• 292: Don’t romanticise the global south. Its sympathy for Russia should change western liberals’ sentimental view of the developing world, submitted on 2022-06-06 05:23:28+08:00.
• 293: Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond, submitted on 2022-06-06 19:41:34+08:00.
• 294: Beyond Weapons: Time for a New U.S. Strategy on Taiwan, submitted on 2022-06-07 11:23:04+08:00.
• 295: The New Energy Order: How Governments Will Transform Energy Markets, submitted on 2022-06-07 22:40:09+08:00.
• 296: Sci-fi series for 9 year old with a (12-15 year old’s reading level), submitted on 2022-06-11 19:16:47+08:00.
• 297: Former state health director Ezike under scrutiny by ethics investigator, submitted on 2022-06-11 20:34:06+08:00.

292: Don’t romanticise the global south. Its sympathy for Russia should change western liberals’ sentimental view of the developing world, submitted on 2022-06-06 05:23:28+08:00.

—– 292.1 —–2022-06-06 19:01:53+08:00:

Post a submission statement.

293: Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond, submitted on 2022-06-06 19:41:34+08:00.

—– 293.1 —–2022-06-06 19:46:20+08:00:

Submission Statement:

In this Atlantic Council report, Richard D. Hooker, Jr. analyzes triggers for escalation in Ukraine at several different levels and suggests strategic approaches to manage those risks. According to Hooker, what will become of Ukraine remains dependent on Western leadership. The greatest risk is a settlement in which Putin remains poised to fight another day, and preventing such an outcome ought to be NATO and the EU’s central objective. To accomplish this, both NATO and the EU should adopt a comprehensive strategy to cooperate out of mutual self interest on all levels.

294: Beyond Weapons: Time for a New U.S. Strategy on Taiwan, submitted on 2022-06-07 11:23:04+08:00.

—– 294.1 —–2022-06-07 11:39:55+08:00:

Submission Statement:

In this Op-Ed, John Bolton argues that the time has come to reconsider the United States’ strategic approach to Taiwan. But a new framework is needed first. The debate over Taiwan is not simply a matter of “defense,” or providing the “right weaponry.” So called “strategic ambiguity” is an archaic concept that has long outlived its utility — a realization that has apparently even dawned on the current administration, since Biden has said no less than three times that the United States would defend Taiwan if it were attacked. And that should come as no surprise. Aside from economic and strategic access perspectives, Taiwan’s territorial claim in the first island chain between China and the broader Pacific alone explains why. Accordingly, America’s strategy on Taiwan must contend with the fact that Taiwan is the geopolitical chokepoint to Beijing’s hegemony in the eastern hemisphere, at the very least.

—– 294.2 —–2022-06-07 11:43:12+08:00:

Submission Statement:

In this Op-Ed, John Bolton argues that the time has come to reconsider the United States’ strategic approach to Taiwan. But a new framework is needed first. The debate over Taiwan is not simply a matter of “defense,” or providing the “right weaponry.” So called “strategic ambiguity” is an archaic concept that has long outlived its utility — a realization that has apparently even dawned on the current administration, since Biden has said no less than three times that the United States would defend Taiwan if it were attacked. And that should come as no surprise. Aside from economic and strategic access perspectives, Taiwan’s territorial claim in the first island chain between China and the broader Pacific alone explains why. Accordingly, America’s strategy on Taiwan must contend with the fact that Taiwan is the geopolitical chokepoint to Beijing’s hegemony in the eastern hemisphere, at the very least.

295: The New Energy Order: How Governments Will Transform Energy Markets, submitted on 2022-06-07 22:40:09+08:00.

—– 295.1 —–2022-06-09 20:46:33+08:00:

Business leaders have declared the acceleration of deglobalization and sounded the alarm about a new period of stagflation.

What a strange sentence; almost as if to imply a policy by “business leaders” by decree. Doesn’t work that way. Economic trends have merely followed in response to the conditions created by Joe Biden’s policies influencing the landscape. Supply chain vulnerability is the sole proximate cause of the combination of post-COVID 19 trends described as “de-globalization,” and that vulnerability is solely the result of the governmental response to COVID 19.

