• 49: How has Mongolia managed to maintain its independence when it sits between two superpowers, why has China or Russia not tried to take it over. Is it not worth it?, submitted on 2022-01-24 04:11:23+08:00.
• 50: Why did Belgium so stubbornly refuse to join the Anglo-French alliance in the runup to WWII?, submitted on 2022-01-24 21:12:23+08:00.
• 51: Has Russia effectively been acting as a military balancer between India and China?, submitted on 2022-01-25 02:23:59+08:00.
• 52: How does the severity of the situation in Ukraine today compare to 2014?, submitted on 2022-01-26 04:32:41+08:00.
• 53: Why did the IJN and IJA hate each other so much?, submitted on 2022-01-27 22:40:23+08:00.
• 54: What would the indicators be prior to a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan? Would a military build up be visible?, submitted on 2022-01-28 17:27:04+08:00.
• 55: How much of a bearing does size have on a country’s military currently?, submitted on 2022-01-29 23:04:54+08:00.
• 56: Why is military spending often held up as a gold standard of comparing forces?, submitted on 2022-01-30 01:04:38+08:00.

49: How has Mongolia managed to maintain its independence when it sits between two superpowers, why has China or Russia not tried to take it over. Is it not worth it?, submitted on 2022-01-24 04:11:23+08:00.

—– 49.1 —–2022-02-02 06:59:51+08:00:

It didn’t. For the entire Communist period, Mongolia was totally controlled by the Soviet Union and was subject to a severe “modernization” (Slavification and urbanization) program. During that period, Khalkha (Northern) Mongols lost their tribes, their written language, and most of their culture. After independence, a Mongolian radio host famously said of Southern Mongols “you lost your country but kept your culture. We lost our culture but kept our country”.

Next, saying Mongolia maintained its independence is like saying Serbia was never conquered by the Turks because Montenegro still held out. Only 30% of Mongols live in Mongolia. More than twice that number live in China, and another sizable chunk (Buryats and Tuvans) live in Russia.

How did this all come about? Mongolia until 1911 was part of the Qing dynasty. Mongols were one of the “three martial races” of the empire (the others being Manchus and “Han-martial”). After the death of Empress Dowager Ci Xi, regent Zaifeng fired nearly all non-royals from the central government and replaced them with Manchu princes who adopted out of touch policies like settling sedentary people in Mongolia. This triggered revolts everywhere. While the Qing defeated rebellions in Inner Mongolia, they lost Outer Mongolia. Attempts to reclaim the province under the subsequent Republic were crushed by “modernized horse archery” - Mongols would fight as mounted infantry, and sometimes as carabiners on horseback, using mobility and concentration of force to defeat larger armies.

This came to an end in 1919, when Chinese warlord Xu Shuzheng occupied Mongolia. The territory never again regained functional independence. From 1919 to 1921, Xu battled anti-Bolshevik Russians who had fled into Mongolia. Ultimately neither of the belligerents in this war would end up with the country, as the Soviets swooped in after the conflict and established a Communist puppet state. From 1922 to 1991, Mongolia was essentially “partitioned” 60:40 between China and Russia. The Buryats and Khalkha lived in the Soviet control zone, while the Southern Khalkha, Korchin, and Ordos lived in China.

50: Why did Belgium so stubbornly refuse to join the Anglo-French alliance in the runup to WWII?, submitted on 2022-01-24 21:12:23+08:00.

—– 50.1 —–2022-01-24 22:07:20+08:00:

Because they were smart. The French envisioned a war fought primarily on Belgian soil, to save Northern France from the horrors of the last war. The other option was to attack Germany, but the French believed technology had given war a defensive slant after the experiences of World War 1. Belgium knew that this defensive war would last years and lead to the total destruction of their country. They did everything they could before the war to preserve their neutrality, and when the war broke out surrendered quickly. In the process they saved themselves from immense suffering.

—– 50.2 —–2022-01-25 03:02:39+08:00:

Yes thanks

51: Has Russia effectively been acting as a military balancer between India and China?, submitted on 2022-01-25 02:23:59+08:00.

—– 51.1 —–2022-01-25 02:54:52+08:00:

No. At least not anymore. During the Cold War this was absolutely the case as China and the Soviet Union were direct military adversaries, complete with actual fighting along the border of two nuclear powers. Both tried to surround each other by supporting dissident states around them - China with Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania and the Soviet Union with North Korea and Vietnam. After the Cold War, the main thing driving Russian arms sales was financial desperation. Though China and Russia did a detente, they still did not trust each other. Nevertheless, Russia - and this being in its “good” years with the West under Yeltsin - did a number of tech transfers to China to solve its cashflow problem.

The Indo-Russian and Vietnamese-Russian relationships are two sided and very sentimental, not a cynical scheme by Russia to undermine its main ally of convenience. India and Russia see each other as something like best friends, and Indian media is as critical of the United States as it is of China. Despite alignment of interests in recent years, the Indian-American relationship is poisoned by decades of American support for Pakistan, the perceived unreliability of the US as an ally owing to its abandonment of Afghanistan and the Kurds, and the disrespect with which it treats its other partners. Afghanistan struck an especially deep chord because Indians saw the country as a key front in their proxy war with Pakistan. Russia, meanwhile, has a soft power advantage owing to decades of Soviet support for India. There’s a general sentiment in India that while America has to be their main partner of convenience, Russia is their “real friend”. The Russians are, of course, all too happy to turn this into arms deals since they need all the financial support they can get.

—– 51.2 —–2022-01-26 22:15:12+08:00:

They don’t like Russia, both because of support for India and because of the Soviet Afghan war which drove millions of refugees into Pakistan and involved direct clashes between the two.

52: How does the severity of the situation in Ukraine today compare to 2014?, submitted on 2022-01-26 04:32:41+08:00.

