theoryofdoom在2022-02-28~2022-03-06的言论

2022-03-06 作者: theoryofdoom 原文 #Reddit 的其它文章

140: A great divide unlike humanity has ever seen before is going up before our eyes [Opinion], submitted on 2022-02-28 14:03:44+08:00.

—– 140.1 —–2022-02-28 21:35:40+08:00:

Do not use language like this again:

“a fuckton more”

141: Garry Kasparov: How the free world gave Putin the green light, submitted on 2022-02-28 21:30:19+08:00.

—– 141.1 —–2022-02-28 21:30:25+08:00:

Submission Statement: In this op-ed, Garry Kasparov examines the impact of European willingness to conduct business as usual in the face of Vladimir Putin’s aggression. Kasparov outlines the blatant, obvious warning signs that went ignored much the same way similar warning signs were ignored in the early 20th century by another despot seeking lebensraum. Despite these unmitigated failures, Kasparov outlines a path forward to mitigate foreseeable harm of Western failures of leadership.

  • Garry Kasparov is chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative and the 1985 world chess champion.
  • No Paywall Link Here.

142: First day of no mask mandate in Illinois - reports and observations, submitted on 2022-03-01 00:44:30+08:00.

—– 142.1 —–2022-03-01 21:47:23+08:00:

Most people follow rules.

Most people follow instructions from authority figures, too.

143: Is Alexander Dugin truly a big influence on Putin?, submitted on 2022-03-01 21:45:19+08:00.

—– 143.1 —–2022-03-02 14:00:40+08:00:

Dugin is a big influence on Putin.

If Russia is a mystery, wrapped in an enigma inside a riddle, Alexander Dugin is the mystery — at least to Western audiences. Dugin is a key, highly influential advisor in Putin’s regime and that is reflected in every foreign policy (and many domestic policy) decisions Putin has made in Russian since shortly after the time George Bush invaded Iraq. At least in my experience, there are several layers to this problem:

First, at the outermost layer, most people who talk about Dugin have not actually read Foundations of Geopolitics or listened to a single one of his lectures. So, the reason Dugin occupies this “mystery” role, as I said above, has nothing to do with whether his ideas are accessible. They are widely accessible. For example, Foundations of Geopolitics, his book, is widely available (in English) and Dugin’s lectures, whether from Moscow State University or otherwise are also pretty widely available (albeit not in English). Instead, they’ve read second- or third-hand hearsay, and encountering all of its obvious associated problems.

Second, even if people have read Dugin’s writing or encountered his lectures in some context first-hand, the extent of incongruity between his worldview and theirs prevents them from understanding what he is saying. This isn’t just a surface-level problem, either. It spans from the foundation of ontology to the particularities of the society and culture in which we live now. For example:

  • while the West is for Liberalism, Dugin is for its rejection; while the West is for Modernity, Dugin is for its rejection;
  • while the West is for technology, Dugin is essentially an anti-tech luddite;
  • while the West is for a rules-based international order, based on institutions and international law, Dugin regards that order’s formation as an embodiment of modernity’s ossification, at the hand of globalist-type interests that are irreconcilable with Russia’s or those of greater Eurasia;
  • while the West is for progress, Dugin regards progress as predestined towards post-modernity and nihilism, and argues for its rejection in favor of something more recognizable to Heidegger;
  • while the West is preoccupied with either individualism or identity politics, dichotomies of power and their impact on the disenfranchised, Dugin is for traditional culture, norms, values and institutions outside the state (e.g., the Russian Orthodox Church) and argues for their importance for societal cohesion and stability; and
  • while the West (or at least the United States) seems to favor unipolar hegemonic rule, wherein the United States is the sole hegemon; Dugin wants a return to the multipolar status quo ante, for the jungle to grow back and for us to return, essentially, to Macro Polo’s world.

Further, Western academics (and journalists) in particular tend to be so fundamentally separated from Russian and Eurasian history and tradition that they can’t connect what he is about to what they think they understand about the world. Dugin himself has commented on this. For some strange reason, people seem to think Putin was joking when he said the fall of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in history and/or they dismiss the idea that Putin is trying to “rebuild” any sort of similar empire, reflexively.

Eurasia, to Dugin (and Putin) is the former Russian Empire. Eurasia, to Dugin (and Putin) is what “the West” is to many in the United States and Europe. It’s not just about supranational trade alliances, although those are important. It’s about uniting the former Russian empire under a unified political heading, rejection of Enlightenment ideals/notions of “universal rights” and “human dignity” and uniting the (eastern) Orthodox world under.

