• 252: Bill Gates warns ‘we’ve NOT seen the worst of Covid’: Microsoft billionaire says there is ‘way above five percent’ risk of pandemic generating more transmissive and ‘even more fatal’ Coronavirus variant, submitted on 2022-05-02 03:12:14+08:00.
• 253: Tragedy, National Insecurity, and War in Ukraine, submitted on 2022-05-02 03:31:34+08:00.
• 254: What are some interesting applications of differential geometry?, submitted on 2022-05-02 12:04:22+08:00.
• 255: Method to get IP address location, submitted on 2022-05-02 12:42:50+08:00.
• 256: From a hacking perspective which is more secure: iPhone or Android?, submitted on 2022-05-02 18:12:59+08:00.
• 257: Pritzker extends Covid-19 disaster proclomation, submitted on 2022-05-04 01:20:10+08:00.
• 258: Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces, submitted on 2022-05-04 19:51:10+08:00.
• 259: I’m getting my laptop back from the police and my usbs, submitted on 2022-05-05 01:13:51+08:00.
• 260: What’s the most time you’ve spent on a problem that had a typo in it?, submitted on 2022-05-05 03:38:22+08:00.

252: Bill Gates warns ‘we’ve NOT seen the worst of Covid’: Microsoft billionaire says there is ‘way above five percent’ risk of pandemic generating more transmissive and ‘even more fatal’ Coronavirus variant, submitted on 2022-05-02 03:12:14+08:00.

—– 252.1 —–2022-05-02 13:48:31+08:00:

Says the guy who shorted Tesla.

—– 252.2 —–2022-05-02 19:48:44+08:00:

Banbot test comment.

—– 252.3 —–2022-05-03 10:27:27+08:00:

The following subreddits are running banbots that discovered the above comment:

• iamatotalpieceofshit
• atheism
• madlads
• Showerthoughts
• pics

253: Tragedy, National Insecurity, and War in Ukraine, submitted on 2022-05-02 03:31:34+08:00.

—– 253.1 —–2022-05-02 03:31:53+08:00:

Submission Statement:

Territorial and maritime geostrategic frameworks define the contest for power in Europe. Ukraine is caught between both. Russia is a territorial power, primarily. The northern European plain lacks natural barriers to invasion, but create opportunities for both client and buffer states, each that could channel risks of invasion. For Russia, establishing and/or maintaining client states — particularly along the Northern European Plain, and possibly from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic Sea — are strategic imperatives to maintain the balance of power. NATO has maritime superiority. The Baltic Sea and Black Sea could likewise be springboards for both commerce and supporting military engagements, whether offensive or defensive. For NATO, both are extensions of the northern Atlantic ocean.

Buffer states between Europe’s adverse power centers mediate that contest — and by so doing, mitigate the risk of “showdown” wars. Particularly where the three Baltic states are NATO members, from Moscow’s perspective, Ukraine is part of Russia’s “near abroad” and should remain within its exclusive sphere of influence (or ideally be re-incorporated into the Russian empire). Yet, Washington has flirted with the idea of Ukraine’s membership in NATO since it gained independence and even more so after the USSR’s collapse. This ostensible “strategic ambiguity” has created the worst possible outcome in Ukraine: inviting a Russian military response under circumstances where Ukraine has failed to develop a robust military of its own and where Washington failed to live up to implied obligations under the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 (along with the other signatories). When hostilities end, Ukraine will either be annexed by Russia or become aligned more closely with NATO. In either world, competition for power on the European continent will become more precarious: concurrently defined by a lack of neutral buffers between NATO and Russia and with greater risk of a showdown war between them.

—– 253.2 —–2022-05-02 04:45:45+08:00:

The issue is what’s left to fight over, in the absence of border states. At that point, it’s not about the Baltic states, Ukraine, etc. Rather, it’s about a showdown for power over the European continent — basically, the war that Churchill wanted and the USSR spent the Cold War preparing for.

—– 253.3 —–2022-05-02 05:50:29+08:00:

That is not an easy assessment, when what counts as an “attack” is subjective in nature.

—– 253.4 —–2022-05-02 06:12:19+08:00:

At least three problems with jumping to conclusions like that readily present themselves.

First, the article doesn’t say that a missile attack is the only condition under which Putin would use nuclear weapons or even define what type of “missile attack” Putin meant:

It is unclear if Putin meant that Russia would respond only in the case of nuclear warheads or non-nuclear missiles in general.

Second, no one has any idea what the actual tripwire would be for Putin. Nor is it the case that Putin sees himself as bound by past statements or commitments. The opposite is true, as reflected in nearly every consequential foreign policy decision he has made — from the Budapest memorandum to present.

Third, you have limited your consideration to nuclear conflict between the Russia and NATO. It is unclear whether you are assuming that Russia would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power (i.e., Ukraine) or whether that just hasn’t been considered. If nuclear weapons are used in the current conflict — and that is a big “if” — the most likely form such use would take, would be Russia using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. In that case, it’s unlikely the United States under current leadership would respond militarily. That unanswered provocation would set the context for future nuclear conflict in the absence of buffer states between Russia and NATO.

