EnclavedMicrostate在2022-06-06~2022-06-12的言论

2022-06-12 作者: EnclavedMicrostate 原文 #Reddit 的其它文章

508: Traveling with IRyS ʕˉʷˉʔ, submitted on 2022-06-06 03:16:27+08:00.

—– 508.1 —–2022-06-06 11:54:21+08:00:

BaeRyS honeymoon photo

509: Horizontally flipped Fauna will never hurt you. Horizontally flipped Fauna:, submitted on 2022-06-06 06:51:27+08:00.

—– 509.1 —–2022-06-06 11:48:58+08:00:

One day we will discover that it is in fact Fauna who is flipped Anuaf, and not the other way around.

—– 509.2 —–2022-06-06 15:04:42+08:00:

So if Fauna is flipped Enuaf then is Anuaf flipped Faune?

—– 509.3 —–2022-06-06 15:06:30+08:00:

…I need to hand in my pun credentials.

510: German WW2 abbreviated rank “O-Rtr.”, What does stand for?, submitted on 2022-06-06 21:06:20+08:00.

—– 510.1 —–2022-06-06 21:13:20+08:00:

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511: W W W W - Weekly Discussion Thread, June 6th, 2022, submitted on 2022-06-06 22:10:48+08:00.

—– 511.1 —–2022-06-07 14:22:12+08:00:

the chinese language

irked linguist noises

—– 511.2 —–2022-06-07 15:11:07+08:00:

There isn’t a single Chinese language, but rather a variety of languages with a common ancestor grouped under the Sinitic label. Mandarin, which is the basis of Standard Chinese and which is the most widely-spoken Chinese language on both sides of the Taiwan strait, is only one of these. I for one speak Cantonese natively, which is a language within the Yue subgroup that is not mutually intelligible with Mandarin.

—– 511.3 —–2022-06-07 21:16:25+08:00:

Yes, by convention, but it’s a bad convention and I’d like to influence people to change it. As a speaker of a minority Sinitic language, at a time when China itself has for decades cracked down on such languages, I may just have a certain justifiable annoyance at people treating Mandarin-derived Standard Chinese as the Chinese language.

—– 511.4 —–2022-06-08 14:48:51+08:00:

an okay brand of instant noodles

Demae Iccho is manna from heaven. I will not be taking further enquiries at this time.

—– 511.5 —–2022-06-08 18:45:16+08:00:

It’ll depend on your definition, because given things like the recent controversy over Luxiem’s merch vis-a-vis other EN units as well as ex-KR and ID livers, it seems like there’s a decent chunk of people who don’t see Niji as treating its talents equitably.

—– 511.6 —–2022-06-08 18:46:56+08:00:

Those two also caught my notice. Firstly, 20% annual growth does not sound sustainable.

Secondly, I’m getting the distinct impression that Anycolor’s approach is to disincentivise smaller talents leaving (given the comments about IP ownership and viability outside the company), and incentivise bigger talents staying. And I mean that works from a corporate perspective, but the word ‘sustainability’ continues to gnaw at the back of my mind here: how long can they keep it up?

EDIT: For another, at what point does it become the case that Niji either can’t keep their big talents from seeking greener pastures because the agency isn’t providing as much support as those talents might be able to arrange for themselves for less, or can’t keep their small talents because they aren’t getting the same incentives?

—– 511.7 —–2022-06-09 05:11:50+08:00:

So, here’s my problem with that. If you reward your more popular talents outright, that creates a positive feedback loop: streaming success is translated into greater direct financial opportunity (through merch for instance) which helps do things like pay for better equipment and just generally improve quality of life given the societies we live in, and also, critically, those benefitting from the loop may be able to stream full time which helps a lot with building up the audience and engagement that got them boosted in the first place.

Now, the question is, does not giving a similar positive feedback loop to smaller talents, especially when you now have the means (we’re talking 20% profit margins for 2021 here after all), essentially creating a negative feedback loop? How many of those smaller talents will be juggling one or more extra jobs because their VTuber activities aren’t paying for themselves and they thus aren’t getting attention from the agency? And if you’re having to do your VTuber gig part-time, you’re less able to build an audience than the full-timers.

Fair treatment is possible – not that everyone will get equal attention, of course not, but if disproportionately rewarding the better talents also makes them more able to receive such rewards, then the agency is essentially deliberately widening the gap.

—– 511.8 —–2022-06-09 11:09:28+08:00:

Bundling a reply here with one to /u/Nel_son_et_lumiere:

I do actually watch a bit of Niji, specifically EN (Selen and occasionally Pomu). Not a lot I’ll grant, but I’m not doing this as a 100% outsider. As for drama, yes I’ll admit I do have a sometimes-morbid fascination, but that’s because it fires off my historian synapses a bit. Given that Niji a) has drama that gets brought up here frequently and b) has gone public and thus publishes a lot more of its internal info, what else do you expect me to have more to say on?

