ForeignAffairsMag在2022-03-28~2022-04-03的言论

2022-04-01 作者: ForeignAffairsMag 原文 #Reddit 的其它文章

167: How the West Can Weaken Putin: Encourage Defections Among Soldiers and Diplomats, submitted on 2022-03-28 22:26:47+08:00.

—– 167.1 —–2022-03-28 22:38:05+08:00:

[SS from the article by Stephen E. Biegun, Deputy Secretary of State from 2019 to 2021, and David J. Kramer, Managing Director for Global Policy at the George W. Bush Institute and a former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.]

“The immediate focus of the United States and allies must be on the Russian military and diplomatic corps to encourage defections. Putin’s orders are worthless if Russian soldiers and diplomats refuse to carry them out—if they recognize that the emperor has no clothes. Ultimately, the result might be that the emperor is no more.”

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168: How the West Can Weaken Putin: Encourage Defections Among Soldiers and Diplomats, submitted on 2022-03-29 00:29:22+08:00.

—– 168.1 —–2022-03-29 00:29:50+08:00:

[SS from the article by Stephen E. Biegun, Deputy Secretary of State from 2019 to 2021, and David J. Kramer, Managing Director for Global Policy at the George W. Bush Institute and a former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.]
“The immediate focus of the United States and allies must be on the Russian military and diplomatic corps to encourage defections. Putin’s orders are worthless if Russian soldiers and diplomats refuse to carry them out—if they recognize that the emperor has no clothes. Ultimately, the result might be that the emperor is no more.”
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169: Leadership at War: How Putin and Zelensky Have Defined the Ukrainian Conflict, submitted on 2022-03-29 22:06:36+08:00.

—– 169.1 —–2022-03-29 22:07:04+08:00:

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170: Leadership at War: How Putin and Zelensky Have Defined the Ukrainian Conflict, submitted on 2022-03-29 22:07:33+08:00.

—– 170.1 —–2022-03-29 22:07:55+08:00:

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171: Leadership at War: How Putin and Zelensky Have Defined the Ukrainian Conflict, submitted on 2022-03-29 22:08:30+08:00.

—– 171.1 —–2022-03-29 22:08:41+08:00:

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172: The Irony of Ukraine: We Have Met the Enemy, and It Is Us, submitted on 2022-03-29 22:12:39+08:00.

—– 172.1 —–2022-03-29 22:15:20+08:00:

[SS from the article by Gideon Rose, Distinguished Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of How Wars End.]

“The description of Putin’s mistakes is a decent summary of not just the earlier Soviet experience in Afghanistan but also much of U.S. national security policy over the last several decades, including the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Washington has repeatedly launched military interventions with extravagantly unrealistic expectations, overestimated its own capabilities and underestimated its opponents, believed it would be loved rather than hated, and thought it could put its favorites into office and then get away easily. And time and again, after running up against the same harsh realities as Putin, it has tried to bull its way forward before ultimately deciding to reverse course and withdraw.Yes, American motives were nobler. Yes, American methods were less brutal (most of the time). Yes, there were many other differences between the conflicts. But on a strategic level, the broad similarities are striking. This means there are several important lessons to be learned from recent American military history—but only if that history is looked at from the enemy’s perspective, not Washington’s. Because it was the enemies who won.”

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173: War in Ukraine Megathread XVI, submitted on 2022-03-30 11:23:51+08:00.

—– 173.1 —–2022-03-31 22:38:24+08:00:

How to Keep Belarus Out of the War: NATO Should Put the Squeeze on Russia’s Chief Accomplice

By Yevgeny Vindman, Colonel in the U.S. Army JAG Corps who served as Deputy Legal Adviser on the National Security Council from 2018 to 2020.

174: Will Germany Stay the Course?: How Biden Can Keep Berlin Focused on Defense, submitted on 2022-03-30 22:33:35+08:00.

—– 174.1 —–2022-03-30 22:34:08+08:00:

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175: The Perilous Long Game in Ukraine: Compromising With Putin May Be America’s Best Option, submitted on 2022-03-30 22:45:06+08:00.

—– 175.1 —–2022-03-30 22:46:41+08:00:

[SS from the article by Samuel Charap, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation]

“Policymakers in Washington must wrestle with two distinct kinds of goals. In the near term, U.S. priorities remain denying Putin a battlefield victory, avoiding the escalation of the conflict, and limiting its humanitarian and economic costs. Over the long term, the United States wants to shape Russian behavior in such a way that minimizes risks to U.S. geopolitical interests and international stability and reduces the potential for future regional conflict.

The main challenge today is that Ukraine’s brave resistance—even combined with ever-greater Western pressure on Moscow—is highly unlikely to overcome Russia’s military advantages, let alone topple Putin. Without some kind of deal with the Kremlin, the best outcome is probably a long, arduous war that Russia is likely to win anyway. And such a protracted conflict would cement the current extreme level of hostility between Russia and the West, undermining long-term U.S. interests in regional and global stability. It will be extremely hard, if not impossible, for the United States to achieve either its short- or long-term objectives if the war drags on for months longer. However distasteful it may be to reach a compromise with Putin after the carnage he has unleashed, the United States should work to secure a negotiated settlement to the conflict sooner rather than later.”