Further, in view of the Biden administration’s reckless spending (among other failures) throughout the pandemic on top of the other harms caused by the COVID 19 response, stagflation was inevitable. If we’re now operating from the perspective that the world isn’t as flat as we previously thought it was (for those new to this subreddit, that’s a reference to Tom Friedman’s book, so titled), that’s due solely to the policies of governments the world over.

Academics have decried the return of conquest and hailed the renewal of transatlantic ties.

The academic commentary on these trends I’ve seen has been unsatisfying, almost without exception. At least from the so called foreign policy establishment. That being said, Marco Polo’s world (again, another reference for those new to this subreddit) isn’t fully back yet, either. But we’ll keep moving in that direction, to the extent the Biden administration’s foreign policy approach continues to sunset the United States’ role in global leadership.

These dramatic shifts have overshadowed another profound transformation in the global energy system. For the last two decades, the urgent need to reduce carbon emissions has gradually reshaped the global energy order. Now, as a result of the war in Ukraine, energy security has returned to the fore, joining climate change as a top concern for policymakers.

I agree that Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has profoundly disrupted energy markets. But reference to the concept of “energy security” is curious. Continental Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas and petrochemical resources more generally is a known vulnerability, as it has been since the existence of the Soviet Union. This isn’t new. Control over European energy markets has been an issue for more than the last two decades as an issue of geopolitical significance, and it has only been brought to forefront due to the game-changing reserves discovered by Exxon (and others) around 2013 in the Black Sea.

Russia’s control of the natural gas supply to Europe and more broadley continuing influence over energy markets in general depends on the structure of the competitive landscape. This influence is the key source of Russia’s ability to influence politics on the European continent. To illustrate, if non-Russian suppliers develop the capacity to supply the European continent, new supply alternatives exist to displace the functional monopoly currently held by Russian oil and gas companies. Examples abound, but the most significant manifestation of this relationship is in Germany’s historical reluctance to hold Vladimir Putin to account in view of the risk that Russia might turn off the gas.

It turns out there are tremendous natural gas reserves in the Black Sea, including within Ukraine’s EEZ (even more so before Crimea was lost). Ukraine, obviously, had no incentive whatsoever to cooperate with Russia on developing those fields which previously were not. Ukraine was moving in that direction and negotiating/partnering with certain non-Russian companies for those purposes.

Essentially, Ukraine very well could have been — and probably still will be — the alternative supplier to displace Russia in at least the Russian natural gas space. This is a game changer, across the board. Though it’s probably obvious, here’s an illustration: if Germany (and others) no longer have to depend on Russia, then Russia no longer has the ability to threaten to shut off the gas, to extract political concessions on the continent or otherwise influence European foreign policy. That mean’s Ukraine’s strategic value is completely redefined, as well. Before those Black Sea reserves were known, Ukraine had no pathway to NATO membership. Now, Ukraine’s pathway to NATO membership is obvious.

Somewhat relatedly, much confusion surrounds discussion of Ukraine’s potential NATO membership. Certain purported academics (such as John Mearsheimer) claim, as they have for years on end, that vague and ambiguous agreements were informally reached between the United States and Russian Federation, in the couple of years immediately after the USSR’s implosion.

Those individuals argue effect of “Ukraine’s membership in NATO represents continuity of a encircling trend, at the expense of Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’,” or so the story goes. This argument is incoherent, because if those were the goals, then Ukraine would already be a NATO member and the subject would have been settled when Russia was far weaker, during Yeltsin’s rule. Further, if encirclement was the goal, then the Budapest Memorandum wouldn’t have likely even been papered. Rather, Ukraine would have just ascended to become a NATO member, which is what it wanted all along and has wanted since the moment it became independent from the USSR.

Except that is not what happened at all. Rather, Washington’s concern was nuclear nonproliferation — a potentially catastrophic risk to global security, given the USSR’s operational incompetence with respect to security over its supply of nuclear arms and technology. Then, Ukraine’s concern was that if they gave up what they had, left over from the USSR, Russia would treat Ukraine as a vassal state or worse absent NATO membership. Now, and over the last decade or so, that risk has been reduced from theory to practice as Vladimir Putin has repeatedly violated Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Together, these dual priorities are poised to reshape national energy planning, energy trade flows, and the broader global economy.