Third, even if people can get past the existential incongruity between where Dugin is coming from and where they are to the point they can intelligibly describe it, they struggle to appreciate the extent to which anyone who thinks like him could have any influence or role in the affairs of a modern state. They try to put Dugin into familiar baskets, like “right wing nut job” or some such nonsense.

Bottom Line: If you want to understand Putin’s Russia, you have to understand Dugin. Realize that I am not endorsing, nor would I endorse, Dugin’s worldview. But, what folks in this hemisphere don’t really seem to understand is that it’s irrational to dismiss his ideas based on what you heard someone else say about him, your subjective disagreement with them or your assumptions about them based on your subjective disagreement. Some combination of those tends to characterize the majority of how “foreign policy” types here talk about him.

—– 143.2 —–2022-03-02 19:10:22+08:00:

Dugin is a big influence on Putin.

If Russia is a mystery, wrapped in an enigma inside a riddle, Alexander Dugin is the mystery — at least to Western audiences. Dugin is a key, highly influential advisor in Putin’s regime and that is reflected in every foreign policy (and many domestic policy) decisions Putin has made in Russian since shortly after the time George Bush invaded Iraq. At least in my experience, there are several layers to this problem:

First, at the outermost layer, most people who talk about Dugin have not actually read Foundations of Geopolitics or listened to a single one of his lectures. So, the reason Dugin occupies this “mystery” role, as I said above, has nothing to do with whether his ideas are accessible. They are widely accessible. For example, Foundations of Geopolitics, his book, is widely available (in English) and Dugin’s lectures, whether from Moscow State University or otherwise are also pretty widely available (albeit not in English). Instead, they’ve read second- or third-hand hearsay, and encountering all of its obvious associated problems.

Second, even if people have read Dugin’s writing or encountered his lectures in some context first-hand, the extent of incongruity between his worldview and theirs prevents them from understanding what he is saying. This isn’t just a surface-level problem, either. It spans from the foundation of ontology to the particularities of the society and culture in which we live now. For example:

  • while the West is for Liberalism, Dugin is for its rejection; while the West is for Modernity, Dugin is for its rejection;
  • while the West is for technology, Dugin is essentially an anti-tech luddite;
  • while the West is for a rules-based international order, based on institutions and international law, Dugin regards that order’s formation as an embodiment of modernity’s ossification, at the hand of globalist-type interests that are irreconcilable with Russia’s or those of greater Eurasia;
  • while the West is for progress, Dugin regards progress as predestined towards post-modernity and nihilism, and argues for its rejection in favor of something more recognizable to Heidegger;
  • while the West is preoccupied with either individualism or identity politics, dichotomies of power and their impact on the disenfranchised, Dugin is for traditional culture, norms, values and institutions outside the state (e.g., the Russian Orthodox Church) and argues for their importance for societal cohesion and stability; and
  • while the West (or at least the United States) seems to favor unipolar hegemonic rule, wherein the United States is the sole hegemon; Dugin wants a return to the multipolar status quo ante, for the jungle to grow back and for us to return, essentially, to Macro Polo’s world.

Further, Western academics (and journalists) in particular tend to be so fundamentally separated from Russian and Eurasian history and tradition that they can’t connect what he is about to what they think they understand about the world. Dugin himself has commented on this. For some strange reason, people seem to think Putin was joking when he said the fall of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in history and/or they dismiss the idea that Putin is trying to “rebuild” any sort of similar empire, reflexively.

Eurasia, to Dugin (and Putin) is the former Russian Empire. Eurasia, to Dugin (and Putin) is what “the West” is to many in the United States and Europe. It’s not just about supranational trade alliances, although those are important. It’s about uniting the former Russian empire under a unified political heading, rejection of Enlightenment ideals/notions of “universal rights” and “human dignity” and uniting the (eastern) Orthodox world under.

Third, even if people can get past the existential incongruity between where Dugin is coming from and where they are to the point they can intelligibly describe it, they struggle to appreciate the extent to which anyone who thinks like him could have any influence or role in the affairs of a modern state. They try to put Dugin into familiar baskets, like “right wing nut job” or some such nonsense.

