• 270: What If Ukraine Wins?: Victory in the War Would Not End the Conflict With Russia, submitted on 2022-06-06 22:10:14+08:00.
• 271: What If Ukraine Wins?: Victory in the War Would Not End the Conflict With Russia, submitted on 2022-06-06 22:11:40+08:00.
• 272: The New Energy Order: How Governments Will Transform Energy Markets, submitted on 2022-06-07 22:40:09+08:00.
• 273: Why the Abraham Accords Fall Short: Sidelining the Palestinians Is a Recipe for Violence, Not Peace, submitted on 2022-06-07 22:49:16+08:00.
• 274: Russia’s Nuclear Power Hegemony: The West Is Dependent on Moscow for More Than Just Gas and Oil, submitted on 2022-06-08 22:21:34+08:00.
• 275: China’s Southern Strategy: Beijing Is Using the Global South to Constrain America, submitted on 2022-06-09 22:43:01+08:00.

270: What If Ukraine Wins?: Victory in the War Would Not End the Conflict With Russia, submitted on 2022-06-06 22:10:14+08:00.

—– 270.1 —–2022-06-06 22:10:56+08:00:

Find Foreign Affairs on Telegram: https://t.me/Foreign_Affairs_Magazine

271: What If Ukraine Wins?: Victory in the War Would Not End the Conflict With Russia, submitted on 2022-06-06 22:11:40+08:00.

—– 271.1 —–2022-06-06 22:11:50+08:00:

Find Foreign Affairs on Telegram: https://t.me/Foreign_Affairs_Magazine

272: The New Energy Order: How Governments Will Transform Energy Markets, submitted on 2022-06-07 22:40:09+08:00.

—– 272.1 —–2022-06-07 22:41:55+08:00:

[SS from the article by Jason Bordoff, Co-Founding Dean of the Columbia Climate School, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School]

“In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the world appears to be at an inflection point. Business leaders have declared the acceleration of deglobalization and sounded the alarm about a new period of stagflation. Academics have decried the return of conquest and hailed the renewal of transatlantic ties. And countries are rethinking almost every aspect of their foreign policies, including trade, defense spending, and military alliances.

These dramatic shifts have overshadowed another profound transformation in the global energy system. For the last two decades, the urgent need to reduce carbon emissions has gradually reshaped the global energy order. Now, as a result of the war in Ukraine, energy security has returned to the fore, joining climate change as a top concern for policymakers. Together, these dual priorities are poised to reshape national energy planning, energy trade flows, and the broader global economy. Countries will increasingly look inward, prioritizing domestic energy production and regional cooperation even as they seek to transition to net-zero carbon emissions. If countries retreat into strategic energy blocs, a multidecade trend toward more energy interconnectedness risks giving way to an age of energy fragmentation.

But in addition to economic nationalism and deglobalization, the coming energy order will be defined by something that few analysts have fully appreciated: government intervention in the energy sector on a scale not seen in recent memory. After four decades during which they generally sought to curb their activity in energy markets, Western governments are now recognizing the need to play a more expansive role in everything from building (and retiring) fossil fuel infrastructure to influencing where private companies buy and sell energy to limiting emissions through carbon pricing, subsidies, mandates, and standards.

This shift is bound to invite comparisons to the 1970s, when excessive government intervention in energy markets exacerbated repeated energy crises. The dawning era of government intervention won’t be a bad thing, however, if managed correctly. Appropriately limited and tailored to address specific market failures, it can forestall the worst effects of climate change, mitigate many energy security risks, and help manage the biggest geopolitical challenges of the coming energy transition. The current energy crisis has refocused the world’s attention on geopolitical energy risks, forcing a reckoning between tomorrow’s climate ambitions and today’s energy needs and offering a preview of the tumultuous era ahead. How governments respond to these challenges, brought into sharp relief by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, will shape the new energy order for decades to come.”

273: Why the Abraham Accords Fall Short: Sidelining the Palestinians Is a Recipe for Violence, Not Peace, submitted on 2022-06-07 22:49:16+08:00.

—– 273.1 —–2022-06-07 22:51:21+08:00:

[SS]

“On September 15, 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump stood on the White House balcony with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain to unveil one of his administration’s signature foreign policy achievements: the Abraham Accords. Trump declared that the pact, through which Bahrain and the UAE became the first two Gulf states to recognize Israel, signaled “the dawn of a new Middle East.” Since that time, Sudan and Morocco have also normalized relations with Israel and the UAE inked a trade deal with the country. This splintering of Arab unity has been remarkable, given the Arab world’s long-standing commitment to withhold political recognition until Israel agrees to end its military occupation over Arab land and comply with international law.

To deepen the ties inaugurated by the accords, Israel hosted a summit in March bringing together representatives of Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, the UAE, and the United States. At the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reminded those in attendance that Arab normalization is no substitute for a political solution between Israelis and Palestinians. But even though others made reference to Israeli-Palestinian peace in their prepared remarks, that topic was not on the agenda. Palestinians were not even invited to the gathering. And Jordan and Saudi Arabia—two players that would be integral in brokering a two-state solution—were notably absent.

