Commodify在2022-02-07~2022-02-13的言论

2022-02-11 作者: Commodify 原文 #Reddit 的其它文章

70: Was the British Strategy in WW1 to commit a massive army to the Western Front a failure?, submitted on 2022-02-07 09:44:33+08:00.

—– 70.1 —–2022-02-07 23:26:23+08:00:

No. Britain paid a relatively small price for a very important goal: the destruction of the Kriegsmarine and the unification of the other four naval powers behind the UK. They prolonged the life of the British Empire by at least a decade, and could have prolonged it by more if they had better navigated relations with their postwar allies.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Britain faced an impossible strategic dilemma that could have spelled its dismemberment at any time. For most of the 19th century, the only real naval powers were the UK and France. The Ottomans briefly commanded a huge fleet but it quickly fell into disrepair. The Russians rose as a threat during the reign of Nicholas I, but the Crimean War put a temporary hold on that. Germany, Japan, the US, and Italy had not yet risen as sea powers.

The rise of fleets outside the “big two” posed a serious risk for Britain. Britain knew that it could defeat the French navy any time (though it was still paranoid: in 1860 there was an unfounded French invasion scare). However, two or more rival navies combined could crush the British on the high seas. If that happened, the Empire would cease to exist overnight. Some Anglo majority colonies like Australia and Canada might have held out (though, just as likely, they’d make accommodations with enemies threatening to invade them), but India, South Africa, Egypt, Singapore, and possibly even Ireland would collapse into rebellion unless some foreign power took them first. Britain had an “empire on the cheap” and maintained most of its colonies with only a skeletal garrison that depended on the acceptance of the local power elite. The first sign of weakness could see the colonial apparatus evaporate overnight.

Compounding Britain’s problem was the paramount importance of concentration of force in naval war. On land, you can deploy “holding forces” to hold one front while your main force makes a push elsewhere. Naval battles are decided in less than a day- meaning it’s easy to mass forces and defeat the enemy in detail. The British Empire was spread out, and dividing its forces spelled suffering defeat everywhere.

The chief goal of British foreign policy in the early 20th century was to co-opt or neutralize as many competing fleets as possible. The establishment accepted the sacrifice this would entail, as they knew Britain had to fix a lot of burnt bridges. Splendid isolation… wasn’t. No one wanted to be friends with Britain after a century of playing Europeans against each other and always under-delivering on promises of aid and second fronts. The diplomatic reputation of “Perfidious Albion” was in the gutter, and this was not helped by the Second Boer War. For a century, Britain had led the liberal bloc of European politics, campaigning against autocracy and representing what would later be known as Western democracy. That bloc turned sharply against it during its campaign against the Boers, whom Northwest Europeans saw as their ideological, cultural, and racial cousins. The liberals of Germany, France, Italy, Poland, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia - previously Britain’s strongest continental supporters - supplied volunteers for the Boers in droves.

The extent of Britain’s isolation in 1902 is revealed by the fact that its first full alliance was with Japan. Japan was not only a nonwhite power, but a military nonentity that year. Eventually that policy reaped enough dividends that it became a campaign point, but at the time it was a risky gamble that showed just how desperate the British establishment was to free up resources and deter a coalition. The risk of that coalition was very real. Today, we often take the view that Franco-German enmity was inevitable, but great power alliances were always shifting. During the Jules Ferry ministry, France cooperated with Bismarck’s Germany against British colonial interests. Nor did the relationship become irreconcilable under Kaiser Wilhelm: after the Sino-Japanese War, Germany, Russia, and France all joined the same coalition against Japan. That coalition was motivated by a joint Franco-German desire to win the affection of Russia, which at the time was still a bitter enemy to Britain. It was very possible that the next Anglo-Russian dispute over the Balkans or Central Asia would see the same configuration form against Britain.

Over the next decade, Britain fell on several strokes of good luck that reversed its strategic predicament. While Europe in 1902 seemed to be poised to form an anti-British coalition (at least diplomatically if not militarily), by 1912 it was Germany who was the target of coalition warfare. The first jackpot was the Anglo-French Entente, which was influenced by the transfer of fleets from Asia to Europe in the aftermath of the Anglo-Japanese alliance that secured Britain’s “Eastern flank”. Next was the Russo-Japanese War, where Japan proved itself as an ally and utterly vanquished the fleet of Britain’s Russian nemesis. Without a fleet, Russia’s ability and desire to antagonize Britain dropped significantly. This, and the good offices of France - Russia’s ally - led to the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. Finally, while Italy remained a nominal German ally, it was a peninsula and highly vulnerable to British sea power: London therefore had good reason to believe it would be neutral in the next war.

