistically, it was very difficult to supply even these garrisons. Well into the late 19th century, Russia’s immediate East - the Volga region and Western Siberia - were subject to pervasive Kazakh raids. That problem had to be resolved first before any stable logistical connection to the East could be established. For the duration of the Russian Empire - but especially in the early 19th century - it was essentially multiple political units strung together only by allegiance to the ruler. The vast majority of Russia’s non-Slavic populations served the Tsar as vassals and envisioned him as their Khan. The Bashkirs famously went into battle against Napoleon as horse archers. This arrangement required minimal “garrison activity”, and therefore a low commitment of troops by the central government, but also meant very few forces could be procured from any area East of the Urals. The auxiliaries Russia relied on to bolster local rulers had little attachment to the central government, and the garrisons Russia deployed were too small to make a difference.

42: Is it true the Chinese SOFs act more like “shock troops” compared to other SOFs who conduct unconventional warfare? And why is that?, submitted on 2022-01-21 07:37:03+08:00.

—– 42.1 —–2022-01-22 00:11:46+08:00:

There are more than 20 different special forces in China. PLA special forces are an extension of the central concept of PLA doctrine which is specialized training. There is no bounding overwatch in PLA infantry: every platoon is broken up into a fire team, an assault team, and a demolition team, and they train to do just that job.

As you zoom out of the basic field exercise, the number of tasks the infantry have to master multiplies. Instead of training every infantryman to respond to every conceivable threat, the PLA breaks off anywhere between 3,000 to 25,000 and drills them to respond to one specific threat. Because the PLA has the most decentralized command structure of major armies, every military region has their own special forces aside from the central special forces. Some, like Nanjing, have two.

Below is a list of units and their core competency.

Central Units

Sea Dragons - Boarding, overseas deployment, and most importantly underwater demolition.

Mountain Eagle - COIN population control.

Snow Leopard - SWAT.

Falcon Commando - COIN “dagger” ops.

Thundergod - Airborne rear disruption and recon.

Regional Units

Oriental Sword (Beijing) - Publicly just “the best, most elite unit”. Their real purpose is to defeat a coup in the streets of Beijing.

Arrow (Beijing) - Ditto. There are two because in case one rebels, the other has to kill it.

South Blade (Guangzhou) - Reconnaissance and maritime demolition.

Falcon (Chengdu) - Airborne rear disruption.

Southwest China Falcon (Chengdu) - Mountaineers

Siberian Tiger (Shenyang) - Mountaineers

Flying Dragon (Nanjing) - SWAT

Oscar (Nanjing) - Maritime demolitions and recon

Night Tiger (Lanzhou/Xinjiang) - COIN

Eagle (Jinan) - Rear disruption

43: What is Russia’s perception of Post-Cold War NATO as a military opponent compared to during the late Cold War?, submitted on 2022-01-21 16:06:23+08:00.

—– 43.1 —–2022-01-22 02:27:25+08:00:

It changed over time. The Russians went from having a guarded admiration for NATO to nothing but contempt for it as both their fortunes and NATO’s changed.

The 1990s represented the heydey of the American war machine and the nadir of the Russian. Russia’s dramatic failure in Chechnya contrasted with America’s stunning successes in the Gulf and Yugoslavia. Russian generals were veritably panicking at this development. Their usual “scientific” military journals degraded into frenetic marveling. Bold proclamations like “war of the future will have no frontlines, only targets” came out of their publications in this period. On the ground level, Chechnya proved them to be tactically deficient and they started Westernizing their organization, previously an ultimate sin. Most impressive of all to them was the USAF’s ability to, apparently, win wars alone. The VVS saw an opportunity to transition from “long ranged artillery” for the ground troops to the core arm of the Russian air force as thrice - Second Chechnya, Georgia, and Syria - they tried to “replicate Desert Storm”.

The admiring Russian view on NATO diminished as the Russian armed forces slowly recovered from their dark ages. Westernization was cut short as the army decided on an “anti-Western” conventional doctrine using “firepower as maneuver” to exploit what they perceived as fire support dependency of NATO soldiers. Publications increasingly pointed out deficiencies of the Americans. Their analyses of the 2003 invasion of Iraq were less impressed than in 1991, despite the 2003 operation being objectively more brilliant. They pointed out the “operational confusion” of the tactically-obsessed Americans, who neglected the bigger picture to pursue local tactical opportunities. The Russians also perceived an acute decline of all Western armies besides that of the US, as severe cutbacks diminished their fighting capabilities.

Increased Russian confidence was further influenced by their perceived improvements. The Second Chechen War was unimpressive but still a victory. The 2008 war was an improved but still imperfect victory. Syria fell well short of the VVS’s Douhetist aspirations to win from above alone, but nevertheless the Russians provided highly effective air support for Iran and its proxies. The Ukraine separatist war was an unmitigated victory, meanwhile, as a very small force of “little green men” essentially put the pre-war Ukrainian army and air force out of commission. Numerous observers throughout both latter conflicts praised the capabilities of the Russians and highlighted their innovative use of drones and their accurate and rapid-firing artillery.

Finally, Russia’s view of NATO has diminished by a perception of division. The Russians do not believe that the Germans and Southern Europeans will come to the aid of NATO allies in the event of a war in Eastern Europe, owing to decades of “gas diplomacy”. Russia also sees Turkey as de facto a non-member of NATO at this point, which is highly important because Turkey is the only NATO member whom Russia perceives as having increased in strength since 1991.

44: Is “grit” a real thing and does it matter?, submitted on 2022-01-21 18:58:29+08:00.