Did I say I was a ‘diehard Hololive tribalist’? Yes. But I also said, immediately after that:

I want that to be on Hololive’s own merits and I don’t want Nijisanji to do worse, because there are many talented people there who don’t deserve to have their careers cut short by their agency making a risky financial decision.

If there were ever a case of words being taken out of context it is that comment up there.

To the meat of the matter and drawing it away from the ad hominems, obviously not everyone wants to stream full time, but my contention is not that Niji is overtly disallowing its talents from streaming full time. What I was stating was that from appearances, there is a clear set of feedback loops that means if you are big you keep getting bigger, and if you are small you stay the same. fI you’re small and don’t want to stream full-time then sure, that works out. But if you are small and want to be able to stream full-time, those loops don’t seem to have anything to work in your favour to allow you to do that.

And sure, it’s great that that 20% profit margin may be reinvested in more tech and so on, but you know, a further bonus for the talents who are the actual core of the operation might be nice?

EDIT: To expand a bit:

I don’t necessarily approach things with the notion that all agencies are necessarily bad; if I did I’d mainly watch indies. But I do look askance at a number of practices, and with a couple of major recent statements by Nijisanji and also more recently PRISM about certain internal matters, I find I have a lot in the industry to look especially askance at. As said, I do watch a couple of Niji talents and I don’t have anything against any individual ones outside one or two (Fulgur in the past solely due to the Discord leaks which he’s since apologised for and which I do agree in retrospect were overblown; Vox funnily enough I’d caught a bit of and liked just before Reimu incident and now I’m more ambivalent). But I think the agency managing those talents has an approach that I find somewhat objectionable.

—– 511.9 —–2022-06-10 12:47:41+08:00:

Look, I’m someone who bangs on about fair treatment a lot. But this is not a case of unfair treatment. Until relatively recently Hololive has had to operate on the assumption that 3D activities take place at the studio in Japan, and yet it created 3D models anyway in the hopes that members could travel soon enough to use them. And when that wasn’t possible, they still pulled out all the stops to get Myth and ID1 into 3rd Fes. If this were all taking place sans-COVID, and EN and ID members weren’t getting 3D within about 9 months except if the talents chose not to travel, then you could call it unfair. But we’re still living in a situation where the logistics of getting people 3D outside Japan are complicated but the alternative of getting them into Japan is still not practical, and that in turn has had knock-on effects for EN members within Japan. Arguably, IRyS not already having 3D is unfair, but equally, it would be its own form of unfairness for her to get hers before Myth gets to properly use theirs (with neither Ina nor Kiara having used their Home3D yet and quite probably for technical reasons).

—– 511.10 —–2022-06-10 12:48:00+08:00:

Also HK for good measure I guess.

—– 511.11 —–2022-06-11 02:27:13+08:00:

Actually that raises a question I’ve been having for a while – is A-Soul currently active? As in, is it still producing content?

—– 511.12 —–2022-06-11 09:26:04+08:00:

Has attention and/or support diminished heavily across the board or has it ultimately mostly been Carol-specific fans driving the backlash?

—– 511.13 —–2022-06-11 09:56:17+08:00:

cover of Q (yes, the hololive song)

We are reaching levels of recursion never thought possible…

—– 511.14 —–2022-06-11 23:54:00+08:00:

Per the official roadmap, HoloAlt consists of the PV, manga, HoloEarth, and Holonometria; Hololive Error doesn’t fall under the HoloAlt umbrella from what I can tell.

—– 511.15 —–2022-06-12 13:16:58+08:00:

I mean, even if only Gura’s appearing for the concert that doesn’t exclude the possibility that Myth as a whole might be in Japan around that time. Plus given it’s a paid concert and Gura is so far the only Myth member with a duo orisong with Calli, it’s not necessarily that the other three would be missing out that much by not being part of that.

—– 511.16 —–2022-06-12 13:37:04+08:00:

We heard zero inklings of the five-member North American offcollab until it happened, except in hindsight, so anything is possible.

—– 511.17 —–2022-06-12 13:42:02+08:00:

I mean Cover also drops news about new generations on quite short notice too. For all we know, this could be normal levels of secrecy compounded with possible continued uncertainty over travel. If it is happening there may well not be an announcement until the time is close enough that it’s a near-certainty it will go ahead. Again, not to say it is happening but there’s no particular reason to dismiss it out of hand.

—– 511.18 —–2022-06-12 13:52:28+08:00:

‘You can’t suspend me, I’m going on hiatus!’

512: What was the reaction of the pope and other important Christian figures of the time to the Taiping Rebellion?, submitted on 2022-06-07 06:25:35+08:00.