Bottom Line: If you want to understand Putin’s Russia, you have to understand Dugin. Realize that I am not endorsing, nor would I endorse, Dugin’s worldview. But, what folks in this hemisphere don’t really seem to understand is that it’s irrational to dismiss his ideas based on what you heard someone else say about him, your subjective disagreement with them or your assumptions about them based on your subjective disagreement. Some combination of those tends to characterize the majority of how “foreign policy” types here talk about him.

—– 143.3 —–2022-03-02 20:44:32+08:00:

Second-hand reader of FoG here too.

Not saying this is your situation, but no shortage of fools have weighed in on Dugin without demonstrating the slightest understanding of what he has actually said, why it matters or even proposing an articulable method to evaluate his influence (much less assessing his influence in any kind of systemic or reliable way). You should read what Dugin actually wrote and listen to his lectures, or translations of them (to the extent you can find them in English).

For example, for some inexplicable reason folks have cited to the above-linked article by George Barros as “credibly” reflecting how “the West [o]verestimates . . . Dugin’s [i]nfluence in Russia.” I guess because Barros knows how to make sure his op-eds in irrelevant online publications appear in Google’s search results? That’s not a good method of assessing reliability, but I digress. The point is that the article is vapid, its analysis is shallow and citation to it is a a self-evident reflection of ignorance with respect to the matters covered therein.

First, Barros’ article is adjective-heavy (and ad-hom heavy), but analysis-light. He describes Dugin as a “shaggy, bearded philosopher with a [mere] penchant for geopolitics.” Dugin is a professor of sociology at Moscow State University. That would be like me calling Noam Chomsky a “shaggy, bearded political commentator with a penchant for linguistics.” Barros’ pedestrian, sophomoric insult doesn’t even rise to the level of idiocy; and this theme continues throughout the rest of the article. But the point is clear.

Second, Barros’ article embodies the deficits in comprehension endemic to Western commentators on Russian geopolitical strategy I identified in another post. For example, most people who talk about Dugin have not actually read Foundations of Geopolitics or listened to a single one of his lectures.

Here, Barros argues “most people who talk about Dugin have not actually read Foundations of Geopolitics or listened to a single one of his lectures.” Then he cites to this now-removed article in the Nation, which embodies the same deficits. Both failed to appreciate the extent to which anyone who thinks like Dugin could have any influence or role in the affairs of a modern state, because extent of incongruity between Dugin’s worldview and theirs — as reflected in the analogies to “the likes of Richard Spencer” and “Glenn Beck.” The shallowness of Barros’ analysis is almost comically absurd. For example, he argues that:

A more than surface-deep look into the Russian zeitgeist reveals that Aleksander Dugin, as controversial and reprehensible as he is, is not the mastermind many in the West frequently and mistakenly make him out to be.

It turns out that analogy to stateside far-right types has no relationship to whether someone is or is not influential inside the government of a foreign country.

Third, Barros’ argument essentially comes down to “Dugin is a stupid, backwards hack therefore he can’t possibly matter, so why are we talking about him?” For example, according to Barros:

Many casual Russia observers and armchair Kremlinologists ascribe grand power to the controversial philosopher using speculative evidence based in hearsay. While Dugin does enjoy some publicity in Russia, his personal eccentrics and appearance of influence, coupled with Putin’s aggressive foreign policy, facilitated the plausible narrative in a Western media echo chamber that Dugin is Putin’s strategist.

. . .

[J]ust because Dugin prescribes certain strategies that are present in Russian policy does not mean that Dugin was the policy’s inspiration or catalyst.

Then Barros lays his cards on the table:

Exercising my own judgement, I can say that from my own discussions with Russian scholars, academic discussions on this field within Russia do not fixate on Dugin, but instead focus on mainstream names in international relations theory: Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Joseph Nye, etc.— Dugin is not really included amongst their ranks.

Conspicuously, Barros’ article doesn’t even identify factors through which Dugin’s influence should be assessed or measured, much less any attempt to actually assess or measure it. Irony aside — e.g., Barros writes with the magisterial tone of a first-year IR student and himself is little more than an armchair Kremlinologist whose insight is self-evidently based only on Western media echo chamber-type pontification — the argument is unavailing. By his own admission Barros bases his opinion on what he’s heard from unidentified others who he claims are “Russian scholars” and “interactions with Russia and intelligence experts.”

This vapid, ad hoc speculation is unavailing.

—– 143.4 —–2022-03-02 20:50:02+08:00:

Folks are reminded to keep their comments up to par. The amount of ad hoc speculation in this thread is unacceptably high.

