Twitter @China Media Project: 2022-03-14~2022-03-20
The CMP is an independent research project studying the Chinese media landscape within the PRC and globally, as well as the CCP’s media and political discourse.
- 1: 2022-03-14 01:49:02+08:00 推文
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- 31: 2022-03-18 07:26:46+08:00 推文
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- 36: 2022-03-18 09:19:56+08:00 推文
- 37: 2022-03-18 09:22:04+08:00 推文
- 38: 2022-03-18 09:26:10+08:00 推文
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- 41: 2022-03-18 09:37:27+08:00 推文
- 42: 2022-03-18 10:43:40+08:00 推文
- 43: 2022-03-18 12:32:18+08:00 推文
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- 50: 2022-03-18 21:25:55+08:00 推文
- 51: 2022-03-18 21:35:46+08:00 推文
- 52: 2022-03-18 21:42:35+08:00 推文
- 53: 2022-03-18 21:47:15+08:00 推文
- 54: 2022-03-18 21:49:05+08:00 推文
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- 56: 2022-03-18 21:56:48+08:00 推文
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- 61: 2022-03-19 04:59:47+08:00 推文
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1: 2022-03-14 01:49:02+08:00 推文
RT Melissa Chan
Everybody is sharing that one essay from one Chinese dude, clinging on to it with hope it is some harbinger of shifting Chinese policy. There is no shift in Chinese policy until they stop copy/pasting Russian propaganda and feeding it into their domestic media pipeline.
2: 2022-03-14 17:48:54+08:00 推文
A US-China meet in Rome today could be key to securing peace in Europe. But the top story in the CCP’s flagship paper today is the glorious closing ceremony of the Paralympic Winter Games. Much to read between the lines in this act of incredible myopia. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/03/14/an-anthem-for-the-new-era/
3: 2022-03-14 17:54:00+08:00 推文
Re No talk of the challenges facing the world, lots on the glories of the host country, 18 gold medals, proof of “China’s human rights protection.” The only foreign affairs reference was the anthem “Peace: Community of Destiny” (和平 – 命运共同体) as Xi took the stage.
4: 2022-03-14 20:50:59+08:00 推文
RT Carl Minzner
It includes this doozy: “人民领袖爱人民,人民领袖人民爱” (The People’s Leader loves the people, the people love the People’s Leader)
Feels like that must have some direct Maoist roots – anyone know more about the historical origins of that phrase?
Carl Minzner: Nice catch by @theChinaDude - this 3/13 @PDChina article uses the Maoist term “People’s Leader” 8 times to refer to Xi Jinping.
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-03/13/nw.D110000renmrb_20220313_1-02.htm
5: 2022-03-15 06:36:35+08:00 推文
RT Lingling Wei 魏玲灵
UPDATE: Beijing released two readouts from the Yang/Sullivan meeting. One was focused on the Taiwan issue; the other on Ukraine. Messaging is clear. Don’t mix up the two.
Lingling Wei 魏玲灵: Beijing is trying to shift attention from its decision to align more closely with Russia in the weeks ahead of its invasion of Ukraine, to its effort to help find a way to halt the fighting. But its role likely will be very limited.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-reluctance-to-distance-itself-from-russia-limits-its-role-on-ukraine-11647265212?reflink=desktopwebshare_twitter
6: 2022-03-15 10:19:59+08:00 推文
Not a whiff in the PD today on the Rome meeting between top US and Chinese diplomats. Meanwhile, a foreign affairs column heaps blame on the US, accusing it of “disinformation.” Publicly at least, US and China views of the Ukraine war are world’s apart. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/03/15/50501/
7: 2022-03-15 10:20:47+08:00 推文
Re We include a full translation of the column, by “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), an official pen name used routinely for important pieces on international affairs on which the leadership wishes to register its view.
8: 2022-03-15 11:08:46+08:00 推文
RT CLB
Re 2/ For more on workers’ rights and #commonprosperity, check out our NEW REPORT, released last week. Ch 1 discusses the reasons for a higher incidence of strikes and protests among #fooddelivery drivers, and Ch 5 is about workers “up against the algorithm.” https://clb.org.hk/content/clb-report-reimagining-workers%E2%80%99-rights-china
9: 2022-03-15 12:12:13+08:00 推文
RT Yawei Liu
I regret to share that both our English- and Chinese-language websites are now completely inaccessible in China, but we at @uscnpm do not regret publishing Hu Wei’s voice on China’s approach to #Ukraine.