—– 512.1 —–2022-06-07 12:50:51+08:00:

This is one of those times where the most relevant answer to link is not one of my own, but rather one of /u/keyilan’s on an older version of a similar question: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/6qdmvz/how_did_the_pope_respond_to_hong_xiuquan_claiming/

Our ability to discuss reception of the Taiping by various overseas faith leaders is limited by a lack of available published research, at least in English. Whether this is due to an absence of evidence or an absence of interest is an open question, and it may be that some years down the line we will know the opinions on the Taiping held by Pope Pius IX, or Saint Philaret of Moscow, or Archbishop John Bird Sumner of Canterbury. As it stands, however, that information is not readily accessible. We do have a lot of published opinions by missionaries of numerous denominations within China, and there has been considerable analysis thereof, both of which I discuss in this answer. But as for leading lights back in Europe? Nothing as yet.

513: What happened to the ethnic Taiwanese after the Republic of China officials escaped mainland China and established a government in Taiwan?, submitted on 2022-06-07 17:25:25+08:00.

—– 513.1 —–2022-06-08 12:05:13+08:00:

In effect, yes. I’m not familiar enough with modern (i.e. post-1895) Taiwanese identity discourse to comment on the use of benshengren vs waishengren and the place of indigenous Taiwanese within the former category so I’ll operate in largely Qing terms here:

Taiwan’s indigenous Austronesian peoples had been largely undisturbed by external settlement until the mid-16th century, when the increasing commercial significance of the seas around Taiwan drew in permanent Dutch and Spanish colonisation in the southern and northern parts of the island, respectively, as well as temporary presences by smugglers, pirates, and more legitimate merchants from Japan and the Chinese mainland. The Dutch in particular deliberately encouraged Chinese migration in order to get workers for their sugar and rice plantations, which effectively marked the beginning of Han Chinese settlement on the island. When the Dutch were expelled from southern Taiwan in 1661-2 by Ming loyalists under Koxinga, these would be joined by these anti-Qing forces.

While the Qing initially expelled many of the old Ming loyalists from Taiwan, leaving a small rump permanent population, the perceived economic benefits of maintaining a settler presence were sufficient to convince authorities to agree to allow quite substantial populations of seasonal workers who would travel to Taiwan during the planting and harvest seasons and return to mainland China during the winter. This in time morphed into the ‘seasonal’ workers settling in Taiwan permanently and petitioning – often successfully – to have their families brought over. This was accompanied by both displacement and forcible assimilation of the indigenous peoples of the coastal plains where Qing settlers, er, settled. By 1780 it was estimated there were 800,000 Han compared to 40,000 indigenous people in the plains.

The Qing did not, however, exercise or intend to exercise meaningful control over the Taiwanese highlands until the 1870s, when diplomatic pressure legitimised calls for the state to expand its influence into those regions and also open them up for Han settlement. An aggressive programme of colonisation followed, with Han settlements strategically placed to break up tribal lands, woods cleared for roads and plantations, punitive expeditions against the indigenous tribes, and a deliberate programme of Confucianising education introduced. This would be interrupted by the Japanese annexation of Taiwan in 1895, at which point my understanding of the island’s ethnic relations ceases.

Framing this as settler-colonialism isn’t new, although it has, for obvious reasons of lack of popular interest, not really made it outside academic discourse. If you’re interested in going deeper though, Emma Teng’s Taiwan’s Imagined Geography is the thing to read.

—– 513.2 —–2022-06-08 14:42:11+08:00:

Assimilatory policies have meant that the plains indigenous peoples have unfortunately largely been subsumed, although there are still some 14,000 or so people identifying as members of one of the plains tribes (the three principal and locally-recognised ones being the Siraya, Taivoan, and Makatao). The highland tribes have generally remained much more cohesive, and altogether account for a little over 550,000 people. The combined indigenous people of Taiwan currently constitute around 2.4% of the total national population, albeit, as stated, weighted overwhelmingly towards the highland tribes.

514: Caffeine Scarcity. [Translated] (@raine64410175), submitted on 2022-06-07 21:37:24+08:00.

—– 514.1 —–2022-06-12 14:22:18+08:00:

I thought she dropped energy drinks entirely after a while?

515: Opinions on IRyS and her Outfits “Issue”, submitted on 2022-06-08 02:53:54+08:00.

—– 515.1 —–2022-06-08 12:27:17+08:00:

I’d like to throw in an extra factor that doesn’t always get brought up: while IRyS happens to live in Japan, the original VSinger requirements did not specify that applicants had to live in Japan, only that those who were Japanese-fluent would be preferred. So for all we know, Cover planned around the VSinger not being based in Japan and IRyS being in Japan was pure coincidence. Given how well in advance we know Cover plans some things, it’s legitimately possible that the original roadmap didn’t involve 3D until well down the line.