—– 253.5 —–2022-05-02 07:53:09+08:00:

Yes, it seems there is a clear disconnect on several levels.

The article is arguing, among other things, that removing buffer states iterates closer to direct conflict between NATO and Russia. You think that risk stops once the only remaining type of conflict is direct.

First, you’re assuming the risk of direct conflict stops once buffer states are off the table, because of mutually assured destruction. That assumption is wrong for the same reason it is wrong to have assumed the cold war would have always remained cold and it couldn’t have been any other way.

It’s a mistake to just assume that direct conflict is off the table when Washington prevaricates in the face of Russian aggression. Washington’s incoherence and ambiguity is what brought the world to this position in the first instance. If the threat of an adequate military response was certain — and not just a bluff like Obama played in Syria — we wouldn’t be here.

Mutually assured destruction is a theoretical abstraction, not a law of international relations on par with something like Einstein’s theory of relativity. One the one hand, it is true that every gamed-out scenario involving nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia leads to mutually assured destruction, very quickly. But on the other, each of those scenarios involve exchanges as opposed to unilateral — subsequently unanswered — nuclear engagements.

One such possible unilateral, potentially unanswered, nuclear engagement is exactly what is on the table now: Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine and Biden does nothing in response. Assume for the sake of argument that the Biden Administration does not engage with Russia directly even if Russia launches tactical nukes against Ukraine. The message that sends Moscow is that Washington might not risk potential escalation even if Russia uses lower yield nukes, like tactical nuclear weapons because of perceived risk of subsequent escalation.

Doing so is consistent with Washington’s historic failures to address Russian aggression from Georgia in 2008 to present, now extrapolated to tactical nuclear weapon use. It’s hardly difficult to imagine that Putin would assume the same would apply if he used tactical nuclear weapons in other contexts, including direct conflict. That would likely be a miscalculation on Putin’s part, but we won’t know until he (or a replacement) is actually confronted with the choice of whether to retaliate and how.

Second, buffer states are not the sole source of direct conflict mediation; but they still serve that purpose, so removing the remainder iterates closer to direct conflict. It almost seems like you’re thinking Washington and Moscow are just fighting over Ukraine for the sake of fighting over Ukraine, and no other reason. So, you think the only reason they’re fighting about a buffer state is just for the sake of having a fight about a buffer state? That makes no sense at all.

The fight over buffer states is about security and strategic access. That is particularly true, given that: Russia’s strength is primarily land-based and main strategic vulnerability is that the unobstructed northern European plain leading directly to Moscow. Outside of Russia’s control, Russia perceives Ukraine as an existential threat.

—– 253.6 —–2022-05-02 08:04:01+08:00:

The article is arguing, among other things, that removing buffer states iterates closer to direct conflict between NATO and Russia. It is hardly as if the risk stops once the only remaining type of conflict between them is direct.

There is no rational reason to assume that mutually assured destruction eliminates the risk of direct conflict between NATO and Russia — for the same reason it is wrong to have assumed the cold war would have always remained cold and it couldn’t have been any other way.

Mutually assured destruction is a theoretical abstraction, not a law of international relations on par with something like Einstein’s theory of relativity. One the one hand, it is true that every gamed-out scenario involving nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia leads to mutually assured destruction, very quickly. But on the other, each of those scenarios involve exchanges as opposed to unilateral — subsequently unanswered — nuclear engagements.

One such possible unilateral, potentially unanswered, nuclear engagement is exactly what is on the table now: Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine and Biden does nothing in response. Assume for the sake of argument that the Biden Administration does not engage with Russia directly even if Russia launches tactical nukes against Ukraine. The message that sends Moscow is that Washington might not risk potential escalation even if Russia uses lower yield nukes, like tactical nuclear weapons because of perceived risk of subsequent escalation.

Doing so is consistent with Washington’s historic failures to address Russian aggression from Georgia in 2008 to present, now extrapolated to tactical nuclear weapon use. It’s hardly difficult to imagine that Putin would assume the same would apply if he used tactical nuclear weapons in other contexts, including direct conflict. That would likely be a miscalculation on Putin’s part, but we won’t know until he (or a replacement) is actually confronted with the choice of whether to retaliate and how. Almost a decade and a half of Washington’s prevarication in the face of Russian aggression and incoherence in its policy towards Russia generally, has brought the world to this point. If the threat of an adequate military response was certain — and not just a bluff like Obama played in Syria — we wouldn’t be here.

—– 253.7 —–2022-05-02 13:43:39+08:00:

What is clear is that the half-hearted US and NATO flirtation with a Ukrainian membership denied Ukraine the actual treaty guarantees, and/or the military support needed to deter Russia, while inviting a Russian response.

I’m really glad to see that you’ve noticed that and recognized its significance, as well as the other section you highlighted. It’s a point that some who are intimately familiar with the game assumed it need not even be said, but from the way the Ukraine conflict is discussed that assumption appears to have been wrong. After all, many are approaching these questions from very different perspectives.

254: What are some interesting applications of differential geometry?, submitted on 2022-05-02 12:04:22+08:00.

