• 341: How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine: The Case Against Incrementalism - Michael McFaul, submitted on 2023-01-30 22:52:46+08:00.
• 342: Andrei Kolesnikov: How Russians Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the War, submitted on 2023-02-02 00:39:18+08:00.
• 343: What Ukraine Needs to Liberate Crimea - Alexander Vindman, submitted on 2023-02-02 22:16:51+08:00.
• 344: The Long Twilight of the Islamic Republic: Iran’s Transformational Season of Protest, submitted on 2023-02-02 22:32:43+08:00.
• 345: Turkey’s Turning Point: What Will Erdogan Do to Stay in Power?, submitted on 2023-02-04 00:07:50+08:00.

341: How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine: The Case Against Incrementalism - Michael McFaul, submitted on 2023-01-30 22:52:46+08:00.

—– 341.1 —–2023-01-30 22:53:58+08:00:

Short Summary: “Western leaders need to shift how they approach the Ukraine conflict. At this stage, incrementally expanding military and economic assistance is likely to only prolong the war indefinitely. Instead, in 2023, the United States, NATO, and the democratic world more broadly should aim to support a breakthrough. This means more advanced weapons, more sanctions against Russia, and more economic aid to Ukraine. None of this should be doled out incrementally. It needs to be provided swiftly, so that Ukraine can win decisively on the battlefield this year. Without greater and immediate support, the war will settle into a stalemate, which is only to Putin’s advantage. In the end, the West will be judged by what happened during the last year of the war, not by what happened in the first.”

342: Andrei Kolesnikov: How Russians Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the War, submitted on 2023-02-02 00:39:18+08:00.

—– 342.1 —–2023-02-02 00:45:43+08:00:

Short Summary: “In the late Soviet era, only twice did Moscow’s military interrupt the daily lives of ordinary citizens. The first occasion was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which went largely unnoticed by many Russians because few knew what was going on. The second was the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which had far greater consequences. For many people, the sight of zinc coffins being flown back from a distant southern country, even as Marxism-Leninism was losing currency at home, shattered the moral foundations of the Soviet project.

In 2022, Moscow’s military once again interrupted the lives of ordinary citizens with an invasion, and the result has been even worse than either of those previous events: Russia has just lived through the most terrifying year in post-Soviet history. Yet despite growing loss of life and stark moral defeats, there has been no shattering of national foundations. Sure, Russians are becoming divided, and their opinions polarized, as people grow tired of war. But far from weakening Putin’s hold on power, the ‘special military operation’ has only strengthened it.

Those who fear Putin have either fled the country or are silent. The regime has a formidable arsenal of instruments to deploy against anyone who speaks out or otherwise expresses opposition. It has used the legal system to crush any dissent, handing down Stalinist prison terms to antiwar activists. It has invented its own equivalent of yellow stars to harass, threaten, and intimidate those deemed ‘foreign agents.’ (I had the honor of receiving such a designation in late December.) It has closed down or blocked access to virtually all independent media. And it has pinned the unofficial label of “national traitor” on anyone who does not express delight at the state’s ramping up of repression, the war, and the increasingly personal military-police-state regime that is driving it.

And so, instead of protesting, most Russians have made clear that they prefer to adapt. Even fleeing the country is not necessarily a form of protest: for many, it is simply a pragmatic answer to the problem of how to avoid being killed or becoming a killer. It is true that the population is more anxious than ever. According to opinion surveys, anxiety among Russians reached new heights in 2022, although it returned to more or less tolerable levels when the threat of mobilization temporarily receded. But adaptation has become the overriding Russian trait. Where will it end? For the moment, it seems that there is no limit.”

343: What Ukraine Needs to Liberate Crimea - Alexander Vindman, submitted on 2023-02-02 22:16:51+08:00.

—– 343.1 —–2023-02-02 22:20:16+08:00:

Short Summary: For much of last year, while the idea of liberating Crimea remained academic, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was willing to set aside the question of the region’s near-term status. Ukrainian forces were focused on liberating occupied territory outside the peninsula, and the future of Crimea seemed likely to be determined after the end of the war through diplomatic negotiations. But as the war has progressed and Ukraine has liberated large swaths of its territory from occupying Russian forces, Zelensky’s rhetoric regarding Crimea has shifted. “Crimea is our land, our territory,” he said last month in a video appeal to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. “Give us your weapons,” he urged, and Ukraine will retake “what is ours.” And according to The New York Times, the Biden administration has begun to come around to the idea that Ukraine may need to threaten Russia’s foothold on the peninsula to strengthen its negotiating position, even at the risk of escalating the conflict.