—– 143.5 —–2022-03-03 10:55:42+08:00:

Most people who think they understand Russia, Putin and/or Dugin, do not. They understand American “perspectives” of Russia, not Russia as such. This is very dangerous. What is currently taking place in Ukraine is one example of the type of risk associated with that incompetence.

144: 30 Years in a Weekend: The Geopolitical Implications of Putin’s War, submitted on 2022-03-01 22:29:10+08:00.

—– 144.1 —–2022-03-02 11:53:51+08:00:

There is no conceivable world where that kind of anti-Semitic bigotry is allowed in this forum. Permanently banned.

—– 144.2 —–2022-03-02 19:20:05+08:00:

sorry, not a geopolitics person, but have there been instances of sanctions actually forcing an aggressor state to give up territory gains?

Generally, not with sanctions alone, never; even when backed up with the threat of greater retaliation (e.g., military intervention) not with a great power/power comparable to Russia. As to Russia, in particular, no combination of sanctions or other means of economic-based statecraft has yet yielded the kind of outcomes Washington has sought from Moscow.

There’s a fair bit of literature assessing the efficacy of getting actors to change policy courses, but measurement is difficult and lends itself to debatable methods where multiple approaches arguably contributed to an outcome. In any case, that debate is academic, for the most part, because you can’t just measure the efficacy of “sanctions” in any vague or general sense. Different actors have different interests and vulnerabilities, different packages of sanctions have different impacts on those vulnerabilities and how they’re resisted (or not) depends on a lot of external factors.

Each approach Washington has taken so far with respect to Russia and Putin has backfired, and mostly wound up to reinforcing Putin’s domestic political talking points and served as a tool to consolidate his political power. There are basically two categories of sanctions to impose, varying according to the scope of their anticipated effect: (a) Broad, sweeping sanctions which entail population-wide harm; and (b) something less than that, which entail a narrow or narrower scope of effect, at the level of less than population wide harm (sometimes even targeting specific individuals).

  • For example, when Washington and others imposed broad sanctions on Iran to bring Tehran in connection with Iran’s nuclear program, the consequential harm those sanctions imposed proximately contributed to bringing getting Iran to the negotiating table. In contrast to Iran, when the United States imposed sanctions with a similar scope of effect (i.e., there would be serious, population-wide economic harm) on Russia following Putin’s invading Ukraine in 2014, Putin blamed the United States and NATO for meddling in Russia’s internal politics.

  • As a further example, when Washington implemented narrower, Magnitsky-style sanctions on Russia in response to certain but heinous human rights violations (intended to cover up egregious corruption inside Russia), nothing changed. It was a serious, symbolic punishment for what Putin’s regime did to Sergei Magnitsky and a watershed moment in context of economic-based statecraft. But again, nothing inside Russia actually changed. However beautiful the gesture may have been, the outcome was less than hoped for.

With respect to the current conflict in which Russia invaded Ukraine without provocation, the idea that sanctions of any kind alone or in combination with anything else, could have deterred Putin from invading Ukraine is absurd. One of two things happened. In the first possible world, decision-makers in Washington incorrectly calculated the value Putin places on Ukraine and the circumstances under which Russia believes its utility is maximized. In the second possible world, decision-makers in Washington correctly calculated the value Putin places on Ukraine and how Russia believes its utility is maximized — and this strategy is no more than a minimally adequate show of resistance. It’s not clear which world we’re in, at this point, though I lean towards the first.

145: Has Putin just angered the Oligarchs irreversibly?, submitted on 2022-03-03 10:24:15+08:00.

—– 145.1 —–2022-03-04 12:16:36+08:00:

This is really close to domestic politics, but I think in this limited case the discussion is worth having.

146: Invasions Are Not Contagious: Russia’s War in Ukraine Doesn’t Presage a Chinese Assault on Taiwan, submitted on 2022-03-03 23:25:36+08:00.

—– 146.1 —–2022-03-04 21:17:35+08:00:

The credible threat of meaningful external opposition preempts any other consideration Xi may have in Taiwan. As in, if Xi knows the United States will act to prevent any such reunification, he won’t do it. Yet for some incoherent reason, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues Ukraine is no bellwether to gauge the extent of other actors’ willingness to resist that kind of aggression.