10: 2022-03-15 12:49:24+08:00 推文
For those who missed it: “When War Isn’t War,” CMP’s look at the weekend into framing in the Chinese media of the Ukraine war. Which media use “war,” and does it refer to Russia or the West? https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/03/12/when-war-isnt-war/
11: 2022-03-15 15:23:24+08:00 推文
RT China Digital
Another data point in the Great Normalisation: tech business will be treated like normal businesses, and need to internalise the costs of doing so
Caixin Global: Tencent shares lost more than 10% after a report that it faces a record fine after China’s central bank found its WeChat Pay violated anti-money laundering rules.
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2022-03-15/tencent-shares-dive-on-report-of-record-fine-for-money-laundering-101855700.html?rkey=4jojc%2BU9DvvtuaHc2n7nI%2FFL%2FE7ci4pKtM5BTn%2BIyVUWo1U2GfFSAg%3D%3D&cxg=web&Sfrom=twitter
12: 2022-03-15 15:46:23+08:00 推文
RT Zheping Huang
Just in: China’s cyberspace regulator said they dispatched a team to Douban to correct its “serious” violations. One-line statement, the most strongly worded in tech crackdown I’ve seen.
13: 2022-03-15 17:01:10+08:00 推文
RT Alex Dukalskis
Today in extraterritorial censorship:
“Two British publishers have censored books intended for western readers to ensure they can be printed cheaply in China, in the latest instance of companies yielding to Beijing’s restrictions on free speech.” https://www.ft.com/content/63cbf209-656f-4f99-9ee3-722755c228ed
14: 2022-03-15 21:16:28+08:00 推文
RT Bill Bishop
China has already decided to send economic aid to Russia in Ukraine conflict, US officials fear https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/15/china-has-already-decided-to-send-economic-aid-to-russia-in-ukraine-conflict-us-officials-fear
15: 2022-03-16 06:58:32+08:00 推文
RT Colum Murphy
China’s support for Russia in the war in Ukraine is showing its limits as the domestic costs for President Xi start to outweigh the benefits of confronting the U.S. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-15/china-s-goal-with-putin-is-to-resist-u-s-without-economic-pain
16: 2022-03-16 07:24:40+08:00 推文
Today’s front page in the People’s Daily is once again all Xi Jinping and talk of “necessary roads” (必由之路). The Rome meeting with the US is pushed to page three.
17: 2022-03-16 07:29:34+08:00 推文
Re The report on Rome centers on Taiwan and China’s assertion that the US has upheld the One-China policy in principle but undermined it in action; and on Xinjiang and Tibet as “internal affairs” of China. There is only mention in passing at end that Ukraine was discussed.
18: 2022-03-16 07:37:59+08:00 推文
Re But on page 16, the leadership really doubles down on the Russian disinformation, a column from “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), a byline representing views of the central leadership, treating seriously Russian allegations of US-run biological labs in Ukraine. http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0316/c1002-32375661.html
19: 2022-03-16 07:39:38+08:00 推文
Re The first line of that “Zhong Sheng” column: “Recently, Russia has revealed a series of U.S. biomilitary cooperation projects in Ukraine, further unveiling the “biomilitary empire” of the United States.” Here is FT’s earlier report with background: https://www.ft.com/content/3f9b8164-e9d6-4dfd-880a-f4fa96966439
20: 2022-03-16 07:45:09+08:00 推文
Re As we said at the start of this thread, the focus in the People’s Daily is Xi, and more Xi. Once again, the printing of an “important speech” in the journal Seeking Truth (求是) is top news. Tops the PD website as well.
21: 2022-03-16 07:47:05+08:00 推文
Re As we wrote on Monday, when any mention of the imminent Yang-Sullivan meeting was absent from the paper – whatever is happening in the world right now, China’s top-top focus is internal power politics. And this will drive much decision-making. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/03/14/an-anthem-for-the-new-era/
22: 2022-03-16 11:08:06+08:00 推文
China’s annual “two sessions” (两会) are not just about introducing policy decisions and new legislative proposals. They are seen by the government and official state media as a key time to deliver China’s propaganda message overseas. Here’s how: https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/03/16/tricks-of-the-external-propaganda-trade/
23: 2022-03-16 11:11:08+08:00 推文
Re This year, the People’s Daily reports, its external propaganda drops during the “two sessions” totaled close to 4,800, achieved through the placement of 770 articles in more than 200 media in 60 countries and 13 languages.
24: 2022-03-16 11:12:47+08:00 推文
Re State media have also pushed “innovative” external propaganda approaches, like Xinhua’s regular “Ambassadors Observing the Two Sessions” feature, which solicits very positive comments from foreign diplomats in China.