If earnest negotiations were to start soon, Zelensky might still be open to a deal that ended the war and deferred the question of Crimea to a later date. But if the fighting drags on through the spring and summer and Ukraine inflicts enormous casualties on Russia while liberating substantial territory, it will become increasingly difficult for Zelensky to grant Putin a face-saving exit from the war and permit Russia’s continued but temporary occupation of Crimea. By the summer, Ukraine is likely to begin targeting more of Russia’s military infrastructure in Crimea in preparation for a broader campaign to liberate the peninsula. Instead of waiting for this scenario to play out, risking a longer and more dangerous war that could embroil NATO, Washington should give Ukraine the weapons and assistance it needs to win quickly and decisively in all occupied territories north of Crimea—and to credibly threaten to take the peninsula militarily.

Doing so would force Putin to the negotiating table and create an opening for diplomatic talks while the final status of Crimea remains unsettled, offering Putin a path out of Ukraine that doesn’t guarantee his political demise and allowing Ukraine to avoid an enormously costly military campaign that is by no means guaranteed to succeed. The eventual deal would require an immediate reduction of Russian conventional forces on the peninsula and outline a path to a referendum allowing the people of Crimea, including those displaced after the 2014 invasion, to determine the final status of the region.

344: The Long Twilight of the Islamic Republic: Iran’s Transformational Season of Protest, submitted on 2023-02-02 22:32:43+08:00.

—– 344.1 —–2023-02-02 22:37:45+08:00:

Short Summary: “The Islamic Republic is now a hollow misnomer. It is a theocracy that has inadvertently secularized the population. It is a republic that has demolished the participatory base it once used to legitimize its rule. By gradually tightening his circle of insiders, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has sidelined an increasing number of the original revolutionaries and other politicians who sought to put the system on a better path. Khamenei elevated sycophants over skilled experts and loyalists over loyal critics, prompting a crisis of competence that has brought the country to the brink of socioeconomic and environmental disaster. There is no one left with political heft, acumen, or gravitas to deliver hard truths to Khamenei, who will soon turn 84.”

345: Turkey’s Turning Point: What Will Erdogan Do to Stay in Power?, submitted on 2023-02-04 00:07:50+08:00.

—– 345.1 —–2023-02-04 00:10:18+08:00:

From Henri Barkey: In a year that has brought renewed strength and unity to NATO, perhaps no country has proven more confounding to the alliance than Turkey. For other NATO members, Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought new resolve against a common enemy and paved the way for the alliance’s expansion. Yet Turkey, though it is a NATO member, has not only maintained cordial relations with Russia; it has also threatened to block the NATO candidacies of Sweden and Finland.

Meanwhile, the Turkish government has suggested it might start a new land invasion of northern Syria to take on the United States’ Syrian Kurdish allies, who operate in that area. And even as Turkey repairs strained ties with many Middle Eastern powers, it has continued to have chilly relations with the European Union and has made new threats toward Greece. Perhaps most unexpectedly, after years of seeking to undermine Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Ankara has begun a rapprochement with the regime in Damascus, mediated by Russia.

These moves, though controversial in the West, are generally popular in Turkey. They also have a clear purpose. In May, Turkey’s longtime populist-authoritarian ruler, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, will face what will likely be the toughest reelection bid of his political career, and foreign policy has become an effective way to distract voters from multiple crises at home. After years of economic mismanagement, Turkey’s inflation rate peaked at 85 percent in November 2022, declining somewhat to 64 percent in December. This is by far the highest rate in Europe, easily surpassing runner-up Hungary with its 25 percent. Turkey’s foreign exchange reserves are dwindling, and the nation faces a burgeoning current-account deficit. The Turkish population is increasingly disgruntled by the presence of 3.6 million Syrian refugees, which Turkey, to its credit, admitted at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. There is also growing fatigue with Erdogan’s increasingly autocratic 20-year rule; a whole generation has known no other leader.

For Erdogan, everything is now riding on the elections. After 20 years of largely unchallenged rule, a defeat would entail serious repercussions for him, his family, his cronies, and many others in his Justice and Development Party (AKP) who have personally benefited from his rule and could likely face prosecution. An opposition win would also constitute a form of regime change, given that its leaders support the restoration of Turkey’s parliamentary system and the curtailment of presidential powers. Erdogan’s sense of vulnerability has grown so acute that the government has used the courts to try to ban a leading potential opposition candidate, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, from running—an extreme move that could ultimately backfire.

Current polls suggest that Erdogan and the AKP could lose the election, scheduled for May 14. For any other leader, such levels of unpopularity and economic malaise might spell certain defeat. But Erdogan is known for his tenacity and his ability to win elections, and he has managed to steady his poll numbers. Given how much is at stake, he is likely to employ almost any means to avoid defeat. As his recent foreign policy moves suggest, he also has several cards to play, and he may seek to manufacture a crisis—including with the West—to change the domestic mood. Europe and the United States must prepare for such a development to minimize potential damage and must have a strategy in place to counter it. Turkey is far too important a country to be allowed to drift away from Western influence.