—– 52.1 —–2022-01-26 22:17:41+08:00:

The main difference is the scale. In 2014 it was clear Russia was just trying to break away separatist regions for leverage and keep Ukraine out of NATO. Now, with that strategy having failed and Russia building up unprecedented troop levels, any war will result in Russia either occupying half or the entirety of Ukraine.

53: Why did the IJN and IJA hate each other so much?, submitted on 2022-01-27 22:40:23+08:00.

—– 53.1 —–2022-01-28 09:17:12+08:00:

The other answers have done a good job explaining away historical myths and highlighting institutional factors. One thing that can’t be overlooked on top of those is that the culture of the Japanese military in general was insubordinate, uncooperative, and acrimonious. Gekokujo, or loyal insubordination, had been a military tradition since the time of the Sengoku Jidai. Essentially mission command on steroids, the norm of gekokujo allowed Japanese officers to defy orders as long as they were acting aggressively. The widespread assumption of earlier historians was that gekokujo was only rewarded when insubordination led to successful results, but some officers even advanced their careers through failed gekokujo. After inciting the Khalkhin Gol incident, Col. Tsuji Masanobu was strangely put in charge of the IJA staff in Taipei, responsible for planning the 1941 invasion of Malaya.

The modern Japanese military was essentially a collection of gloryhounds from its conception. Insubordinate aggression offered the promise of rapid elevation and involved far fewer repercussions than it would in any other military. When authors mention IJA-IJN rivalry, they often don’t elaborate on specifics. In the vast majority of cases, this rivalry involved the IJA and IJN trying to outdo each other and each steal the greater glory of an achievement, at the detriment of effective combination between both arms. They were, in effect, racing eachother to death or glory.

While the army-navy rivalry was certainly abetted by the civilian government, it, like Gekokujo in general, was willingly enabled by the powers that be. The Japanese firmly believed that only vigorous, unrestrained offensive spirit would enable victory on land or at sea, and were careful not to “institutionalize cowardice” by placing “undue restraints” on branches and their commanders. To this end, there was a separate army and navy ministry, a separate army and navy chief of staff, and no overall chief of staff. The reason this problem was allowed to go unabetted for such a long period of time was that the Japanese military establishment largely did not see it as a terrible problem, but simply as their longstanding way of operating and even as an advantage.

54: What would the indicators be prior to a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan? Would a military build up be visible?, submitted on 2022-01-28 17:27:04+08:00.

—– 54.1 —–2022-01-31 22:59:11+08:00:

None of the answers about military preparations are right. You can do military preparations either to sabre rattle or actually attack. The real indicator that China is about to invade is that it stockpiles 3 or more billion barrels of oil. The fact that it is releasing oil amid high prices indicates no invasion is coming soon. At 3 billion barrels, China could with severe rationing last under blockade for 2 or more years combined with imports through overland routes. This would be sufficient time to leverage its industrial advantage and outproduce whichever enemies came to Taiwan’s defense. The preparations of Chinese leadership indicate that they are not under the delusion that a Taiwan war would be short.

55: How much of a bearing does size have on a country’s military currently?, submitted on 2022-01-29 23:04:54+08:00.

—– 55.1 —–2022-01-29 23:49:32+08:00:

Almost no impact. War is competitive, meaning something is only useful if it’s employed in a way that creates advantages. The great numbers of the Qing army did all of nothing against Europeans when they were fought in pike and square and played right into the he hands of forces that outraged them. China’s long military reversal started only when it started using stealth and deception to force engagements at close and even melee range, starting with Bang Bo and culminating in the Korean War. Iran had an immense numerical superiority over Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, but ultimately wasted it with crude and inefficient tactics. The Arabs always possessed an overwhelming numerical edge against Israel, but failed repeatedly because of huge training deficiencies. Nothing has to be said about the Chechen wars. I would go as far as to say you can’t draw any correlation between personnel numbers and the outcome of recent wars.

56: Why is military spending often held up as a gold standard of comparing forces?, submitted on 2022-01-30 01:04:38+08:00.

—– 56.1 —–2022-01-31 02:56:33+08:00:

Because it is the gold standard. Any underfunded army is inevitably cutting corners and has skeletons in the closet. In 1878 and 1885, properly funded Qing provincial armies defeated the Russians and French in open battle. Just ten years and a regime change later, the Qing army was totally crushed by the Japanese. What happened? Since the military was aligned with the old ruling clique, the new ruling clique slashed its budget by almost half. This led to a culture of shamming at all levels of the Qing forces. When Viceroy Li Hongzhang went to inspect the Taku forts on the eve of war, the commander, unable to afford his “mandated” garrison, hired civilians to masquerade as soldiers for a day. At sea, most of the navy’s gunpowder had been sold and replaced by sawdust to pay for daily expenses.

Every underfunded army is in a similar situation. The repeated failures of the Arabs against Israel, the floundering of the Russians in Chechnya, and the Nagorno-Karabakh disaster last year all stemmed from the same problem: you can’t perform combined arms on a shoestring budget. Something will fall apart, whether that’s your tankers and pilots not being properly trained, your officers having to communicate with cell phones because military communications are unreliable, your “advanced systems” from discount vendors not working as advertised, or your underpaid troops looking for the first opportunity to go AWOL. Despite almost everything in China being much cheaper, China spends more per soldier than most NATO members, and Russia would be wise to follow suit. History shows us that the “make do and detect problems through inspections” approach will always lose to the simpler strategy of “spend enough money”.

—– 56.2 —–2022-02-01 06:41:32+08:00:

Yes - most NATO members are in the 50-100k range. Even many of the “rich” members. This is still far behind the US, UK, Canada, and Australia which are the biggest per soldier spenders.