—– 44.1 —–2022-01-21 23:56:00+08:00:

No because humans are very good at adjusting to new conditions. Think back to the biggest, hardest, worst lifestyle change in your life. It probably sucked for a week, maybe two or three, then you got used to it. The same has always been in the case for troops thrown into combat. Adrenaline carries you through the most dangerous moments. For the rest - the general suffering of going 60 hours with no sleep, sleeping outdoors, shitting with no toilet paper - your body just acclimatizes. Often after only a day.

Boot camp is an ancient concept. Even primitive cultures had some kind of warrior initiation process that involved a combination of humiliation, survival tasks and ugly haircuts. The point wasn’t to “make real men grrr”. It was just to let recruits know that their lives sucked now, and give them time to get used to that.

So yes, a 17 year old who wants a Camarro couldn’t put up conditions any harsher than camping in the summer with marshmallows for a night. But after 3 months on some faraway COP he’ll be fine. So grit equalizes between all combatants over time.

Perseverance in combat meanwhile has nothing to do with grit. I’d bet that the average ANA soldier was only a little less “gritty” (innately able to “tough things out”) than the average Taliban soldier. The difference was political motivation: his willingness (not ability) to put himself in harm’s way for other people. It’s impossible to willingly die for self-interest. This kind of perseverance doesn’t equalize between combatants over time and is a significant force multiplier. A unit with it is thinking about dealing maximum damage, while a unit without it is thinking only of surviving the war and going home.

45: Alexander Vindman: The Day After Russia Attacks. What War in Ukraine Would Look Like—and How America Should Respond, submitted on 2022-01-21 23:15:21+08:00.

—– 45.1 —–2022-01-22 02:31:43+08:00:

They perceive themselves as having lost the second “cold” war and needing to go hot to avoid a repeat of the 1991 dismemberment. Orangism (pro-democracy/EU) and pan-Turkism have largely captured the hearts and minds of the people of even “safe” Russian allies like Belarus and Kazakhstan, so they need to take dramatic action to turn things around.

46: Why did the Philippine-American war even have to happen?, submitted on 2022-01-22 04:59:12+08:00.

—– 46.1 —–2022-01-23 00:27:12+08:00:

The imperialist camp’s arguments were essentially:

  1. All great powers have them so we need them too.

  2. The Philippines is a base from which we can access the China market! American support for China from the 1800s all the way to the 2000s was founded on this yet unrealized ambition that it’s hundreds of millions of consumers would enrich American companies.

  3. If the US doesn’t take the colonies then Japan will, which is bad. For reasons.

The decision to colonize the Philippines was essentially a “logistical” one. The administration was convinced that if they didn’t have it, the Europeans and Japanese could cut off their access to China and its market. Exactly how they would do this, or how America could convince the Qing to really open their markets (they had defied every trade treaty they signed) wasn’t clear, but the prevailing ideas at the time went something along the lines of “we will win them over with the power of friendship”. Ultimately this strategy became pointless just 20 years later as China descended into warlordism and civil war. That, combined with pre existing anti-Imperial sentiment spurred the decolonization process.

There was a large and genuine anti imperialist camp in American politics and the survival of the McKinley administration was not a sure fire thing after the loud controversy of the annexation. As you mentioned, imperialism by extermination and imperialism by subjugation were two different things to the American public, which was far more ready to accept the first than the second. The capture of a territory with a subject people was unacceptable for reasons far more noble than “eww icky brown Catholics”. The main argument of the anti imperialists was that it violated the republican ideal, which was based on consent of the governed, and that this could ultimately undermine republicanism at home as well. At the time democracy was the heart of the American national identity, far more than today, since most still spoke the language of their home country and had a strong connection to it. The only way to consolidate a national identity was around the republican ideal, and subjugating a foreign people undermined that identity.

—– 46.2 —–2022-01-23 22:40:30+08:00:

It’s not that it isn’t important to the American national psyche today, just that the fervor Americans of the late 19th century felt about republicanism was on a whole different level. This becomes immediately evident if you read sources from the late 19th century: these people really took their democracy seriously. There are a few reasons for this, the first being that democracy at the time was seen as a desirable but inevitably doomed system owing to the examples of Greece and Rome. It was a fairly common sentiment expressed in debates at the time that the people needed to protect their civic virtue or they would backslide. The fairly recent civil war was evidence this was possible. Next the country was still a scattering of different European groups that held allegiance to their homeland - republicanism was America’s way of differentiating.

47: Did Schlieffen Plan fail because of its concept or execution?, submitted on 2022-01-22 20:10:00+08:00.

—– 47.1 —–2022-01-23 00:03:01+08:00:

Because it didn’t exist. There was no “Schlieffen” plan. The entire thing was a fabrication and deliberate distortion by postwar German officers and historians who all saw Schlieffen as a first class military mind and daydreamed that if he were in charge they would have won the war. Schlieffen had no plan, only rough sketches, often involving units that didn’t exist. The reason for this is he was not actually planning an invasion, only to teach German officers important lessons in war games, most of which were based on his plan or engagements during the plan. Moltke filled the plan in as best he could before the onset of hostilities, and the only way it could have been filled. “ Strengthen the right” was impossible because of logistics which were already strained. That said, Moltke’s incompetent command once hostilities began absolutely slowed the plan down, as his vaccilating and contradictory orders prevented fast execution.

48: What did the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command get wrong early on in the Pacific campaign?, submitted on 2022-01-22 22:27:18+08:00.

—– 48.1 —–2022-01-23 00:10:06+08:00:

Nothing really. It’s command has been frequently lampooned for incompetence but even a skilled command would have failed. Its fleet was inferior to the Japanese in numbers, training, and technology. It was tasked with what was essentially mission impossible: maintain the “Malaya barrier”. On land, none of the defeats were ABDA command’s responsibility because they were brought about by the local, national commanders. The only way the command could have avoided the disasters it wrought was by fleeing the theatre, and that of course was not an option.

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