This kind of language is difficult to take seriously. So called “green” advocates express no interest in nuclear power, the sole technology that has the ability to meet current or future needs (and by implication, the sole technology that has the ability to replace coal-generated electricity). Yet, these self-styled “green” advocates oppose nuclear power’s expansion almost without exception.

Though I assume most who are familiar with this subreddit are already aware, Germany’s inexplicable aversion to nuclear power is the reason why it is beholden to Russia. To sustain demands on Germany’s electrical grid, it has to burn natural gas. Natural gas Germany burns for this purpose comes from Russia. As a point of comparison, France’s electrical grid is not so encumbered, because France has (for now, at least) an outstanding nuclear utilization rate. But that said, I agree energy planning is critical. Germany lacks the infrastructure to import LNG because it does not have the facilities to convert. Most of the existing infrastructure comprises Soviet-legacy pipelines over land, across the continent.

Germany either has to import LNG to meet its needs, which it lacks the ability to do at this time, or come up with some other alternative. And if Germany is going to take this seriously, it will not put its eggs all in the same basket. Solar and wind have their place, but no one familiar with the technology rationally believes they can replace coal. Nuclear is the only option for sustained grid demand, and Germany should have started moving in that direction 30 years ago and stayed on course. Natural gas will continue to play a role in Germany’s electrical demands for the foreseeable future, so to the extent grid demands can’t be met with whatever else Germany is doing (whether solar, wind or anything else), it should be developing the infrastructure to import LNG.

Europe needs to follow France’s model (except to the extent that anti-nuclear voices seem to inexplicably be gaining ground there), in any case. Electricity generation by coal is no longer a viable means and must be replaced, for reasons that should be obvious. Coal can only be replaced by nuclear, but nuclear can’t meet fluctuating grid demand. Other options have to be available to supplement, and natural gas is the least worst means to that end at this time. Likewise, so called green advocates need to understand the technologies they advocate for. The useful life of wind turbines is a lot less than people realize and their carbon footprint is woefully undervalued. Same with solar. And both suffer the same reliability problems, because it turns out that acute increases in grid demand don’t reliably correlate with the weather. Sometimes that is true, but it has to always be true for those technologies to be viable in the absence of storage capacity.

—– 295.2 —–2022-06-11 21:21:56+08:00:

Business leaders have declared the acceleration of deglobalization and sounded the alarm about a new period of stagflation.

What a strange sentence; almost as if to imply a policy by “business leaders” by decree. Doesn’t work that way. Economic trends have merely followed in response to the conditions created by Joe Biden’s policies influencing the landscape. Supply chain vulnerability is the sole proximate cause of the combination of post-COVID 19 trends described as “de-globalization,” and that vulnerability is solely the result of the governmental response to COVID 19.

Further, in view of the Biden administration’s reckless spending (among other failures) throughout the pandemic on top of the other harms caused by the COVID 19 response, stagflation was inevitable. If we’re now operating from the perspective that the world isn’t as flat as we previously thought it was (for those new to this subreddit, that’s a reference to Tom Friedman’s book, so titled), that’s due solely to the policies of governments the world over.

Academics have decried the return of conquest and hailed the renewal of transatlantic ties.

The academic commentary on these trends I’ve seen has been unsatisfying, almost without exception. At least from the so called foreign policy establishment. That being said, Marco Polo’s world (again, another reference for those new to this subreddit) isn’t fully back yet, either. But we’ll keep moving in that direction, to the extent the Biden administration’s foreign policy approach continues to sunset the United States’ role in global leadership.

These dramatic shifts have overshadowed another profound transformation in the global energy system. For the last two decades, the urgent need to reduce carbon emissions has gradually reshaped the global energy order. Now, as a result of the war in Ukraine, energy security has returned to the fore, joining climate change as a top concern for policymakers.

I agree that Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has profoundly disrupted energy markets. But reference to the concept of “energy security” is curious. Continental Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas and petrochemical resources more generally is a known vulnerability, as it has been since the existence of the Soviet Union. This isn’t new. Control over European energy markets has been an issue for more than the last two decades as an issue of geopolitical significance, and it has only been brought to forefront due to the game-changing reserves discovered by Exxon (and others) around 2013 in the Black Sea.