516: There’s no such thing as a coincidence o7, submitted on 2022-06-10 05:12:42+08:00.

—– 516.1 —–2022-06-10 20:37:33+08:00:

Without the racism I’d hope.

517: holo animals, submitted on 2022-06-10 06:16:18+08:00.

—– 517.1 —–2022-06-10 09:32:58+08:00:

Confusingly, while Zeta and Kaela aren’t animals there is a certain degree of animal theming: Zeta has the antelope pin and also Bazo is sort of canonically a deer of some kind, while Kaela’s outfit is inspired by the Barong which is a Balinese mythical creature.

518: What was it about the evolution of military combat among the nomadic peoples of the steppe that caused them to consistently dominate Europeans to the West when invading in force?, submitted on 2022-06-10 09:26:33+08:00.

—– 518.1 —–2022-06-10 20:36:26+08:00:

You’ve stumbled upon a phenomenon known in some circles as the ‘Nomadic Military Advantage’, something on which more can be said but where I’ve written a few answers here:

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/mhb2tl/why_wasnt_mongolia_invaded_or_annexed_any_time/gt0k2dc/

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/ncau53/what_led_to_the_decline_of_nomadic_people_horse/gy4qneo/

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/ojwh1l/has_there_ever_been_a_nation_or_group_where_every/h54e9px/

519: Which sources describing Alexander the Great’s relation to knowledge and science do we have and what do they tell us?, submitted on 2022-06-11 03:43:33+08:00.

—– 519.1 —–2022-06-12 03:36:16+08:00:

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520: Could Manchu rule of Han China (during the Qing dynasty) be considered colonialism?, submitted on 2022-06-11 04:28:30+08:00.

—– 520.1 —–2022-06-11 18:59:30+08:00:

You ask an interesting question, and the answer is, er, complicated.

What is colonialism, anyway?

If we just go by a dictionary definition, then let’s go with the good old Oxford English Dictionary, which defines colonialism as

(n.) the policy or practice of acquiring full or partial political control over another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it economically.

Which seems simple enough: conquer, settle, exploit. But wait, do we not actually define some entities as colonies that fail to fit one or more of those three requirements? Most European colonies in Africa involved little permanent settlement of white Europeans; similarly we could cite British India as a case where permanent settlement was limited. In these instances, colonial power was exercised through military power and control over institutions (both existing and newly-created), rather than the supplanting of the existing population. Some colonies were arguably not economically-motivated in nature, and maintained at the expense of the country holding them: the leased territories of Guangzhouwan, Port Arthur, and Weihaiwei served purely as naval bases; even today the UK has overseas possessions like Ascension, the Falklands, and the British Indian Ocean Territories whose principal functions are military force projection. And of course, what about Ireland, whose long-term subjection to English and later British rule did involve a number of economy-affecting policies such as the Plantations, but where overt extraction of resources was not necessarily the primary goal? Now, you can argue that colonialism isn’t just another word for ‘having colonies’: you can, in essence, have colonies not based in colonialism. But perhaps the issue is that ‘colonialism’ has been defined too narrowly.

If you can have colonies without colonialism, can you have colonialism without colonies? For instance, Michael Hechter has argued that the English and to an extent Lowland Scots were involved in ‘internal colonialism’ within the British Isles through the suppression of Celtic culture in Ireland, Wales, the Scottish Highlands, and Cornwall. We don’t consider the Scottish Highlands to be a colony of the Lowlands, or Wales to have been a colony of England, yet colonialism still serves as a valid frame of reference. As alluded to above of course, the notion of Ireland as a British/English colony, and the characterisation of British policy towards Ireland as ‘colonialism’, are arguably less controversial. So perhaps it is merely a matter of conventional classification: the entire contiguous United States east of the Appalachians is colonial territory per that OED definition above, yet we do not, conventionally, refer to it as such (for the most part).

I would argue, though, that we can and should take a relatively broad view of colonialism, not so much as a set of practices but rather as a discourse, and one which can take many specific forms depending on context. In broad terms, however, I would define colonialism as a discursive state in which one polity claims the authority to arbitrarily disregard or overrule the agency of another, typically on the basis of a presumed inherent superiority on the part of the acting polity. I distinguish this from imperialism in that I define that as being a discourse advocating the geographical extension of state power. There can, of course, be considerable overlap, but such overlap is not total. It is worth clarifying here that I am not using ‘polity’ synonymously with ‘state’, as there are both non- and sub-state structures of political organisation that can mark a community as a polity.