Imagine you’re a senior policymaker in London in 1914. You’ve spent ten years crossing an ocean of bad blood and have finally seen land: a world arrayed against Britain in 1902 is now mostly united against your main rival. What is your recommendation to the Prime Minister? Send in a huge land army and sacrifice possibly hundreds of thousands of British lives, or once again screw over your allies and watch Europe burn for your own pocketbook? No one who lived through the insecurity of the seven-fleet period would have made the second choice. Britain’s “traditional strategy” be damned: that strategy nearly led to it being on the receiving end of the nightmare Germany was now facing. The establishment by 1914 understood that, to be safe in a multi-polar naval environment, Britain had to be a team player.

Many historians have argued that the British Empire’s bankruptcy in WW2 and subsequent dismemberment can be traced back to its interventionist policy in 1902-1914, but that’s an extremely backwards view. What undermined Britain in World War 2 was having to divide its naval resources across three oceans. Losing the Eastern colonies was inevitable since Britain had to hold the Mediterranean against Italy, combat the U-Boats, and stop a German crossing of the channel. The formation of this anti-British coalition was completely avoidable, and was caused by Britain’s postwar aloofness. By 1921, British policymakers found the Japanese-American relationship too complex to navigate and decided to “simplify” their Pacific policy by siding with America on all questions. They also found Italy’s Ethiopian policy distasteful, and similarly suspended cooperation with Mussolini: Il Duce had joined Britain and France in the anti-German Stresa Front before this “betrayal”. Put simply, Britain’s salvation in World War 1 was its skill in playing world politics. Its nightmare in World War 2 was its failure to do the same.

71: The PLA and its logistics operations for Tonga aid, submitted on 2022-02-08 05:20:43+08:00.

—– 71.1 —–2022-02-09 23:07:41+08:00:

It doesn’t. Here’s a secret: there’s no such thing as power projection as most people conceive of it. Any country in good standing can charter huge volumes of civilian jets and freight ships to take their forces anywhere. In major powers, these resources are always in great enough quantities to ship the entire army if that’s what the country wanted. Case in point, after 1991 the US got rid of the vast majority of its supply ships and a fair share of its transport aircraft. It still managed to deploy at one point six digits worth of soldiers to the Middle East by using the services of third party contractors who largely repurposed civilian assets. Was it efficient? Absolutely not. But the US was able to “power project” despite having only a handful of supply ships at one point nevertheless.

Some people have pointed out China has Y-20s now. It’s a great improvement, but doesn’t represent any significant shift in the country’s logistical capability at all. Any Chinese deployment to say, Africa, would be overwhelmingly managed by contractors, the maritime militia, and other “semi-military” arms. Even today not nearly enough military planes and dedicated transport ships exist to support any huge deployment outside the Second Island Chain.

Finally, while “absolute” power projection doesn’t exist, comparative power projection does. What really matters in seaborne and airborne logistics is whether you can protect the ships and planes you’re sending. An unopposed supply shipment doesn’t demonstrate this in the slightest - the Netherlands could pull that off.

72: Documents detail U.S. military’s frustration with White House, diplomats over Afghanistan evacuation, submitted on 2022-02-08 19:33:07+08:00.

—– 72.1 —–2022-02-09 23:18:59+08:00:

There was a big shift in the 90s. I know three senior state department officials from the Cold War era: one was the head of USAID, another was a major country ambassador in Europe, and the last one was heading up the former Yugoslavia working group for most of the war there. All were extremely shrewd and competent people who were deeply involved in the politics of their host countries. u/Veqq mentioned French embassies, unlike American ones, will host social functions for local elites. Well, the USAID head, when he was ambassador to multiple African countries, was doing just that (he always got excellent attendance since his wife was a famous chef). As late as 2000, State was taking the lead on masterstrokes of political interference like the US operation to depose Slobodan Milosevic. The head of the Yugoslavia group and his staff convinced some lobbyists and political strategists in Washington to fly over, snuck them into the country and modernized the ground game of the opposition parties.

Things like this never happen today because of a little known event in 1994: the Aldritch Ames Incident. A long-time, senior intelligence official was discovered to have been spying for Moscow for decades. The CIA subsequently imposed a draconian security clearance policy that excluded anyone who could possibly know anything about the countries it was waging covert operations against from their new recruit classes, and gradually started purging “unreliable” experts and even operatives.

Throughout the 90s and especially after 2001, the CIA also exerted greater influence over the other arms of intelligence and diplomacy. The AA incident drove the White House and Congress to demand the CIA “work with” other bodies like State and the NSA, but it ended up being the CIA “working over” them. There was never an equality of information between the three, with the CIA always knowing the most and influencing tri-agency strategy by selective truth telling. “Cooperation” also gradually imposed the CIA’s new security culture on the other two bodies. Security clearance fanaticism clearly hit state years later than the CIA, as evidenced by the fact that State was still somewhat competent in 2000. But, by the creation of the Iraqi “Green Zone”, it was clear State had declined into the same “walled castle” mentality of the CIA.

The State Department’s problem today is the same as the problem of the entire American foreign apparatus. It’s so obsessed with betrayal that it can’t engineer betrayal in the ranks of the enemy. Intelligence and diplomacy are both “contact” sports, and the amount of contact with locals deemed permissible for a state department official today is far lower than even 20 years ago.