25: 2022-03-17 14:27:30+08:00 推文
CMP Dictionary: First used in the 90s, “seeking progress in stability” (稳中求进) has come in the Xi era to encompass the idea that China must proceed cautiously with economic development in the midst of persistent domestic and global uncertainties. https://bit.ly/3Im8A5g
26: 2022-03-17 20:57:38+08:00 推文
RT Melissa Chan
“When my father arrived in Leningrad, he was all pumped up on the lies of his government… To the Russian soldiers listening… I don’t want you to be broken like my father. This is not the war to defend Russia… This is an illegal war.”
27: 2022-03-17 23:53:21+08:00 推文
RT Maria Repnikova
Looking forward to this event today at 3:00pm! Please join us. I will talk about studying #China from #Ethiopia, but also how #GlobalChina is an important lens for understanding #China’s domestic politics.
SAIS China Global Research Center: Please join us on March 17th at 3 PM when we host Dr. @MariaRepnikova of @GeorgiaStateU @GSUArtSc, on the Studying #China from Elsewhere Methodology Series.
Prof. @MerthaAndrew will moderate this must-watch talk!
Register here:
https://tinyurl.com/2avpsnut
28: 2022-03-18 04:52:32+08:00 推文
RT Lingling Wei 魏玲灵
Re The stance shows Xi is sticking to his strategic focus on aligning with Russia to confront the US, while trying to present China as a responsible power. “The US probably can influence the degree of China’s partnership with Russia, but not the direction.”
29: 2022-03-18 05:20:39+08:00 推文
RT Lingling Wei 魏玲灵
Re The Sullivan-Yang meeting delivered China what it had wanted. In Beijing, the scheduled Biden-Xi call is viewed as a sign that the U.S. needs China to help stop the violence.
30: 2022-03-18 07:25:56+08:00 推文
Re @CarlMinzner @JohnDelury @Dali_Yang @UselessTree @MariaRepnikova @WendyZhou502 @dong_mengyu @ashleyesarey However, the bioweapons lab narrative seems quite strong still. It was the subject of a “Zhong Sheng” 钟声 column on Wednesday in the People’s Daily, which is quite a high-profile treatment. The column begins . . . .
31: 2022-03-18 07:26:46+08:00 推文
Re @CarlMinzner @JohnDelury @Dali_Yang @UselessTree @MariaRepnikova @WendyZhou502 @dong_mengyu @ashleyesarey “Recently, Russia has revealed a series of U.S. biomilitary cooperation projects in Ukraine, further unveiling the “biomilitary empire” of the United States.” And state media have continued to push this narrative independently as well . . .
32: 2022-03-18 07:28:52+08:00 推文
Re @CarlMinzner @JohnDelury @Dali_Yang @UselessTree @MariaRepnikova @WendyZhou502 @dong_mengyu @ashleyesarey This is from GLOBALink, the international service of Xinhua News Agency, quoting Syrian experts to support the broader narrative of US irresponsibility on the spread of bioweapons. https://english.news.cn/20220315/15f9c21c31ce443b906d402db80cd7b0/c.html
33: 2022-03-18 07:37:11+08:00 推文
Re @WendyZhou502 @CarlMinzner @JohnDelury @Dali_Yang @UselessTree @MariaRepnikova @dong_mengyu @ashleyesarey This raises interesting questions about where we should be looking for changes in “tone.” A huge question for all of us now watching the media closely – as the entire media landscape (official too) is transforming in China. Typically, 钟声 is all about “tone” on foreign affairs.
34: 2022-03-18 07:48:32+08:00 推文
Re @CarlMinzner @JohnDelury @Dali_Yang @UselessTree @MariaRepnikova @WendyZhou502 @dong_mengyu @ashleyesarey The changes on Weibo that @WendyZhou502 notes are fascinating. The complexities here are worth some broad collaboration here – to get at the dynamics of “tone” in a changing media (+official media) landscape.
35: 2022-03-18 07:50:33+08:00 推文
Re @CarlMinzner @JohnDelury @Dali_Yang @UselessTree @MariaRepnikova @WendyZhou502 @dong_mengyu @ashleyesarey Always perilous (caveat) to read straight strategy into moves, but if we were to try, might there not be attempts to prepare the way for tonal changes at the top, for example, by cooling discussion on social media that would create dissonance? Tone change not flipping a switch.