Situating Qing colonialism in historiographical context

Most discussions of Qing colonialism don’t concern the historically Han-majority regions of China proper, but they provide a useful point of reference by giving some context to how Qing historians discuss colonialism in general, and thus how applicable the concept would be to China. When historians of the Qing call it a ‘colonial empire’, they are almost invariably referring to the empire’s practices in regions beyond China proper, in imperial frontier regions like Taiwan, Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and southwest China. Some of these regions were subject to settler-colonialism, Taiwan and Xinjiang most prominently; yet a number of these were, in a broader sense, colonised through political reorganisation. Mongolian tribes were partitioned and confined to designated pasturages, while Tibetan Buddhism (which was also practiced by the Mongols) became integrated as a Qing state religion. Southwest China is a particularly interesting case because the discursive dimension is perhaps the best well-known, with Laura Hostetler’s work examining how cartographic and ethnographic projects crystallised a Qing vision of what southwest China ought to look like, during a period (the latter half of the eighteenth century) when the actual extent of Qing power remained relatively constant. Of course, not all colonialism under the Qing was overtly state-sponsored. Much of the settler-colonialism that marked Qing policy in southwest China, Taiwan, and latterly Manchuria were the result of Han demands for access to land to which the Qing either acquiesced under pressure (Taiwan, Manchuria) or just didn’t do much to stop it (SW China).

As such I think it makes sense to distinguish between three sorts of frontier colonialism under the Qing with somewhat different motivations and mechanics:

  1. State-backed settler-colonialism, which happened in Xinjiang after 1828, Taiwan after 1862, and Manchuria after around 1850, involved the Qing actively supporting efforts by predominantly Han settlers to establish permanent settlements in the regions in question. The typical motivation was security, with the settler population(s) presumed to be more loyal to the Qing than the existing population(s) in the regions being colonised, and thus both directly and indirectly acting as means of heading off revolts and invasions. Security was not always the sole concern, however: while the sponsored colonisation of Manchuria was partially motivated by an escalation in Russian encroachments from Siberia, it was also prompted by economic collapse in the region, with the colonists being brought in to exploit previously-untapped arable land and mineral resources. In short, the Qing deliberately altered these regions on a demographic level in order to create an environment more conducive to their rule.

  2. Institutional colonialism, which was the principal colonial mode in Tibet and Mongolia, involved the Qing emperors exercising an effectively unilateral claim to make changes to religious and political organisation, based on the either implicit or explicit claim that they knew what was best for them. In Mongolia this took the form of the jasak-banner system which delineated both the sizes and locations of tribal units, the subordination of Mongolian monasteries to the Dalai Lama-led Gelug priesthood at Lhasa, the replacement of Mongolian as a liturgical language in favour of Tibetan, and an attempt to create a unified, homogenised ‘Mongolian’ identity. In Tibet this manifested principally through the Qing essentially giving itself veto rights over new candidates for the Dalai Lama and other reincarnating clerics starting in 1792, an in the broader Tibetan world with the suppression of Bön and ‘Red Hat’ Buddhist sects in the aftermath of the Jinchuan Wars. In effect, the Qing relationship with Tibet involved a two-step process of strengthening the Gelug religious establishment’s control over the broader Tibetan and Vajrayana worlds, while also strengthening Qing control over Gelug clergy and religious institutions. While institutional colonialism did not involve demographic alteration via migration, it still aimed at a similar goal of imposing a Qing-conceived order on a local population, dressed in some notional sense that the Qing were realising a Qing-created ideal cultural state for said populations.

  3. Voluntary permanent migration, typically of Han Chinese populations, was sometimes resisted, sometimes ignored, and sometimes actively sponsored by the Qing, and applied to a number of areas including Southwest China, Manchuria before 1850ish, and can also be considered to include the emigrations that produced the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. This can be considered colonialism in many instances where Han settlers outright displaced local populations, but it was not an inherently state-backed process, nor intended to strengthen state control. Indeed, at times migrants were seeking to move to regions where Qing control was weak or nonexistent. In these scenarios the principal motivation was the economic benefit to the individual migrant and/or households and social networks.

—– 520.2 —–2022-06-11 21:22:37+08:00:

So, was Qing rule in China proper colonial in nature?

Well, I would argue that at least on the surface, two of those three categories listed above can be applied to Qing rule in China proper. Firstly, the presence of Banner garrison cities in partitions of major cities in China proper was, I would argue, settler-colonialism by definition. Banner people were resettled, on an initially temporary but eventually permanent basis, in strategically important locations, providing a reserve of loyal military manpower on the ground that both dissuaded revolts and invasions and could be relied upon to deal with them if they did arise. Secondly, Qing rulers often deliberately attempted to leave marks on Chinese culture and on the notion of Han identity, most notably the Qianlong Emperor. The compilation of the imperial encyclopaedia, the Siku Quanshu, under his auspices entailed a literary inquisition that saw a number of texts discarded, with the imperial state essentially promulgating its own canon of legitimate Confucian scholarship. The Qianlong reign also arguably saw the reification of Manchu and Han separation, and while the Manchus were the recipients of more attention than the Han were, some such as Pamela Crossley have argued that there was still an attempt to promulgate a singular ideal notion of Han identity. So, just as the Qing tried to create an ideal ‘Mongol-ness’ through institutional manipulations, we can argue that there were also attempts at creating an ideal ‘Han-ness’. What didn’t happen was opportunistic, economically-motivated migration from Manchuria to China proper on individual initiative. If there was Qing colonialism in China proper, it was exclusively a state enterprise.