According to Mastro, on the one hand:

  • The Chinese Communist Party and its leadership has been considering so-called “armed reunification” — whatever that means — “more seriously than at any time in 50 years.”
  • Further, “Xi will assert Chinese control over the island only if he is confident his military can conduct a successful amphibious invasion and if he believes the timing is right for his own career.”

But on the other hand:

  • Mastro argues “nothing Russia or its adversaries have done meaningfully alters the calculus on Taiwan,” even though by this author’s admission, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has certainly changed [read: redefined all] aspects of the international order.”

When I have to suspend disbelief to take an an argument seriously, questions of other motives arise. This article’s analysis is internally contradictory and borders the nonsensical.

—– 147.1 —–2022-03-04 13:06:24+08:00:

As to why this wasn’t communicated, there is a lot of things going on right now and sometimes moving fast means missing steps along the way (like sharing with mods). We did not intend to hide this decision.

Realize that your decision to ban all Russian domains have meant that any native effort to identify or dispel Russian disinformation, misinformation and/or false narratives on Reddit, with links to specific examples thereof, are almost certainly ensnared by that censorship.

I’ve already identified one case that affected me directly, and I’m sure there are and will continue to be more.

I encourage the admins to reflect on Jeff Goldblum’s wisdom from Jurassic Park:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mRNX6XJOeGU

—– 147.2 —–2022-03-04 20:48:40+08:00:

Reddit almost certainly has cybersecurity experts

This is a censorship, not a cybersecurity issue.

fuck, they might even have the CIA

That’s funny, but improbable.

—– 147.3 —–2022-03-04 20:49:35+08:00:

Those are significantly less common than the disinformation itself. If you are directly removing a huge source of disinformation, who cares about the small amount of anti-disinformation going with it?

By that logic, we might as well just shut down the entire internet and all social media of any kind.

—– 147.4 —–2022-03-04 20:56:07+08:00:

Noting for the record that I agree Reddit’s purported “decision” to block all links to any Russian domains is fundamentally idiotic. Censorship does not curtail the harm of disinformation, misinformation or propaganda. Rather, it has the opposite effect. At what point will past mistakes be learned from?

—– 147.5 —–2022-03-05 00:19:16+08:00:

What keen and piercing insight.

—– 147.6 —–2022-03-05 00:21:46+08:00:

Seems like the point of what I said is lost on you.

—– 147.7 —–2022-03-06 03:33:11+08:00:

you can’t just block a entire country cause you don’t agree with them

Apparently they can. And what a fantastic precedent. Tit for tat. Russian government vs. American social media.

Reddit bans all Russian domains under the pretext of “cybersecurity,” which is really just the new word they’ve labeled on what was previously called “misinformation” — that it turns out they were incapable of even identifying, much less appropriately addressing. In effect, they turned out to be little more than blatant censorship.

So, in response, Russia initiates bans of American social media and starts arresting people for spreading “misinformation,” and passes a series of sweeping new laws that amount to little more than blatant censorship.

Both are censoring speech, which will have the obviously foreseeable effect of curtailing political dissent of any kind. Just like happened not too long ago in one context. And such measures have been a prominent feature of all authoritarian governments throughout the 20th century and before.

Instead of letting facts be submitted in a candid world, we’re now seeing just the opposite. Looks like even Novaya Gazeta (Новая газета) — which serves the purpose and function of countering each and every item of propaganda, disinformation, misinformation and other lies from the Russian government, in addition to highlighting the barbarism, brutality and corruption of Vladimir Putin’s government — is banned.

So what’s next? Banning every user on Reddit with a Russian IP address? It turns out that the overwhelming majority of Russians oppose Putin’s idiotic war. But there is no better way to tip the scale in Putin’s favor than by engaging in actions which reinforce the propaganda, misinformation, disinformation and other false narratives he’s used to gain any support in the first place. Which is exactly what Reddit has done here.

The point is to be better. To be an example. To conduct yourselves according to the values of of a democratic and free society. Yet, Reddit (and apparently this whole industry) has chosen the opposite path.

148: What If Russia Loses?: A Defeat for Moscow Won’t Be a Clear Victory for the West, submitted on 2022-03-04 23:11:11+08:00.

—– 148.1 —–2022-03-06 01:01:25+08:00:

Michael Kimmage

I am really getting tired of seeing Michael Kimmage’s articles. Setting aside the fact that his analysis almost never rises above the level of internally contradictory speculation, on his best day all he does is repeat other people’s ideas. This particular article, along with everything else Kimmage has published in Foreign Affairs since last year, is below even Buzzfeed’s standards.