Russia’s control of the natural gas supply to Europe and more broadley continuing influence over energy markets in general depends on the structure of the competitive landscape. This influence is the key source of Russia’s ability to influence politics on the European continent. To illustrate, if non-Russian suppliers develop the capacity to supply the European continent, new supply alternatives exist to displace the functional monopoly currently held by Russian oil and gas companies. Examples abound, but the most significant manifestation of this relationship is in Germany’s historical reluctance to hold Vladimir Putin to account in view of the risk that Russia might turn off the gas.

It turns out there are tremendous natural gas reserves in the Black Sea, including within Ukraine’s EEZ (even more so before Crimea was lost). Ukraine, obviously, had no incentive whatsoever to cooperate with Russia on developing those fields which previously were not. Ukraine was moving in that direction and negotiating/partnering with certain non-Russian companies for those purposes.

Essentially, Ukraine very well could have been — and probably still will be — the alternative supplier to displace Russia in at least the Russian natural gas space. This is a game changer, across the board. Though it’s probably obvious, here’s an illustration: if Germany (and others) no longer have to depend on Russia, then Russia no longer has the ability to threaten to shut off the gas, to extract political concessions on the continent or otherwise influence European foreign policy. That mean’s Ukraine’s strategic value is completely redefined, as well. Before those Black Sea reserves were known, Ukraine had no pathway to NATO membership. Now, Ukraine’s pathway to NATO membership is obvious.

Somewhat relatedly, much confusion surrounds discussion of Ukraine’s potential NATO membership. Certain purported academics (such as John Mearsheimer) claim, as they have for years on end, that vague and ambiguous agreements were informally reached between the United States and Russian Federation, in the couple of years immediately after the USSR’s implosion.

Those individuals argue effect of “Ukraine’s membership in NATO represents continuity of a encircling trend, at the expense of Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’,” or so the story goes. This argument is incoherent, because if those were the goals, then Ukraine would already be a NATO member and the subject would have been settled when Russia was far weaker, during Yeltsin’s rule. Further, if encirclement was the goal, then the Budapest Memorandum wouldn’t have likely even been papered. Rather, Ukraine would have just ascended to become a NATO member, which is what it wanted all along and has wanted since the moment it became independent from the USSR.

Except that is not what happened at all. Rather, Washington’s concern was nuclear nonproliferation — a potentially catastrophic risk to global security, given the USSR’s operational incompetence with respect to security over its supply of nuclear arms and technology. Then, Ukraine’s concern was that if they gave up what they had, left over from the USSR, Russia would treat Ukraine as a vassal state or worse absent NATO membership. Now, and over the last decade or so, that risk has been reduced from theory to practice as Vladimir Putin has repeatedly violated Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Together, these dual priorities are poised to reshape national energy planning, energy trade flows, and the broader global economy.

This kind of language is difficult to take seriously. So called “green” advocates express no interest in nuclear power, the sole technology that has the ability to meet current or future needs (and by implication, the sole technology that has the ability to replace coal-generated electricity). Yet, these self-styled “green” advocates oppose nuclear power’s expansion almost without exception.

Though I assume most who are familiar with this subreddit are already aware, Germany’s inexplicable aversion to nuclear power is the reason why it is beholden to Russia. To sustain demands on Germany’s electrical grid, it has to burn natural gas. Natural gas Germany burns for this purpose comes from Russia. As a point of comparison, France’s electrical grid is not so encumbered, because France has (for now, at least) an outstanding nuclear utilization rate. But that said, I agree energy planning is critical. Germany lacks the infrastructure to import LNG because it does not have the facilities to convert. Most of the existing infrastructure comprises Soviet-legacy pipelines over land, across the continent.

Germany either has to import LNG to meet its needs, which it lacks the ability to do at this time, or come up with some other alternative. And if Germany is going to take this seriously, it will not put its eggs all in the same basket. Solar and wind have their place, but no one familiar with the technology rationally believes they can replace coal. Nuclear is the only option for sustained grid demand, and Germany should have started moving in that direction 30 years ago and stayed on course. Natural gas will continue to play a role in Germany’s electrical demands for the foreseeable future, so to the extent grid demands can’t be met with whatever else Germany is doing (whether solar, wind or anything else), it should be developing the infrastructure to import LNG.