—– 254.1 —–2022-05-02 20:45:00+08:00:

Differential geometry has a variety of applications to econometrics and econometric modeling. There are even a few textbooks on the subject floating around out there.

—– 254.2 —–2022-05-03 10:24:33+08:00:

It’s a little out of date, but here you go:

https://www.amazon.com/Applications-Differential-Geometry-Econometrics-Marriott/dp/0521651166

I’m sure there’s been a lot of good stuff since then.

255: Method to get IP address location, submitted on 2022-05-02 12:42:50+08:00.

—– 255.1 —–2022-05-02 19:59:56+08:00:

You can’t ordinarily get an exact location from an IP address alone. You might be able to cross-reference an IP address from a third-party database but that’s likely only to get you IP ownership.

256: From a hacking perspective which is more secure: iPhone or Android?, submitted on 2022-05-02 18:12:59+08:00.

—– 256.1 —–2022-05-02 20:34:02+08:00:

I agree with this. But out-of-the-box security doesn’t really do much when device users do things like open random links contained in text messages from unknown sources.

257: Pritzker extends Covid-19 disaster proclomation, submitted on 2022-05-04 01:20:10+08:00.

—– 257.1 —–2022-05-04 19:16:20+08:00:

Why should we expend resources tracking it at this point?

The question isn’t “why,” but “how.” Mass testing sites paid for by tax dollars no longer make sense, but testing symptomatic individuals for diagnostic purposes — which we obviously still do — is important, for the same reasons we track many other infectious, communicable diseases (e.g., the flu).

—– 257.2 —–2022-05-04 19:39:05+08:00:

So we have sufficient supplies available in areas that need them

So hospitals can plan staffing, supplies etc.

The proposed — in March 2020 — risk of overwhelmed healthcare systems was based on, among other things, a modeled pandemic simulation which presumed high susceptibility among infection-naive populations, without recognizable immunity from prior infection or vaccination.

At the current time, the same population-level susceptibility cannot be presumed because of both the rate of prior infections and the extent of vaccination among the population (among other reasons).

Certain challenges remain for hospital staffing, but most of those problems relate to the high attrition rates among staff generally as opposed to pandemic-related risks.

Further, with several commercialized pharmaceutical products and a recognized outpatient treatment protocol (e.g., prescription antivirals, such as Merck’s protease inhibitor, molnupiravir), the demand for hospital resources even among cohorts likely to have a severe response to infection is significantly lessened.

Folks should realize that we’ve come a long way since this began.

—– 257.3 —–2022-05-04 19:44:47+08:00:

Your comment is incoherent. Refrain from that sort of low-effort conduct moving forward.

—– 257.4 —–2022-05-04 19:47:40+08:00:

That discussion has nothing to do with this subreddit.

258: Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces, submitted on 2022-05-04 19:51:10+08:00.

—– 258.1 —–2022-05-04 20:00:13+08:00:

Submission Statement:

This Human Rights Watch report details egregious human rights abuses in the Central African Republic by one of Russia’s private military contractors, the Wagner Group. Investigation is ongoing and the full scope of Wagner’s conduct in the CAR is not presently ascertained. However, this report overviews certain aspects of Wagner’s activity and violations, including extrajudicial executions, torture and other war crimes. Though not detailed in the article, gold, diamond and uranium mining interests are a key reason for Wagner’s presence there.

259: I’m getting my laptop back from the police and my usbs, submitted on 2022-05-05 01:13:51+08:00.

—– 259.1 —–2022-05-05 18:37:03+08:00:

Yes, a member of the Royal Family should do.

—– 259.2 —–2022-05-05 19:04:02+08:00:

It’s called chain of custody.

So, I guess I have to state the obvious, here.

Forensic data analysis has nothing to do with installing spyware, malware, keyloggers, etc. after a disc was imaged for evidentiary purposes, which is the case here (because OP’s laptop is being returned after two months, following seizure by British authorities). Frequently, when authorities seize electronics, the goal isn’t even to collect, so much as it is to install some difficult to detect method of monitoring everything that happens on that device moving forward. Your claim that “only in high profile cases” would they install “additional spyware” is wrong. Legal requirements for that kind of search/seizure are different from country to country, but getting authorization to do so in the United Kingdom is very easy for authorities.

Chain of custody issues matter for evidentiary purposes in legal proceedings. For example, if something was found that was itself or evidence of criminality, duplicate forensic disc images would be created to analyze the content, eventually prove up what was on there or any other related purpose. But, again, that has absolutely nothing to do with what might have been done after the disc was imaged and the authorities in question decided to return a seized laptop to the OP. The disc image, timestamped after the device was seized, is what they needed. After the disc was imaged, anything is possible. It’s easy, fast, routine and should be expected.

260: What’s the most time you’ve spent on a problem that had a typo in it?, submitted on 2022-05-05 03:38:22+08:00.

—– 260.1 —–2022-05-05 19:09:21+08:00:

You likely learned a lot of stuff you wouldn’t have otherwise learned by struggling with the problem.

Like how sloppy textbook editors can be? Haha, kidding of course. And I agree with you.