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176: Snort and Talk: Why Washington Has Long Struggled to Deter Russia—and How It Can Now, submitted on 2022-03-30 22:49:14+08:00.

—– 176.1 —–2022-03-30 22:49:23+08:00:

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177: Snort and Talk: Why Washington Has Long Struggled to Deter Russia—and How It Can Now, submitted on 2022-03-30 22:49:56+08:00.

—– 177.1 —–2022-03-30 22:50:07+08:00:

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178: Putin’s Pyrrhic Victory: Russia’s Setbacks in Eastern Ukraine Show Why It Can’t Win the Wider War, submitted on 2022-03-31 20:44:23+08:00.

—– 178.1 —–2022-03-31 20:44:37+08:00:

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179: Putin’s Pyrrhic Victory: Russia’s Setbacks in Eastern Ukraine Show Why It Can’t Win the Wider War, submitted on 2022-03-31 21:07:54+08:00.

—– 179.1 —–2022-03-31 21:08:27+08:00:

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180: How to Keep Belarus Out of the War: NATO Should Put the Squeeze on Russia’s Chief Accomplice, submitted on 2022-03-31 22:33:27+08:00.

—– 180.1 —–2022-03-31 22:35:32+08:00:

[SS from the article by Yevgeny Vindman, Colonel in the U.S. Army JAG Corps who served as Deputy Legal Adviser on the National Security Council from 2018 to 2020]

“Having failed to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine, the United States and its allies must urgently consider how to prevent Belarus from becoming a full belligerent in the war. A Belarusian invasion is not a foregone conclusion. Russia claims that it is now focused on gaining control of the Donbas, in the east of Ukraine and far from the border with Belarus, but it is unclear if that is really true or if Moscow is simply regrouping for future operations. Unless Western nations impose harsher sanctions on Belarus, position additional NATO troops along the country’s western border as a deterrent, and offer Minsk a diplomatic off-ramp, Belarusian troops may soon be fighting alongside their Russian counterparts in Ukraine.”

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181: The Sanctions War Is Just Beginning: Targeting Russia Was the Easy Part, submitted on 2022-03-31 22:39:58+08:00.

—– 181.1 —–2022-03-31 22:40:59+08:00:

[SS from the article by Richard Nephew, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and former Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the U.S. State Department from 2013 to 2015.]

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“The effort to squeeze Moscow economically is just beginning, and it will become more difficult to sustain as time goes on, especially if the Kremlin’s opponents target sectors that bite more sharply into the global economy. Disruptions in energy, food, agricultural goods, and trade routes will generate friction within the sanctions coalition—which currently counts Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and the European Union among its members—especially if the burdens seem unbalanced or unfair. Russia will seek to exacerbate that friction through retaliatory measures, as it did last week when it shut down a major oil pipeline that runs from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea, allegedly due to bad weather. The sanctions coalition will probably prove more durable than Russia would like, but these points of tension will make it more difficult to roll out big measures with regularity and will create pressure for strict enforcement to ensure that evasive behavior by China, India, and other countries doesn’t sap away the potency of the sanctions regime.
As a stalemate between the Russian military and the Ukrainian resistance begins to look more probable, those hoping to check Moscow’s ambitions should bear in mind that Russia can readily exploit such a scenario by amplifying tensions within the coalition in order to tear it apart. Taken together, these factors portend a more challenging future for the sanctions campaign than its early successes might suggest. The United States and its allies must therefore dig in for the long haul—working together to identify the optimal next set of sanctions measures, craft a collective response to sanctions evasion and Russian retaliation, and present a unified front in the face of a potential Russian stalemate in Ukraine—if they seek to sustain an effective sanctions regime against Russia.”

182: Francis Fukuyama: Liberalism Needs the Nation, submitted on 2022-04-01 21:09:44+08:00.

—– 182.1 —–2022-04-01 21:10:15+08:00:

[SS]

“Liberalism’s most important selling point remains the pragmatic one that has existed for centuries: its ability to manage diversity in pluralistic societies. Yet there is a limit to the kinds of diversity that liberal societies can handle. If enough people reject liberal principles themselves and seek to restrict the fundamental rights of others, or if citizens resort to violence to get their way, then liberalism alone cannot maintain political order. And if diverse societies move away from liberal principles and try to base their national identities on race, ethnicity, religion, or some other, different substantive vision of the good life, they invite a return to potentially bloody conflict. A world full of such countries will invariably be more fractious, more tumultuous, and more violent.

That is why it is all the more important for liberals not to give up on the idea of the nation. They should recognize that in truth, nothing makes the universalism of liberalism incompatible with a world of nation-states. National identity is malleable, and it can be shaped to reflect liberal aspirations and to instill a sense of community and purpose among a broad public.

For proof of the abiding importance of national identity, look no further than the trouble Russia has run into in attacking Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Ukraine did not have an identity separate from that of Russia and that the country would collapse immediately once his invasion began. Instead, Ukraine has resisted Russia tenaciously precisely because its citizens are loyal to the idea of an independent, liberal democratic Ukraine and do not want to live in a corrupt dictatorship imposed from without. With their bravery, they have made clear that citizens are willing to die for liberal ideals, but only when those ideals are embedded in a country they can call their own.”

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