Twitter @China Media Project: 2022-10-03~2022-10-09
The CMP is an independent research project studying the Chinese media landscape within the PRC and globally, as well as the CCP’s media and political discourse.
- 1: 2022-10-03 12:15:58+08:00 推文
- 2: 2022-10-03 12:17:16+08:00 推文
- 3: 2022-10-05 11:10:37+08:00 推文
- 4: 2022-10-05 11:12:51+08:00 推文
- 5: 2022-10-05 11:14:36+08:00 推文
- 6: 2022-10-05 11:16:31+08:00 推文
- 7: 2022-10-06 09:26:06+08:00 推文
- 8: 2022-10-06 10:48:32+08:00 推文
- 9: 2022-10-06 14:39:38+08:00 推文
- 10: 2022-10-06 14:43:28+08:00 推文
- 11: 2022-10-06 14:46:30+08:00 推文
- 12: 2022-10-06 17:49:53+08:00 推文
- 13: 2022-10-06 17:59:57+08:00 推文
- 14: 2022-10-06 18:02:15+08:00 推文
- 15: 2022-10-06 18:05:29+08:00 推文
- 16: 2022-10-06 22:56:43+08:00 推文
- 17: 2022-10-07 17:16:29+08:00 推文
- 18: 2022-10-07 17:18:05+08:00 推文
- 19: 2022-10-07 17:51:08+08:00 推文
1: 2022-10-03 12:15:58+08:00 推文
Until Xi Jinping’s banner term is shortened at the upcoming 20th National Congress, this will be a serious problem for shorter bridges.
Matthew Walsh: Slogan season in Beijing, and this one in Dongzhimen just rolls off the tongue: “Spare no effort in composing a new chapter of comprehensively building a socialist modern Beijing under the guidance of Xi Jinping thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.”
2: 2022-10-03 12:17:16+08:00 推文
A quick look at how various policy-related permutations of Xi Jinping’s “banner term” (旗帜语) have been faring ahead of the 20th National Congress. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/10/03/xiplomacy-gets-rare-stage-time/
3: 2022-10-05 11:10:37+08:00 推文
Exhausted by the speculation and commentary over the upcoming 20th National Congress of the CCP, which will prove important (but as exciting as watching paint dry)? . . . . Perhaps you should read about “political depression” in the CMP Dictionary. https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/political-depression/
4: 2022-10-05 11:12:51+08:00 推文
Re There’s a great rundown on the Congress by @lingli_vienna here, in thread form and at The Diplomat.
𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐋𝐢: I wrote a long-form piece for The Diplomat, explaining how the Party Congress works.
I also identify the formally authorized group who makes the final approval of nominated candidates for the membership of the Central Committee.
Main takeaways. A thread.
5: 2022-10-05 11:14:36+08:00 推文
Re And a helpful rundown of the schedule this month as well.
𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐋𝐢: #CCP Calendar
9.10 7th plenum mtg of 19th Central Committee
16.10 20th Party Congress opens
22.10 Congress votes on
Party Charter
Central Committee
Congress closes
23.10 1st plenum mtg of 20th CC votes on
Politburo
PSC
Head of Party
Central Secretariat
6: 2022-10-05 11:16:31+08:00 推文
Re This piece by Martin Wolf in the FT is also well worth a read. “Ten years is always enough.” https://www.ft.com/content/fa1510a3-0ea9-4eab-a67c-392c7704fdb1
7: 2022-10-06 09:26:06+08:00 推文
Our latest: a fascinating example of how the Chinese leadership appropriates popular memes from social media to incorporate them into “mainstream” (CCP-led) propaganda. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/10/06/no-lying-down-on-covid/
8: 2022-10-06 10:48:32+08:00 推文
“Lying down” (躺平) rose in popularity in 2021 in China as an anti-battle-cry against ambition. Now the CCP leadership is turning the buzzword into a harsh critique of those who suggest the country should relax Covid-related restrictions. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/10/06/no-lying-down-on-covid/
9: 2022-10-06 14:39:38+08:00 推文
It’s not often that we promote a post that is more than 5 years old. But CMP’s analysis in March 2017 of how Xi Jinping MIGHT POSSIBLY frame his “banner term” and seal his legacy is a crucial look at the 20th National Congress thru what might have been. https://chinamediaproject.org/2017/03/19/xi-jinping-gotten-crown/
10: 2022-10-06 14:43:28+08:00 推文
Re At that time, we looked at several possibilities, which included Xi Jinping Theory” (习近平理论) and “Xi Jinping Strategy” (习近平战略).
11: 2022-10-06 14:46:30+08:00 推文
Re Might it instead have been “Xi Jinping Concept” (习近平理念)? . . . All of these seemingly pointless questions are in fact very important within the CCP’s political culture and history. Understanding that is critical to understanding what comes at the 20th Nat. Congress.
12: 2022-10-06 17:49:53+08:00 推文
Self-criticism, or 自我批评, of this nature is chilling to read in 21st-century China. But the “letter of self-confession,” or jiantaoshu (检讨书), is terribly common, and possibly one of the most prolific genres under CCP rule.
Muyi Xiao: We are making public for the first time the contents of the apology letter that Dr. Li’s employer made him write.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/10/05/world/asia/li-wenliang-letter.html
13: 2022-10-06 17:59:57+08:00 推文
Re Aside from the language in the letter, it’s important to note of course the date: December 30. This is 3 full weeks before Xi Jinping issued his “important instructions” on the virus and the official state media got on board.
14: 2022-10-06 18:02:15+08:00 推文
Re But even then, this major story with implications for the world was still downplayed for days. For 4 days from January 22—25 there was NO MENTION of Covid in the People’s Daily. Xi Jinping propaganda took the central position. More from Qian Gang: https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/02/24/what-ails-the-peoples-daily/
15: 2022-10-06 18:05:29+08:00 推文
Re It’s important also to note that the Li Wenliang letter explicitly mentions the 2003 SARS epidemic — because that was meant to have been the episode from which China learned the hard lesson about grappling with breaking crises openly and concertedly.
16: 2022-10-06 22:56:43+08:00 推文
RT 𝐋𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐋𝐢
Given the strategic importance and weight of the CCDI in the power system of the Party, it would make sense to change the head of CCDI regularly and assign Zhao Leji to a different portfolio at the coming congress, on the premise that he is age-eligible to stay on.
Christian Shepherd: In contrast to some other strongmen, he concentrated power by melding personal authority with expanded but long-standing instruments of Party control. The National Supervisory Commission, for example, allows Xi to “compel consent” from colleagues, said @lingli_vienna (2/5)
17: 2022-10-07 17:16:29+08:00 推文
The discourse of the Chinese Communist Party can be rigid and ritualistic. But it also changes, incorporating new terms and recycling old ones. Here’s a look at how CCP media are now using a popular online phrase. https://chinamediaproject.org/2022/10/06/no-lying-down-on-covid/
18: 2022-10-07 17:18:05+08:00 推文
“Political depression”: A good term to study up on as the run-up to the 20th National Congress has you, well, depressed about the direction of CCP politics. More in the CMP Dictionary. https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/political-depression/
19: 2022-10-07 17:51:08+08:00 推文
A simple yet profound observation about where information is in China today.
Chenchen Zhang 🤦🏻♀️: unfortunately not an exaggeration
and the web is dead in China, not just bc of WeChat
if I search something in baidu all I get is a full page of apps. in other words all the “content” the internet has to offer is hosted by segregated apps
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