Europe needs to follow France’s model (except to the extent that anti-nuclear voices seem to inexplicably be gaining ground there), in any case. Electricity generation by coal is no longer a viable means and must be replaced, for reasons that should be obvious. Coal can only be replaced by nuclear, but nuclear can’t meet fluctuating grid demand. Other options have to be available to supplement, and natural gas is the least worst means to that end at this time. Likewise, so called green advocates need to understand the technologies they advocate for. The useful life of wind turbines is a lot less than people realize and their carbon footprint is woefully undervalued. Same with solar. And both suffer the same reliability problems, because it turns out that acute increases in grid demand don’t reliably correlate with the weather. Sometimes that is true, but it has to always be true for those technologies to be viable in the absence of storage capacity.

296: Sci-fi series for 9 year old with a (12-15 year old’s reading level), submitted on 2022-06-11 19:16:47+08:00.

—– 296.1 —–2022-06-12 01:47:25+08:00:

Dune. If your son can read and understand the Harry Potter series, then he should be reaching just slightly outside the scope of his current ability.

297: Former state health director Ezike under scrutiny by ethics investigator, submitted on 2022-06-11 20:34:06+08:00.

—– 297.1 —–2022-06-11 21:40:40+08:00:

From the article:

The state’s former public health director – a well-regarded adviser to Gov. J.B. Pritzker during the COVID-19 crisis – is under investigation by a state ethics agency for taking a CEO job at a medical nonprofit overseen and funded by the state agency she led.

Dr. Ngozi Ezike, a steady, reassuring figure alongside Pritzker during pandemic news conferences, stepped down from her $178,000-per-year state post in March. In April, she accepted an offer to lead Sinai Health System – one of the state’s top medical nonprofits.

The Illinois Ethics Act requires department heads like Ezike to wait a year before accepting positions with companies that hold contracts overseen by their departments, or with companies their departments license or regulate. And while in office they cannot engage in job negotiations with companies that lobby their agencies.

. . . Not even surprised. This is Illinois.

—– 297.2 —–2022-06-12 00:03:28+08:00:

The reason that the law exists as written is pretty straightforward. It’s a check against corruption, applicable to very high level public officials.

This is not a situation where a low-level state employee can’t go get a job at a hospital.

So, don’t confuse those situations. And also realize that anyone who goes into the “public sector” is perfectly well aware of the laws that govern the terms of their position, before they accept it. If they don’t want the job on those terms, they don’t have to accept. Really simple.

Here’s the scenario the ethics rule is designed to check against:

1. Public official in a position to improperly benefit private company is approached by private company.
2. Private company offers something amounting to a quid pro quo, for the private company’s benefit. For example, company says “If you use your position in ‘public service’ to award us this contract, we will give you a job that pays way more than you are making now or ever could make working for the government, at a specific point in the future.”
3. Public official says “Ok, I’m in.”
4. Company gets the contract.
5. Formerly public official takes a job making way more money than she could have ever hoped to make in the public sector.

Obviously, the one year bar is not a perfect check against the corruption associated with a public official accepting a bribe in the form of a lucrative private sector position subsequent to their time in “public service.”

But it’s better than nothing.

Even still, this is Illinois.

Things are what they are.

—– 297.3 —–2022-06-12 01:36:46+08:00:

Indeed. A casual review of public records suggests that Vaught — Madigan’s lawyer — was a common denominator in all sorts of eyebrow-raising circumstances throughout her “legal career.” A “legal career” that is fairly surprising, considering that she graduated from a law school whose admission criteria is little more than walking in the door. But she’s a power player behind the scenes. Which is the important thing. In Illinois, at least.

—– 297.4 —–2022-06-13 02:55:35+08:00:

Perhaps one day folks will comprehend the fact that a report button is not a “disagree” button.

—– 297.5 —–2022-06-13 06:24:38+08:00:

Just pretend to care about the rules

Yep, and maybe take a “consulting” job during that time. It’s a low bar.