ForeignAffairsMag在2022-04-11~2022-04-17的言论
- 199: The Return of Conquest?: Why the Future of Global Order Hinges on Ukraine, submitted on 2022-04-11 22:29:55+08:00.
- 200: Could the Siloviki Challenge Putin?: What It Would Take for a Coup by Kremlin Insiders, submitted on 2022-04-11 22:36:43+08:00.
- 201: A Shadow War Against Putin: How America Can Covertly Undermine the Kremlin, submitted on 2022-04-11 22:39:14+08:00.
- 202: The Ukraine Temptation: Biden Should Resist Calls to Fight a New Cold War, submitted on 2022-04-12 22:25:24+08:00.
- 203: What China Can Learn From German History: Beijing Should Avoid Embracing Russia’s War in Ukraine, submitted on 2022-04-12 22:30:33+08:00.
- 204: Putin Unbound: How Repression at Home Presaged Belligerence Abroad, submitted on 2022-04-13 22:19:06+08:00.
- 205: Putin Unbound: How Repression at Home Presaged Belligerence Abroad, submitted on 2022-04-13 22:19:33+08:00.
- 206: The Unstoppable Rise of Hindu Nationalism: How India’s Far Right Is Conquering Castes—and the Country, submitted on 2022-04-13 22:21:27+08:00.
- 207: The Outsiders: How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia, submitted on 2022-04-14 22:23:29+08:00.
- 208: Sri Lanka on the Brink: How the Pandemic and War in Ukraine Led to Economic Collapse, submitted on 2022-04-14 22:29:34+08:00.
- 209: It’s Time for America and India to Talk Trade: Otherwise, China Will Dictate the Terms in the Indo-Pacific, submitted on 2022-04-14 23:00:39+08:00.
- 210: How Extremism Went Mainstream: Washington Needs a New Approach to Preventing Far-Right Violence, submitted on 2022-04-15 04:20:10+08:00.
- 211: How Extremism Went Mainstream: Washington Needs a New Approach to Preventing Far-Right Violence, submitted on 2022-04-15 04:23:40+08:00.
199: The Return of Conquest?: Why the Future of Global Order Hinges on Ukraine, submitted on 2022-04-11 22:29:55+08:00.
—– 199.1 —–2022-04-11 22:33:15+08:00:
[SS from the article by Tanisha M. Fazal, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota]
“What made Russia’s invasion so shocking was its anachronistic nature. For decades, this kind of territorial conquest had seemed to be a thing of the past. It had been more than 30 years since one country had tried to conquer another internationally recognized country outright (when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990). This restraint formed the basis of the international system: borders were, by and large, sacrosanct.
Compliance with the norms of state sovereignty—including the notion that a country gets to control what happens in its own territory—has never been perfect. But states have generally tried to observe the sanctity of borders or at least maintain the appearance of doing so. Countries could rest assured that of all the threats they faced, an invasion to redraw their borders was unlikely to be one of them. With a main cause of war largely consigned to history, this particular brand of conflict became less common.
Now, with Russia’s invasion, the norm against territorial conquest has been tested in the most threatening and vivid way since the end of World War II. The war in Ukraine is reminiscent of a previous, more violent era. If the global community allows Russia to subsume Ukraine, states may more frequently use force to challenge borders, and wars may break out, former empires may be reinstated, and more countries may be brought to the edge of extinction.
However disturbing Russia’s attack may be, the rest of the world can still protect the norm that Moscow has challenged. The global community can use sanctions and international courts to impose costs on Russia for its blatant and illegal aggression. It can press for reforms at the UN so that Security Council members, Russia included, cannot veto a referral to the International Criminal Court and thus hamstring that institution’s ability to mete out justice. Such a response will require cooperation and sacrifices, but it is well worth the effort. At stake is one of the bedrock principles of international law: the territorial integrity of states.”
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200: Could the Siloviki Challenge Putin?: What It Would Take for a Coup by Kremlin Insiders, submitted on 2022-04-11 22:36:43+08:00.
—– 200.1 —–2022-04-11 22:37:11+08:00:
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201: A Shadow War Against Putin: How America Can Covertly Undermine the Kremlin, submitted on 2022-04-11 22:39:14+08:00.
—– 201.1 —–2022-04-11 22:39:31+08:00:
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202: The Ukraine Temptation: Biden Should Resist Calls to Fight a New Cold War, submitted on 2022-04-12 22:25:24+08:00.
—– 202.1 —–2022-04-12 22:27:02+08:00:
[SS from the article by Stephen Wertheim, Senior Fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]
“For three decades, U.S. foreign policy has run on inertia and called it strategy. The Cold War had ended, but the United States nonetheless retained its Cold War alliances. The Soviet Union had disappeared, but the absence of a major threat produced much the same prescription as the presence of a major threat had: just as the U.S. military had defended “the free world,” now it would become the guardian of the whole world. When problems appeared, successive administrations generally took them as reasons to expand U.S. deployments. Even if its bid for primacy had created or exacerbated those problems, Washington had the solution: more and better primacy.