36: 2022-03-18 09:19:56+08:00 推文
The front page of today’s People’s Daily has a readout of yesterday’s Politburo Standing Committee meeting stressing need to continue current covid policies. Key phrase: “persistence is victory” (坚持就是胜利). http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2022/0318/c1024-32377735.html
37: 2022-03-18 09:22:04+08:00 推文
Re Also to be found in the readout is the phrase “seeking progress in stability” (稳中求进). For more on that, see Stella Chen’s post yesterday in the CMP Dictionary. https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/seeking-progress-in-stability/
38: 2022-03-18 09:26:10+08:00 推文
Re But also crucial is the content to the right of the 人民日报 masthead. That is a headline announcing the talk this evening Beijing time between Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-03/18/nw.D110000renmrb_20220318_2-01.htm
39: 2022-03-18 09:31:34+08:00 推文
Page 4 of today’s People’s Daily has an article on “ideological and political education” (思政), education in the CCP political line for high school and university students – which has blossomed in the Xi era. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-03/18/nw.D110000renmrb_20220318_3-04.htm
40: 2022-03-18 09:33:28+08:00 推文
Re For more, read our entry on “sizheng” (思政) and its history under the CCP in the CMP Dictionary. https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/ideological-and-political-education/
41: 2022-03-18 09:37:27+08:00 推文
Re PD: By the end of 2021, China had 127,000+ full-time and part-time “sizheng” teachers in colleges and universities. Nearly 78% are under 49 years old and 35% have senior roles. 41 national training bases and 32 prep centers train 6,000 new teachers a year.
42: 2022-03-18 10:43:40+08:00 推文
Another note for discourse watchers. Premier Li is on the front page of PD today with “important written comments” on forest fire prevention. More about “important instructions” vs written comments in the Xi era in the CMP Dictionary: https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/important-instructions/
43: 2022-03-18 12:32:18+08:00 推文
While US focusses on Putin’s international isolation, China seeks to shift focus to the question of US bioweapons in Ukraine – based only on Russian claims from March 6. The result is a rift in public priorities that mirrors US-China tensions. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/03/18/china-doubles-down-on-us-bioweapons/
44: 2022-03-18 19:28:32+08:00 推文
RT Carl Minzner
Notes that “the Chinese delegation (at Rome meeting) stunned US officials by echoing debunked Russian claims that US/Ukraine had been pursuing a secret biological weapons programme together. The Americans came away more pessimistic than ever…“ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/18/chinas-decisive-turning-point-will-it-side-with-russia-and-divide-the-world
45: 2022-03-18 20:16:24+08:00 推文
Re @CarlMinzner The US bioweapons narrative has been the subject of 2 commentaries from “Zhong Sheng” (central leadership) on Weds and Friday. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/03/18/china-doubles-down-on-us-bioweapons/
46: 2022-03-18 20:38:47+08:00 推文
Re @CarlMinzner 1 of 2 top Ukraine stories on Xinhua right now as well is about US biolabs all over the world.
47: 2022-03-18 20:41:41+08:00 推文
Caution is in order as many observe a change in “tone” in the Chinese media regarding Ukraine. This is not a simple flip of the switch – even if we see more attention to Ukraine. 2 top stories on Xinhua right now . . . .
48: 2022-03-18 20:43:15+08:00 推文
Re 1) is about more than 300 US DOD bio labs worldwide including Ukraine, and need for US transparency given threat to the world; and 2) is about how as Ukrainians suffer China is providing what’s needed (food and blankets) while the US is feeding the conflict with weapons.
49: 2022-03-18 21:15:35+08:00 推文
CCTV’s Xinwen Lianbo 新闻联播 just an incredible glimpse at the narrowness of the CCP media worldview. 1st story is Xi meeting with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, 2nd on meeting with Cambodia’s PM. At the end of latter, casual reference to both discussing Ukraine.
50: 2022-03-18 21:25:55+08:00 推文
Re 21 minutes into Xinwen Lianbo, the Ukraine discussion with Cambodia’s PM is the only mention, 5 passing seconds. But investment in political indoctrination in higher education, that’s news! CMP background on that here: https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/ideological-and-political-education/
51: 2022-03-18 21:35:46+08:00 推文
And here we go. At the very end, 21:25, Xinwen Lianbo turns to Ukraine. A mention of peace negotiations. Then? US “throwing oil on the fire” by supplying weapons to Ukraine. And then more on bioweapons facilities as a global problem . . . says Russia.
52: 2022-03-18 21:42:35+08:00 推文
Re It is certainly hard to agree with a significant change in tone in the Party-state media so long as they give so much credence to the Russia narrative.
