• 276: Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power, submitted on 2022-06-14 22:53:33+08:00.
• 277: The Consequences of Conquest: Why Indo-Pacific Power Hinges on Taiwan, submitted on 2022-06-16 23:56:00+08:00.
• 278: A Post-Roe World?: Why Abortion Battles in America Won’t Halt Reform Abroad, submitted on 2022-06-17 00:05:36+08:00.
• 279: Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba: How Ukraine Will Win, submitted on 2022-06-17 21:40:26+08:00.
• 280: How Ukraine Will Win: Kyiv’s Theory of Victory, submitted on 2022-06-17 21:43:50+08:00.

276: Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power, submitted on 2022-06-14 22:53:33+08:00.

—– 276.1 —–2022-06-14 22:54:54+08:00:

[SS from the article by Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London]

“Military power is not only about a nation’s armaments and the skill with which they are used. It must take into account the resources of the enemy, as well as the contributions from allies and friends, whether in the form of practical assistance or direct interventions. And although military strength is often measured in firepower, by counting inventories of arms and the size of armies, navies, and air forces, much depends on the quality of the equipment, how well it has been maintained, and on the training and motivation of the personnel using it. In any war, the ability of an economy to sustain the war effort, and the resilience of the logistical systems to ensure that supplies reach the front lines as needed, is of increasing importance as the conflict wears on. So is the degree to which a belligerent can mobilize and maintain support for its own cause, both domestically and externally, and undermine that of the enemy, tasks that require constructing compelling narratives that can rationalize setbacks as well as anticipate victories. Above all, however, military power depends on effective command. And that includes both a country’s political leaders, who act as supreme commanders, and those seeking to achieve their military goals as operational commanders.

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has underscored the crucial role of command in determining ultimate military success. The raw force of arms can only do so much for a state. As Western leaders discovered in Afghanistan and Iran, superior military hardware and firepower may enable forces to gain control of territory, but they are far less effective in the successful administration of that territory. In Ukraine, Putin has struggled even to gain control of territory, and the way that his forces have waged war has already ensured that any attempt to govern, even in Ukraine’s supposedly pro-Russian east, will be met by animosity and resistance. For in launching the invasion, Putin made the familiar but catastrophic mistake of underestimating the enemy, assuming it to be weak at its core, while having excessive confidence in what his own forces could achieve.”

277: The Consequences of Conquest: Why Indo-Pacific Power Hinges on Taiwan, submitted on 2022-06-16 23:56:00+08:00.

—– 277.1 —–2022-06-16 23:57:00+08:00:

[SS from the article by Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Professor of Political Science at theUniversity of Cincinnati, and Caitlin Talmadge, Professor of Security Studies at the Walsh School ofForeign Service at Georgetown University]

“Of all the intractable issues that could spark a hot war between the United States and China, Taiwan is at the very top of the list. And the potential geopolitical consequences of such a war would be profound. Taiwan—“an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender,” as U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur once described it—has important, often underappreciated military value as a gateway to the Philippine Sea, a vital theater for defending Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea from possible Chinese coercion or attack. There is no guarantee that China would win a war for the island—or that such a conflict wouldn’t drag on for years and weaken China. But if Beijing gained control of Taiwan and based military assets there, China’s military position would improve markedly.

Beijing’s ocean surveillance assets and submarines, in particular, could make control of Taiwan a substantial boon to Chinese military power. Even without any major technological or military leaps, possession of the island would improve China’s ability to impede U.S. naval and air operations in the Philippine Sea and thereby limit the United States’ ability to defend its Asian allies. And if, in the future, Beijing were to develop a large fleet of quiet nuclear attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, basing them on Taiwan would enable China to threaten Northeast Asian shipping lanes and strengthen its sea-based nuclear forces.

Clearly, the island’s military value bolsters the argument for keeping Taiwan out of China’s grasp. The strength of that case, however, depends on several factors, including whether one assumes that China would pursue additional territorial expansion after occupying Taiwan and make the long-term military and technological investments needed to take full advantage of the island. It also depends on the broader course of U.S. China policy. Washington could remain committed to its current approach of containing the expansion of Chinese power through a combination of political commitments to U.S. partners and allies in Asia and a significant forward military presence. Or it might adopt a more flexible policy that retains commitments only to core treaty allies and reduces forward deployed forces. Or it might reduce all such commitments as part of a more restrained approach. Regardless of which of these three strategies the United States pursues, however, Chinese control of Taiwan would limit the U.S. military’s ability to operate in the Pacific and would potentially threaten U.S. interests there.

But the issue is not just that Taiwan’s tremendous military value poses problems for any U.S. grand strategy. It is that no matter what Washington does—whether it attempts to keep Taiwan out of Chinese hands or not—it will be forced to run risks and incur costs in its standoff with Beijing. As the place where all the dilemmas of U.S. policy toward China collide, Taiwan presents one of the toughest and most dangerous problems in the world. Simply put, Washington has few good options there and a great many bad ones that could court calamity.”

278: A Post-Roe World?: Why Abortion Battles in America Won’t Halt Reform Abroad, submitted on 2022-06-17 00:05:36+08:00.

—– 278.1 —–2022-06-17 00:06:06+08:00:

[SS]

“Any day now, the U.S. Supreme Court will release a ruling that is likely to overturn its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, the case that affirmed a constitutional right to abortion. Reversing Roe would have profound implications for abortion access in the United States. Such a decision would also have ramifications abroad, particularly if a judicial ruling empowers future U.S. presidential administrations to push for restrictions on abortion in other parts of the world.

It is important, however, not to overstate U.S. influence on global abortion policy. The 1973 case was a landmark in allowing abortion access and served as an example to abortion advocates across the world. But in the 50 years since, the United States’ international messaging on abortion has been incoherent. U.S. law made abortion legal at home, but additional legislation that followed gave U.S. presidential administrations tools to restrict access abroad. Indeed, the United States, with policies that are at worst obstructionist and at best inconsistent, has been instrumental in blocking international agreement on abortion liberalization. Nevertheless, the global trend has slowly moved toward greater access to abortion. Whatever the fate of Roe in the United States, other countries will decide their own abortion policies as they see fit.”

279: Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba: How Ukraine Will Win, submitted on 2022-06-17 21:40:26+08:00.

—– 279.1 —–2022-06-17 21:40:47+08:00:

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280: How Ukraine Will Win: Kyiv’s Theory of Victory, submitted on 2022-06-17 21:43:50+08:00.

—– 280.1 —–2022-06-17 21:44:49+08:00:

{SS from the article by Dmytro Kuleba, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine}

“To avoid growing weary of the war and falling for misleading narratives, the West needs to understand exactly how Ukraine can win, and then support us accordingly. This war is existential, and we are motivated to fight. Properly armed, our forces can stretch Putin’s troops—which are already exhausted—past the breaking point. We can counterattack Russian forces in both Ukraine’s south and Ukraine’s east, pressuring Putin to decide which of his gains to protect. To succeed, however, the United States and its European allies must swiftly supply our country with appropriate numbers of advanced heavy weapons. They must also maintain and increase sanctions against Russia. And, critically, they need to ignore calls for diplomatic settlements that would help Putin before he makes serious concessions.

Compromising with Russia may seem tempting to some abroad, especially as the costs of the war grow, but bowing to Putin’s aggression will help him destroy more of our nation, embolden his government to carry out attacks elsewhere in the world, and allow him to rewrite the rules of the global order. His approach to talks could change; if we succeed in pushing back Russian troops far enough, Putin may be compelled to come to the table and deal in good faith. But getting there will require that the West exercise patient dedication to one outcome: a complete and total Ukrainian victory.”