Now the war in Ukraine is tempting policymakers to repeat that mistake in an exceedingly consequential way. Just when President Joe Biden had been trying to prioritize security in Asia and prosperity for the American middle class, advocates of U.S. primacy are seizing this emotionally charged moment to insist that post–Cold War path dependency prevail. Rather than pivot to Asia, they argue, the United States must now build up its military presence in Europe to contain an assertive Russia, even as it strengthens its Indo-Pacific defenses to contain a rising China. They admit their proposal would cost hundreds of billions of dollars more in defense spending and put U.S. forces on the front lines of two potential great-power wars, but they think the price is worth it.
The Biden administration should decline this invitation to wage a risky global cold war. Although the invasion of Ukraine has revealed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to take risks in the pursuit of aggression, it has also exposed the weakness of the Russian military and economy. If anything, the war has strengthened the case for strategic discipline, by offering a chance to encourage Europe to balance against Russia while the United States concentrates on security in Asia and renewal at home. Such a division of labor is fair and sustainable. It would put the United States in the best position to limit the fallout from the war in Ukraine and achieve long-term peace and stability in Europe and beyond. Primacy’s lure is strong in Washington, but a more restrained approach is better.”
203: What China Can Learn From German History: Beijing Should Avoid Embracing Russia’s War in Ukraine, submitted on 2022-04-12 22:30:33+08:00.
—– 203.1 —–2022-04-12 22:30:54+08:00:
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204: Putin Unbound: How Repression at Home Presaged Belligerence Abroad, submitted on 2022-04-13 22:19:06+08:00.
—– 204.1 —–2022-04-13 22:20:03+08:00:
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205: Putin Unbound: How Repression at Home Presaged Belligerence Abroad, submitted on 2022-04-13 22:19:33+08:00.
—– 205.1 —–2022-04-13 22:19:51+08:00:
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206: The Unstoppable Rise of Hindu Nationalism: How India’s Far Right Is Conquering Castes—and the Country, submitted on 2022-04-13 22:21:27+08:00.
—– 206.1 —–2022-04-13 22:21:47+08:00:
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207: The Outsiders: How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia, submitted on 2022-04-14 22:23:29+08:00.
—– 207.1 —–2022-04-14 22:24:47+08:00:
[SS from the article by Stacie E. Goddard, Professor of Political Science and Faculty Director of the Albright Institute at Wellesley College.]
“There is very little Washington could have done to stave off challenges to the liberal order. Historically, integration into international institutions has not restrained countries hoping to challenge the status quo. To the contrary, it has enhanced their ability to mobilize allies, secure leverage over their trading partners, and gain legitimacy for their normative visions. It is not simply that international institutions were unlikely to check China’s and Russia’s revisionism; their membership in fact assisted their efforts to transform world politics.
On the other hand, it is a mistake to dismiss institutional integration as a complete failure. If judged by the high ambitions set by U.S. policymakers, who thought that incorporating expansionist powers into international institutions would temper their ambitions, then it has not lived up to its promise. But judged by a more reasonable standard, it has succeeded: although institutional integration can’t prevent revisionism, it can shape the strategies revisionists use. Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that countries bent on expansionism will charge ahead regardless, on the whole, international institutions can channel this aggression so that it doesn’t devolve into bloodshed. Rather than giving up on institutions, then, Western policymakers should adopt a realistic approach to them. While they may not lead to completely harmonious relations, they can be a potent tool for preventing war.
A strategy of institutional realpolitik would also recognize that for all their coordination, China and Russia are very different types of revisionists. China’s assaults have been less violent but in many ways more consequential; where Moscow has relied on strategies of disruption and violence, Beijing has preferred to exert influence through growing networks and its position within international institutions. That is why the one-size-fits-all strategy of the past fell short—and why a new approach is called for. To that end, the United States needs to see international institutions not as a way to transform the fundamental nature of its rivals but as places that can become better forums for communicating preferences, resolving disputes, and establishing clear redlines. That, not lofty plans to change China and Russia or a wholesale abandonment of institutions, should help keep the revisionists in check.”
208: Sri Lanka on the Brink: How the Pandemic and War in Ukraine Led to Economic Collapse, submitted on 2022-04-14 22:29:34+08:00.
—– 208.1 —–2022-04-14 22:29:55+08:00:
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209: It’s Time for America and India to Talk Trade: Otherwise, China Will Dictate the Terms in the Indo-Pacific, submitted on 2022-04-14 23:00:39+08:00.
—– 209.1 —–2022-04-14 23:00:49+08:00:
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210: How Extremism Went Mainstream: Washington Needs a New Approach to Preventing Far-Right Violence, submitted on 2022-04-15 04:20:10+08:00.
—– 210.1 —–2022-04-15 04:21:15+08:00:
“If officials can’t find ways to push extremist ideas back to the fringes, the January 6 riot might someday look less like the last gasp of Trump-era extremism and more like a prelude to an era of violent division.”
Revisit Cynthia Miller-Idriss’s essay on the rise of far-right extremism in the United States.
211: How Extremism Went Mainstream: Washington Needs a New Approach to Preventing Far-Right Violence, submitted on 2022-04-15 04:23:40+08:00.
—– 211.1 —–2022-04-15 04:24:43+08:00:
[SS]
“If officials can’t find ways to push extremist ideas back to the fringes, the January 6 riot might someday look less like the last gasp of Trump-era extremism and more like a prelude to an era of violent division.” Revisit Cynthia Miller-Idriss’s article on the rise of far-Right extremism in the United States.
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