If we wish to draw in some other, more broad-ranging perspectives, we can find other definitions of colonialism where Qing rule in China equally fits the bill. Peter Perdue cites one definition by Jürgen Osterhammel, which in most respects aligns with the definition I have used:

Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule.

This, as Perdue argues, is reasonably apposite. The Manchus, as stressed by many historians of the Qing, did not ‘Sinicise’ to compromise culturally with the Han population, or at least not in any intentional and systematic manner. They also made certain metaphysical claims to the right to rule in China, drawing on notions of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ to legitimise their rule over lands hitherto ruled by the Ming. At the same time, we ought not to overstress the alignment of this definition with Qing practice. While overt cultural compromise didn’t take place, neither did the Qing refuse to ingratiate themselves with local elites (Han or otherwise) and vice versa. Political compromise, which some (such as Charles Maier, also cited by Perdue) argue to be a critical dimension of imperial polities, could coexist with cultural segregation.

But was this Manchu colonialism?

This is where it gets tricky for a number of reasons, firstly because ‘Qing’ and ‘Manchu’ are not inherently synonymous, and secondly because ‘Manchu’ is also not inherently synonymous with ‘Banner’.

Now, for some the notion of the Qing as a Manchu state is essentially uncontroversial. Peter Perdue, for instance, comfortably regards the Manchus as the ruling population of the Qing by virtue of the Manchu identity of the imperial clan. I am not about to declare this perspective as inherently invalid, not least because I myself hold to a version of it, but I will stress that there is an alternative perspective to take. Pamela Crossley, whom I have mentioned above, has consistently argued that we ought not to see the Qing emperors, and by extension the Qing state as an abstracted entity, as having any kind of ethnic or cultural identity, but instead as amorphously adapting to individual contexts. The Qing emperors were of Manchu patrilineal descent, but their often simultaneous mobilisation of contextually-specific languages of power (Son of Heaven to the Han, Great Khan to the Mongols, etc.) shows that they were ultimately ‘culturally null’ as rulers. By extension, then, the Qing state was not a Manchu state, in that the Qing existed above and beyond the Manchu ethnic or cultural group. Now, the contention would be that the Manchus were a privileged group within the empire and/or that they served as an elite functionary caste in both civil and military capacities, and so we should see the Qing state as prioritising Manchu interests nevertheless. I would agree that this is also a valid take, but it is complicated by the role the Qing state itself had in creating and reifying Manchu identity, not unlike (indeed, in Crossley’s view, essentially synonymous with) how the Qing attempted to reify ideal notions of Mongol, Tibetan, and Han identities.

After all, if it was the Qing court, and not the Manchus acting collectively, that promulgated these idealised identities, Manchu and non-Manchu alike, then were Manchus equally colonial subjects of that imperial court? My view would be no, in that the Qing court was an institution and not a polity, but if your definition of colonialism differs then you may well say otherwise. Yet it would then become problematic to speak of ‘Qing colonialism’, and so I’d also note that the Manchus being themselves a colonised population would not prevent them from being instrumentalised by the Qing as a coloniser population in China at the same time, just as the Han were instrumentalised as colonisers on the frontiers: if we want to return to the British Empire here, we can bring up the role of Scots and Irish in colonial warfare and administration, or of the complicated place of Indian soldiers in British service in other colonial contexts such as Afghanistan. But there is perhaps a subtle difference between ‘colonialism in a way that benefits the Manchus’ and ‘Manchu colonialism’, which I hope has been highlighted by the above discussion.

Even if we accept the conceit that the Banners were not only an elite group but the ruling population of the empire, we run into the problem that ‘Manchus’ and ‘Banner people’ were not necessarily the same thing, although the two came to be colloquially conflated in time. The Banners, as originally conceived, were an extremely multiethnic entity, encompassing a wide variety of populations. The simple tripartite division into Manchu, Mongolian, and Hanjun Banners obscures a number of ethnic sub-units within the Banners, including Koreans, ‘post-conquest Han’, Khorchins (defined as distinct from Mongols within the Banners), non-Manchu Tungusic tribes, even some Russians. Although all Banner people came to be identified as Manchus in time (indeed, the modern requirement for claiming Manchu ethnic status is simply to prove ancestry within the Banners), the exact point at which the the Banners as a functional caste morphed into the Manchus as an ethnic group – and whether there was in fact a phase during which the Banners stopped being purely a functional caste but were not a purely Manchu institution either – has been a question left unresolved for literal decades at this point.