When the UAE signed the Abraham Accords, the country’s ambassador to the United States, Yousef al-Otaiba, declared that the “most immediate and significant outcome” of the deal was Israel’s pledge to suspend its planned annexation of Palestinian land and pursue a negotiated peace deal. Yet de facto annexation continues unabated, and Israeli leaders have all but forsworn talks with Palestinians. The truth is that the accords have not advanced peace in the Middle East because Israel’s aim in signing the accords was to redirect world attention away from its military occupation, not to end it. Without international engagement, Palestinian displacement and Israeli land grabs will continue. Witness how in early May, Israel’s Supreme Court ruled that eight villages in the West Bank can be leveled and hundreds of residents expelled so the Israeli military can use the area as a firing zone.

The daily violence that is Israel’s military occupation takes place largely without international outcry. That the United States criticized the Israeli police for attacking mourners at the funeral of the Palestinian-American broadcaster Shireen Abu Aqleh—who was likely killed by a targeted Israeli attack while reporting in the occupied West Bank, according to reports by The Associated Press and CNN—is the exception that proves the rule. If the last two months are a harbinger, then the stage is set for the situation to become increasingly volatile across the occupied territories. Palestinians will refuse to have their basic rights indefinitely deferred.”

274: Russia’s Nuclear Power Hegemony: The West Is Dependent on Moscow for More Than Just Gas and Oil, submitted on 2022-06-08 22:21:34+08:00.

—– 274.1 —–2022-06-08 22:23:14+08:00:

[SS from the article by Jessica Lovering, Executive Director of the Good Energy Collective, and Havard Halland, senior economist at the OECD Development Centre]

“The invasion of Ukraine has thrust the world into an energy crisis. Since Russian troops began pouring across the country’s borders, oil prices have risen by more than a quarter. Gas prices have nearly doubled. And the outlook for both markets is not promising; as Western countries use sanctions to limit Russia’s ability to finance its war with oil and gas revenues, energy prices are likely to remain high and volatile. The wartime uncertainty is dovetailing with concerns about climate change, prompting further anxiety about the world’s energy future. Countries needed to start shifting away from fossil fuels decades ago to protect the planet. Now, they must do so at a time when people are paying increasingly high prices.

As states look to bring down high energy costs and disentangle themselves from Russia—while combating climate change—many have expressed a renewed interest in nuclear energy. It’s easy to see why. Nuclear power is already one of the world’s largest sources of carbon-free energy, responsible for 25 percent of the European Union’s electricity. Unlike most forms of renewable energy, such as solar and wind, nuclear power can reliably produce large quantities of electricity every hour of the year. And it has already helped Europe move away from fossil fuels extracted elsewhere in the world, including natural gas from Russia.

But in the short term, increasing Europe’s reliance on nuclear energy won’t free the continent from Russian fuel. Just as Europe has become dependent on Russian oil and gas, so too has much of the world become dependent on Russia for the materials needed to make nuclear power. Russia has close to half of the global capacity to enrich uranium for nuclear fuel, and 40 percent of the nuclear energy produced in Europe depends on uranium from Russia or Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both close allies of the Kremlin. Roughly half of all U.S. nuclear power plants—about 10 percent of total U.S. electricity generation—are powered by imports from those three countries (a fact that could explain why the U.S. nuclear industry lobbied to exclude uranium from sanctions on Russian energy imports.) Russia also dominates the market for nuclear power plant exports and construction, especially in emerging economies. Its closest competitor is China, another autocracy. States that contract with China or Russia could spend decades dependent on them for nuclear fuel and services.

To end Russia’s dominance over the nuclear business (and prevent China from taking its place), democratic countries need to get serious about supporting their domestic nuclear industries—especially as new, innovative technologies hit the market. They must implement policies that create demand for nuclear energy as part of their broader climate agendas, and they need to invest in creating nuclear manufacturing facilities that can reliably supply a growing global market. Doing so is critical both to fighting climate change and curtailing the global power of authoritarian regimes.”

275: China’s Southern Strategy: Beijing Is Using the Global South to Constrain America, submitted on 2022-06-09 22:43:01+08:00.

—– 275.1 —–2022-06-09 22:44:56+08:00:

[SS from the article by Nadége Rolland, Senior Fellow for political and security affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research.]

“For the past decade, Chinese President Xi Jinping has endeavored to help China attain what it considers to be its rightful position at the center of the world stage. To do this, Xi—along with the rest of China’s leadership—is attempting to consolidate the country’s economic, political, diplomatic, and military power. It is also working to counter U.S. pressure in the Indo-Pacific region. Xi’s desire to turn China into the world’s most powerful state is, after all, coupled with an inextricable corollary: the imperative of stopping what he sees as efforts by the West to contain it.But China’s grand strategy includes a third component: asserting its dominant position over a different international system of states. Chinese policymakers are attempting to create a sphere of influence comprising not just their country’s immediately contiguous region but also the entire emerging, non-Western, and largely nondemocratic world—the “global South.” Securing dominance over this vast swath of nations would provide a strong base for China’s power while restricting the United States’ actions and influence. Ultimately, that could help spell the end of U.S. global hegemony.”