The editorial board should consider whether repeatedly publishing this sort of low-brow content is consistent with Foreign Affairs’ readers’ expectations. This isn’t the first time I’ve communicated these observations either. Since certain leadership changes several years back I have been disappointed to see this stuff getting through.

149: In case anyone was still wondering whether the recent shift away from masks, mandates, and restrictions was “for the science” or for some other reason…, submitted on 2022-03-05 07:52:49+08:00.

—– 149.1 —–2022-03-06 05:50:34+08:00:

Off topic.

150: Elon, defender of free speech, submitted on 2022-03-05 22:40:31+08:00.

—– 150.1 —–2022-03-06 00:51:05+08:00:

Even if at gunpoint, I still wouldn’t. As soon as you start compromising on values, it’s a slippery slope from there.

151: Foundations of Geo politics by Aleksandr Dugin, submitted on 2022-03-05 23:06:47+08:00.

—– 151.1 —–2022-03-06 01:06:21+08:00:

Google it.

152: Russian Sanctions and Global Economic Risk, submitted on 2022-03-06 05:53:08+08:00.

—– 152.1 —–2022-03-06 06:01:33+08:00:

Submission Statement: This video essay explains at a general level what sanctions have been placed on Russia, how they work and what risks are associated with their imposition. Particularly with respect to SWIFT and the Russian Central Bank, this video essay lays essential foundation for the significance of these statecraft tools, both in terms of benefits and risks. For some here, this video won’t tell you anything you didn’t already know. But I suspect for most, you’ll be enabled to better understand what is happening in the world right now.

153: You’re Being Instructed Not To Think About This, submitted on 2022-03-06 06:13:21+08:00.

—– 153.1 —–2022-03-06 11:47:04+08:00:

Off topic.

154: University of Chicago students circulating a letter calling for the cancellation of John Mearsheimer over “Putinism,” “anti-Ukrainian ideology,”, submitted on 2022-03-06 18:52:08+08:00.

—– 154.1 —–2022-03-07 04:32:05+08:00:

John Mearsheimer is an idiot and a paid whore. As my comment history here alone reflects, I’ve been going after him since before it was cool. But when you have such an abundance, and indeed an entire academic career worth, of stupid ideas to refute on their merits, to “cancel” him is pathetically lazy. Censorship is not the appropriate response to ideas you don’t like. Refutation is.

Let ideas rise or fall on their merits, and their merits alone.

This is not the Soviet Union. We do not “denounce” people, or at least we didn’t when we still knew who we were. Now, only this shit is left.

—– 154.2 —–2022-03-07 05:00:56+08:00:

I was actually inclined to argue with you about your first point, but then I opened your comment history

Good. There’s more to that story but I’m not inclined to comment further in a public setting.

—– 154.3 —–2022-03-07 05:07:23+08:00:

Yep.

155: How common is this in Russia? Is this more of an isolated case or is it quite common? Police brutality in Ekaterinburg, Russian cops showing their true colors, submitted on 2022-03-06 22:19:05+08:00.

—– 155.1 —–2022-03-07 04:51:15+08:00:

*every protest in every city

This is correct.

—– 155.2 —–2022-03-07 04:53:28+08:00:

excessive force?

This concept does not really apply in Russia. When American see police brutality, they are shocked and horrified. When people who do not live in the United States see it, they shake their head and think “another Tuesday.”

—– 155.3 —–2022-03-07 05:14:54+08:00:

American police are, for the most part, professional and among the least corrupt in the world. For example, in the United States you cannot just bribe the police to get out of a ticket. Try that and you will go to jail. In most countries in central or eastern Europe, it is the opposite. They initiate confrontation for the sole purpose of seeking a handout. This does not happen in the United States.

In Russia, the police serve to reinforce the power of the state. The law is whatever the current political leadership says it is. Follow that directive and your behavior is sanctioned. Deviate from it and you will be imprisoned. This is “criminal justice” in Russia. You have seen what Vladimir Putin did to Sergei Magnitsky, for example. The only reason anyone cared outside of Russia is because Bill Browder was Magnitsky’s client.

The only difference between organized crime and “the police” in Russia is that police wear a uniform. This is the norm, it has been the norm since before the Soviet Union and it will not change. Want to try to change it? Good luck. You’ll end up like Anna Politkovskya or Boris Nemstov.

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