As such, it isn’t unambiguously clear that we can frame Qing colonialism as necessarily Manchu colonialism. Yes, the Qing approach to the Han Chinese arguably involved the same colonialist discourses that underpinned their approaches to the Tibetans and the Mongols, but such discourses were comparably employed towards the Manchus, whose centrality to Banners in particular, let alone the Qing state writ large, was not unambiguous. We can certainly speak of ‘Qing colonialism’, but ‘Manchu colonialism’ is perhaps harder to use without some strong caveats.

Sources and Further Reading

  • Peter C. Perdue, ‘China and Other Colonial Empires’, The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 16:1/2 (2009)

  • Peter C. Perdue, ‘Comparing Empires: Manchu Colonialism’, The International History Review 20:2 (1998)

  • Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (2001)

  • Johan Elverskog, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, and the State in Late Imperial China (2008)

  • Max Oidtmann, Forging the Golden Urn: The Qing Empire and the Politics of Reincarnation in Tibet (2018)

  • Eric Schluessel, Land of Strangers: The Civilizing Project in Qing Central Asia (2020)

  • Emma Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895 (2004)

  • Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (1999)

  • Seonmin Kim, Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations Between Qing China and Choson Korea, 1636-1912 (2017)

  • Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (2001)

  • James Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (1998)

—– 520.3 —–2022-06-12 19:44:29+08:00:

I did have a think over it as I was writing it out, and I would clarify as follows:

What defines colonialism in my view is not the act in itself, but the basis of the claim to be allowed to act, and critically by virtue of some notion that the acting polity has some essential superiority over any existing polities that those acts affect. In addition, the claim is that the colonised polity is not entitled to its own agency. It is one thing to have a temporary state of war in which one polity uses force to constrain another’s freedom of action in certain senses, and another thing to claim that the other polity can and should never have agency in any regard whatsoever.

A naval blockade, for instance, is not necessarily an act of colonialism, for instance if there is the expectation there will ultimately be a peace deal (which depending on the war in question could be a heavily negotiated settlement) and that the blockaded power will resume its existence as an independent polity; it also need not be underpinned by the notion that the existence of the blockaded polity as an independent entity is illegitimate, or that the blockader power is inherently entitled to dictate any terms it wants – it may only be contingently entitled to that through its exercise of force.

Anti-nuclear proliferation, however, gets trickier, though I think a framework of colonialism can apply. You could very well make the case that enforced non-proliferation is a form of colonial act in that the nuclear ‘haves’ deliberately prevent nuclear ‘have-nots’ from becoming ‘haves’ and gaining a greater degree of geopolitical presence. The notion would be that the non-nuclear powers are, to use my exact phrasing, not entitled to possess nuclear arms. You don’t have to agree with this line of argument, but I would suggest that under a broader definition we can and maybe even should see colonialism as a discourse underpinning quite a wide range of possible acts.

—– 520.4 —–2022-06-12 20:30:22+08:00:

It is worth stressing that the term ‘polity’ does not refer to the governing entity of a particular society, but to a society that has some form of governing entity. Stating for instance that the Duchy of Nowhereia is an illegitimate state that ought to be replaced with a democracy is different from saying that the very notion of the country of Nowhereia is illegitimate and it ought to be annexed into the territory of Someotherplaceland.

As for power differential, I think I have made clear by emphasising the importance of an underlying notion of superiority that I do think it matters, but it worth suggesting that the differential need not be an actual one, only a conceptual one.

521: Did Athens or Sparta leave behind a better legacy? Why?, submitted on 2022-06-11 09:13:25+08:00.

—– 521.1 —–2022-06-11 09:22:40+08:00:

This submission has been removed because it violates the rule on poll-type questions. These questions do not lend themselves to answers with a firm foundation in sources and research, and the resulting threads usually turn into monsters with enormous speculation and little focused discussion. Questions about the “most”, the “worst”, “unknown”, or other value judgments usually lead to vague, subjective, and speculative answers. For further information, please consult this Roundtable discussion.

For questions of this type, we ask that you redirect them to more appropriate subreddits, such as /r/history or /r/askhistory.

522: There’s your proof! Enough Said!, submitted on 2022-06-11 17:51:03+08:00.

—– 522.1 —–2022-06-11 21:48:49+08:00:

The second PV for Hololive Alternative, a side project being worked on by Cover.

—– 522.2 —–2022-06-11 23:32:32+08:00:

The second PV for Hololive Alternative, a side project being worked on by Cover, which is the company behind VTuber agency Hololive production.

