ForeignAffairsMag在2022-04-18~2022-04-24的言论

“The Hungarian election—the first major vote in Europe since the war in Ukraine began—calls into question any facile assumptions about the limits of autocracy, even within the EU itself. Instead of weakening over time, Orban has carefully crafted a system that is apparently inoculated against democracy and smart enough to survive even in the face of policy blunders. International observers have focused on his government’s successive campaigns against refugees, George Soros, the European Union, and, as of late, the LGBTQ community. (After all, each time Orban faces election he has needed to conjure up a new existential threat to the nation.) But beyond these strategies, which are easy enough for other aspiring autocrats to copy, there is the more complex picture of how Orban, a trained lawyer who surrounds himself with other savvy jurists, has for so long kept up a façade of perfect legality—and even legitimacy—for his rule.”

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217: The New Nuclear Age: How China’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal Threatens Deterrence, submitted on 2022-04-19 22:09:24+08:00.

—– 217.1 —–2022-04-19 22:10:29+08:00:

[SS from the article by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.]

“There is nothing the United States can do to prevent China from joining it and Russia as the world’s top nuclear powers, but there are things that U.S. strategists and defense planners can do to mitigate the consequences. For starters, Washington will need to modernize its nuclear deterrent. But it will also need to engage in new ways of thinking about the nuclear balance of power and how, in a far more complex strategic environment, it can maintain deterrence and keep the nuclear peace.”

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218: What If the War in Ukraine Doesn’t End?: The Global Consequences of a Long Conflict, submitted on 2022-04-20 21:34:50+08:00.

—– 218.1 —–2022-04-20 21:35:16+08:00:

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219: What If the War in Ukraine Doesn’t End?: The Global Consequences of a Long Conflict, submitted on 2022-04-21 03:04:13+08:00.

—– 219.1 —–2022-04-21 03:06:01+08:00:

[SS from the article by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage]

“All wars end, and their closing moments are often vivid and memorable. Take, for instance, Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s surrender to Union General Ulysses S. Grant in April 1865, which brought an end to the U.S. Civil War. Or the armistice that terminated World War I, signed by Germany and the Allies in a train car near Paris in November 1918. Or the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the toppling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and, later, the lowering of the Soviet flag from the Kremlin on Christmas Day of 1991. These scenes loom large in the cultural imagination as decisive moments that provided the sense of a definitive ending.
But the spectacle around a war’s end can be misleading. The Confederate surrender at Appomattox Court House did not settle political or cultural tensions between the North and South, nor did it resolve the related racial prejudices and political differences, which lingered long after slavery had been abolished. The interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s in Europe was suffused with anxieties and tensions that culminated in another great war. The conclusion of World War II marked the dawn of the Cold War. And, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War may not have ended—it may still be ongoing, as the historian Stephen Kotkin recently argued in these pages.
In the Russian war in Ukraine, there may not be a discrete moment marking the war’s end—at least, not for some time. After eight weeks of war—far longer, seemingly, than either side anticipated—it is a real possibility that neither country will achieve what it wishes to achieve. Ukraine may not be able to expel Russian forces fully from the territory they have taken since Moscow launched its invasion in February. Russia is likely unable to achieve its main political objective: control over Ukraine. Instead of reaching a definite resolution, the war may well usher in a new era of conflict characterized by a cycle of Russian wars in Ukraine. If the war does not end any time soon, the crucial question is: Whose side is time on?”
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220: The Return of Statecraft: Back to Basics in the Post-American World, submitted on 2022-04-21 21:31:17+08:00.

—– 220.1 —–2022-04-21 21:32:52+08:00:

[SS from the article by Eliot A. Cohen, Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies]

“For the foreseeable future, the United States will remain powerful. Although China’s rise means that it may not have the world’s largest economy forever, it will certainly have the second-largest and possibly the most dynamic and globally connected one. It has one of the biggest and most experienced militaries on the planet, along with plentiful allies. Above all, the United States has a demonstrated resilience going back to its founding. It has been rent before, suffered grievous economic setbacks, and, time and again, bounced back.

Nonetheless, relative decline is a fact. Historians will dissect why the age of American dominance ended when it did and whether its disappearance might have been delayed or mitigated. The question now, however, is how the United States should adjust to its changing position. The response will have many elements, but the most important is attitudinal. After decades of relying on big strategic ideas that are translated into policy by complex and arduous bureaucratic processes, the U.S. government must return to statecraft. This means an approach that embodies a fine-grained comprehension of the world, the ability to quickly detect and respond to challenges, a penchant for exploiting opportunities as they arise, and, behind all of this, effective institutions for the formulation and conduct of a nimble foreign policy.

In the previous era, the United States was strong enough to get away with less-than-perfect implementation of its big ideas. Its unrivaled power granted it a wide margin of error, enough space so that Washington could get most of what it wanted, no matter what its level of competence. Today, when it is much harder for Washington to call the shots, the problems it faces demand not more abstruse strategies. They require something far earthier: skill.”

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221: The Chinese Way of Innovation: What Washington Can Learn From Beijing About Investing in Tech, submitted on 2022-04-21 21:35:35+08:00.

—– 221.1 —–2022-04-21 21:35:48+08:00:

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222: The Chinese Way of Innovation: What Washington Can Learn From Beijing About Investing in Tech, submitted on 2022-04-21 21:41:22+08:00.

—– 222.1 —–2022-04-21 21:42:48+08:00:

[SS from the article by Matt Sheehan, Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]

“Over the past several years any complacency over U.S. technological superiority has evaporated. Business columns explaining China’s seeming inability to innovate have given way to op-eds warning that it is poised to surpass the United States in strategic technologies such as artificial intelligence and 5G. Policymakers in Washington who had long been content to leave technology up to Silicon Valley are now racing to find ways to bolster U.S. technological capabilities and counter Chinese progress. But making effective technology policy requires a clear understanding of how both countries got here, and what that means going forward.

Traditional explanations for China’s rise have focused heavily on the stealing of intellectual property. Although that has played a role, allowing Chinese manufacturers to crank out imitations of specific products, it is overly simplistic to imagine that intellectual property theft alone explains China’s rapid progress. In fact, that misconception deludes American policymakers into believing that all that is required to preserve the United States’ technological edge is to cut off China’s access to emerging technologies. The roots of China’s technological takeoff are more complex, and formulating an effective U.S. policy response requires a solid grasp of emerging technologies and a degree of projective empathy—understanding how an ambitious Chinese bureaucrat is likely to view innovation and the range of tools available for encouraging it.”