73: When did we reach a point that private individuals stopped being able to meaningfully challenge states militarily?, submitted on 2022-02-09 23:52:16+08:00.

—– 73.1 —–2022-02-10 03:02:05+08:00:

Never. Henry Morgan was a privateer with a letter of marque, in other words a part of the English military apparatus, but one they kept at arms’ length. He is the same as a Blackwater or Wagner Company today, and those organizations are absolutely waging private wars and going up against states and de facto states. Those two are on the same order of magnitude. Morgan was not taking on the heart of the Spanish Empire, he was striking at its most distant fringes while they were distracted in other conflicts.

When, then, did private individuals lose the ability to challenge states? They never had it, unless they became the state. Modern history is full of examples of warlords taking on foreign and domestic enemies, but whenever they take territory they naturally build a state around them. This has always been the case.

—– 73.2 —–2022-02-10 04:18:15+08:00:

They also “made themselves the state”. That kind of thing still happens today, with probably the best examples being Libya and ISIL where largely foreign forces established themselves as a local government.

74: What do you people think about China’s Strategic Vision behind the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the One Belt One Road (OBOR)?, submitted on 2022-02-10 01:15:17+08:00.

—– 74.1 —–2022-02-15 03:10:14+08:00:

There is no vision, that’s just a marketing piece. “Belt and road” partnerships exist in places like Luxembourg and the Caribbean which are not even close to the Silk Road or any of the maps the Chinese foreign office drew. The real reasons for Belt and Road were as follows:

  1. China needs to take Yuan out of its economy and convert them to dollars to depreciate the Yuan and make products cheaper. It used to invest in American bonds to buy American protection. Around 2012-13, they decided they were strong enough to resist an American attack and decided to stop funding their rival’s deficits.
  2. China’s most efficient sector is construction, but it’s traditionally non-exportable. BRI projects are essentially marketing for Chinese construction firms that help them get started in foreign markets and displace less efficient Western and local contractors. Think of it as a “free trial” for the Chinese construction industry.
  3. China needed allies as it was clear global confrontation was inevitable. The traditional way for China to win friends was always “by virtue” per the Confucian concept - in other words, talk a little but deliver a lot of value up front. Chinese governing philosophy opposite is the polar opposite as Western governing philosophy. With no enemies to defeat in elections, Chinese governments since the first dynasties put no stock in arguing with their enemies and instead let results do the talking.

75: Best Single-Volume Current Work on the American Civil War, submitted on 2022-02-10 09:18:04+08:00.

—– 75.1 —–2022-02-10 21:20:43+08:00:

You’re basically looking at 3 books. There’s John Keenan’s book which is a military history but prone to hyperbole and not held in enormously high regard, McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom, and Hsieh & Murray’s A Savage War. The third is by far the best. Battle Cry of Freedom is a classic but isn’t exactly a military history.

76: Why would Russia wait until now to invade Ukraine?, submitted on 2022-02-10 22:58:41+08:00.

—– 76.1 —–2022-02-15 03:02:53+08:00:

Because the old strategy failed but was worth a try. When Ukraine did Maidan, Putin was initially convinced he could try the “Georgia approach” on them - deliver them a military setback, free some secessionist Republics, and in the process humiliate the new democratic leadership. In the wake of this humiliation, oligarchs would be rallied by the FSB under a retake power, then return the country to satellite status. This happened in Georgia after the war, when Russian-made billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili led his “Georgian Dream” coalition of old elites to power.

The strategy backfired in Ukraine because the people in power after 2014 were by and large the same people as before 2014. The Ukrainian oligarchy had misgoverned the country for 23 years and was divided into two camps based on county of origin. When Russia discredited the oligarch-stuffed Poroshenko cabinet, it brought to power an actual populist movement under Zelensky. Russia essentially created a Saakashvili where none existed.

The “saving grace” of the situation was that Donetsk and Luhansk could be used as bargaining chips. Ukrainian nationalists, Russia thought, could be convinced to stay out of NATO for the promise of regaining lost territories. Instead, Ukrainians largely saw the Russian East as a liability and was fine parting with it for NATO/EU membership.

77: A Rival of America’s Making?: The Debate Over Washington’s China Strategy, submitted on 2022-02-11 21:40:29+08:00.

—– 77.1 —–2022-02-15 02:58:18+08:00:

This exactly. It’s supreme arrogance to claim success for someone else’s growth, especially when it was never encouraged, only begrudgingly accepted to keep the American standard of living inflated. When the Qing sent a diplomatic mission to London in the 19th century, the officials claimed there was nothing worth emulating in Britain because all its technology was originally Chinese and it only got rich because China traded with it. When Britain entered into conflict with the Qing, officials claimed that they could bankrupt the country simply by cutting off the rhubarb supply. Ironically, the Anglo-American policy towards China today follows the same cult of inaction.

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