—– 522.3 —–2022-06-11 23:32:49+08:00:

The second PV for Hololive Alternative, a side project being worked on by Cover.

—– 522.4 —–2022-06-12 01:52:16+08:00:

It’s the umbrella term for a number of non-streaming, lore-focussed side project content organised under one particular part of Cover, consisting of animated teasers like these at roughly yearly intervals, but interspersed with manga, the ongoing HoloEarth game project, and Holonometria. Confusingly, HoloAlt is not in charge of Error.

—– 522.5 —–2022-06-12 01:53:24+08:00:

For what it’s worth, presenting Hololive as purely a streamer agency is a bit of a misnomer; it’s perhaps better to conceptualise it as a multimedia variety entertainment talent agency where the talents all happen to livestream, and then just kinda accept that a large variety of experimental stuff happens.

523: Seems like the girl in the PV has a twitter account, submitted on 2022-06-11 18:02:55+08:00.

—– 523.1 —–2022-06-11 18:12:59+08:00:

I’m 90% sure You Kururu is a Cover staff member who works on HoloEarth and that the profile pic is temporary. I mean alternatively they are actually going to debut as a game dev VTuber but that seems unlikely.

524: Can i get to Oxford with a drama A level?, submitted on 2022-06-12 03:03:52+08:00.

—– 524.1 —–2022-06-12 03:53:45+08:00:

Oxford’s typical requirements, at least for humanities, are three As in any subjects, albeit including the one most relevant to your course. So unless you’re planning on taking psych you should be fine.

—– 524.2 —–2022-06-12 12:55:27+08:00:

I did indeed, and I’m heading back this autumn.

—– 524.3 —–2022-06-12 15:16:12+08:00:

Indeed I am.

525: Kiara German Language Channel Now Open, submitted on 2022-06-12 03:08:01+08:00.

—– 525.1 —–2022-06-12 23:25:06+08:00:

Damn, we must be lost then because the only Kiwawa we have is from Austria.

—– 525.2 —–2022-06-12 23:25:18+08:00:

Also that bit of Belgium.

526: [hololive Alternative] 2nd Teaser, submitted on 2022-06-12 08:57:45+08:00.

—– 526.1 —–2022-06-12 13:03:58+08:00:

HoloALT is a lore-centric multimedia project whose original plan seems to have been three manga accompanied by a lore website (Holonometria) and followed by a game (HoloEarth), with animated PVs as extra promotion, but complications have meant only one of the three manga has actually been released so far and the lore site reflects that. The game, however, is in active development. There are, however, certain side projects that don’t fall under HoloAlt, notably Hololive ERROR.

527: Why asian counties like China, Korea, Japan never get on with each other?, submitted on 2022-06-12 15:59:10+08:00.

—– 527.1 —–2022-06-12 16:22:24+08:00:

This submission has been removed because it involves current events. To keep from discussion of politics, we have a 20-year rule here. You may want to try /r/ask_politics, /r/NeutralPolitics, or another current-events focused sub. For further explanation of this rule, feel free to consult this Rules Roundtable.

528: He Really Tanked This Prediction, submitted on 2022-06-12 20:17:07+08:00.

—– 528.1 —–2022-06-13 11:09:01+08:00:

I mean even if the quote was real (it isn’t) it would nevertheless be correct. Cavalry’s principal function was to serve as mobile infantry, something which tanks aren’t. Lorries (that’s trucks for those of you across the Atlantic) and armoured personnel carriers replaced the horse, not the tank. Yes, tank forces were and are often the descendants of cavalry formations, but the functions of cavalry were replicated by a combination of tanks and motorised and mechanised infantry (which are invariably integrated as part of armoured formations), and mostly the latter.

529: [Hobby Scuffles] Week of June 13, 2022, submitted on 2022-06-12 23:00:15+08:00.

—– 529.1 —–2022-06-13 23:38:38+08:00:

Reminds me of RWBY a bit honestly – there are people who genuinely like it but generally acknowledge the show is largely okay but rarely great, and then there are the people for whom the show being anything short of brilliant is an utter affront to all that is holy.

—– 529.2 —–2022-06-14 19:25:50+08:00:

I just had a look at the Tactics Ogre series and I’m slightly saddened that they didn’t stick to just using Queen song titles for the game titles.

—– 529.3 —–2022-06-16 03:21:40+08:00:

By happy coincidence, last night Izzzyzzz released a video on the Yogventures Kickstarter, just as I was writing about a failed kickstarter for a full writeup here.

—– 529.4 —–2022-06-16 13:44:33+08:00:

Active VTuber I’d hope and not yet another VTweeter?

—– 529.5 —–2022-06-19 03:28:48+08:00:

I hate painting horses. But I love having cavalry.

It’s a classic case of, ‘I want to have done X, but I don’t want to do X.’

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