53: 2022-03-18 21:47:15+08:00 推文
Re Next, clear statement that the origin 根源 of the “conflict” 冲突 (not war, mind you) is “the US and the West.” Who supports that view? This familiar face, Martin Jacques. And . . . . .
54: 2022-03-18 21:49:05+08:00 推文
Re The team over at Fox News. Not sure, but this could be their first appearance on Xinwen Lianbo.
55: 2022-03-18 21:55:00+08:00 推文
Re On CCTV4 the discussion is about the prospects of peace. How far? Can Turkey mediate successfully? Can Ukraine actually win the war? Is Ukraine stalling for time to get Western support in place?
56: 2022-03-18 21:56:48+08:00 推文
Re Followed by discussion of Zelensky’s speech to Germany’s Bundestag. Will the EU answer his requests?
57: 2022-03-18 22:05:41+08:00 推文
Re On CCTV13, The World begins with a rapid montage of Moscow and a biology lab with key questions: Will negotiations move ahead? How will the question of US bioweapons labs be resolved?
58: 2022-03-18 22:07:53+08:00 推文
Re Here, the war in Ukraine is referred to as a “crisis” still. And their key question: Will the EU find its own direction or continue to be bound by the United States?
59: 2022-03-18 22:22:19+08:00 推文
Re The short clip that follows to inform audience of the “latest situation” begins with entirely Russian Ministry of Defense material. Lower-third text: “Russian troops assist Donetsk forces in continuing offensive.” They are fighting “Ukrainian nationalists.”
60: 2022-03-18 22:25:22+08:00 推文
Re We could debate what we expect from Chinese state media in terms of a “change in tone.” But as Biden and Xi chat, this is the alternative reality on Chinese state television. Russian disinformation still very much the news, with the US to blame for the “conflict/crisis.”
61: 2022-03-19 04:59:47+08:00 推文
RT Mareike Ohlberg
Official China has consistently portrayed the US as the party that is responsible for the war in Ukraine. In how they’ve covered the war, they’ve strictly followed united front logic of attacking the principal enemy, the U.S. I don’t think that will change, and I do think… 1/
Victor Shih: @niubi “As the initiator and directly concerned party of the Ukraine crisis, the US should reflect on its own role, earnestly assume its historical responsibility..” if China really believes this, we are in for a long war….
62: 2022-03-19 05:03:04+08:00 推文
RT Mareike Ohlberg
Re It will lose what little goodwill remained for China in Central and Eastern Europe (not that much to begin with) because the Chinese framing is frankly unforgivable to pretty much all CEE countries 3/
63: 2022-03-19 11:28:08+08:00 推文
RT Massimo Sfriso
This is Hong Kong today. City’s portrait by @IlariaMariaSala https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/18/hong-kong-covid-surge-vaccination-rates?utm_term=Autofeed&CMP=twt_gu&utm_medium&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1647607945
64: 2022-03-20 10:35:42+08:00 推文
Topping Xinhua Sunday, nothing on Ukraine at all. But related piece criticizing the hypocrisy of the US in touting values like “science without borders” and “freedom of expression” when it treats sanctions like a global weapon. From the deputy FM. https://bit.ly/3JGtM7P
65: 2022-03-20 10:40:22+08:00 推文
Re Big headline is: “Three key messages from the video call between China and US leaders.” There Ukraine does come up as the “Ukraine crisis” (乌克兰危机) and the “problem of Ukraine” (乌克兰问题上).
66: 2022-03-20 10:45:17+08:00 推文
Re 3 messages? 1. U.S. demand for dialogue with China on the rise; 2. Managing differences is key to US-China getting along ; 3. China has been doing its best for peace. On last, emphasis is on China acting w/ “the attitude of a responsible major nation” (负责任大国应有的态度).
67: 2022-03-20 10:49:31+08:00 推文
Re Much of the world has seen China talking, dragging and fence sitting, and the longer-term impact of this remains to be seen. But China’s complaint against US here is that US has “used the Ukraine issue to spread fake information twisting China’s position” (歪曲抹黑中方立场).
68: 2022-03-20 10:55:23+08:00 推文
Re On Weibo today the top trending topic (noting these are not generally organic, but chosen) is the US-China video talk. Nothing at all on Ukraine or the war (“conflict” “problem” “special military operation”). Several threads are on covid case spikes.
69: 2022-03-20 10:57:16+08:00 推文
Re This top-trending US-China topic is a hashtag that essentially aggregates official state media reporting on the Xi-Biden call. https://bit.ly/3wlWRBy
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