• 233: Revenge of the Patriarchs: Why Autocrats Fear Women, submitted on 2022-05-03 22:31:04+08:00.
• 234: Revenge of the Patriarchs: Why Autocrats Fear Women, submitted on 2022-05-03 22:51:09+08:00.
• 235: Finland’s New Frontier: Will Russia Seek to Disrupt Helsinki’s NATO Bid?, submitted on 2022-05-04 22:47:26+08:00.
• 236: Ian Bremmer: The New Cold War Could Soon Heat Up, submitted on 2022-05-05 22:37:33+08:00.
• 237: The Trouble With “the Free World”: Why It’s a Bad Idea to Revive a Cold War Concept, submitted on 2022-05-06 22:22:31+08:00.
• 238: Putin’s Orange Obsession: How a Twenty-Year Fixation With Color Revolutions Drove a Disastrous War, submitted on 2022-05-06 23:33:26+08:00.

233: Revenge of the Patriarchs: Why Autocrats Fear Women, submitted on 2022-05-03 22:31:04+08:00.

—– 233.1 —–2022-05-03 22:31:38+08:00:

[SS]

Both aspiring and established autocrats fear women’s political participation—and for good reason.

Erica Chenoweth and Zoe Marks argue that because pro-democracy campaigns with women at their center are more likely to succeed, the repressive governments they target have “a strategic reason to be sexist.”

With authoritarianism on the rise and women’s rights being rolled back in countries as diverse as Brazil, India, Poland, and the United States, “understanding the relationship between sexism and democratic backsliding is vital for those who wish to fight back against both.”

234: Revenge of the Patriarchs: Why Autocrats Fear Women, submitted on 2022-05-03 22:51:09+08:00.

—– 234.1 —–2022-05-03 22:51:36+08:00:

[SS]

Both aspiring and established autocrats fear women’s political participation—and for good reason.

Erica Chenoweth and Zoe Marks argue that because pro-democracy campaigns with women at their center are more likely to succeed, the repressive governments they target have “a strategic reason to be sexist.”

With authoritarianism on the rise and women’s rights being rolled back in countries as diverse as Brazil, India, Poland, and the United States, “understanding the relationship between sexism and democratic backsliding is vital for those who wish to fight back against both.”

235: Finland’s New Frontier: Will Russia Seek to Disrupt Helsinki’s NATO Bid?, submitted on 2022-05-04 22:47:26+08:00.

—– 235.1 —–2022-05-04 22:48:04+08:00:

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236: Ian Bremmer: The New Cold War Could Soon Heat Up, submitted on 2022-05-05 22:37:33+08:00.

—– 236.1 —–2022-05-05 22:38:32+08:00:

[SS from the article by Ian Bremmer, President and Founder of Eurasia Group.]

“In the ten weeks since Russia began its assault on Ukraine, tensions between Russia and Western countries have been greater than at any point since the Cuban missile crisis. U.S. President Joe Biden has accused Russian President Vladimir Putin, leader of a nuclear-armed superpower, of carrying out a “genocide,” called him a “war criminal,” and stated that he “cannot remain in power.” According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the United States now seeks to “weaken Russia” to the point that it can no longer threaten its neighbors. Liz Truss, the British Foreign Secretary, has called the war in Ukraine “our war.”

Other European leaders have been more cautious in their choice of words but just as clear in their opposition to Russian aggression. “Atrocious. Unbelievable. Shocking,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said after visiting the town of Bucha in early April. The conflict has put EU members on military high alert and dramatically underlined the dangers of European energy dependence on Russia. Complacency about Putin’s willingness to use force and weaponize trade has vanished, as has reluctance to welcome Ukraine into the European Union. NATO has deployed thousands of new troops near Russia’s borders, and the alliance will likely soon add Finland and Sweden to its ranks.

Russian leaders, meanwhile, have dramatically shifted their framing of the war—from a limited “special operation” to “liberate” parts of eastern Ukraine to an all-out existential struggle against NATO. Putin has accused the United States and others of trying to “destroy Russia from within,” and on multiple occasions, Russian leaders have threatened to deploy nuclear weapons against any country that dares intervene in the conflict.

Taken together, these developments constitute a dangerous new reality. Gone are the days when Russia’s war aims consisted solely of “de-Nazifying and demilitarizing” Ukraine. Also gone are the days when U.S. and allied governments limited their involvement to helping Ukraine defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Leaders on both sides of the conflict have now crossed a series of lines that cannot easily be uncrossed. The result is a new Cold War between Russia and its opponents—one that promises to be less global than its twentieth-century counterpart but also less stable and predictable.”

237: The Trouble With “the Free World”: Why It’s a Bad Idea to Revive a Cold War Concept, submitted on 2022-05-06 22:22:31+08:00.

—– 237.1 —–2022-05-06 22:23:22+08:00:

[SS from the article by Peter Slezkine, Postdoctoral Fellow at East China Normal University]

“The Russian invasion of Ukraine has revived the concept of “the free world.” On the day the attack began, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appealed to “free world leaders” for support. In his State of the Union address on March 1, U.S. President Joe Biden emphasized “the resolve of the free world.” “The free world is united in its resolve,” echoed British Prime Minister Boris Johnson three days later.

The return of the free world may have consequences that transcend the realm of rhetoric. From the late 1940s through the mid-1960s, the American commitment to free world leadership resulted in a series of unintended policymaking constraints. Before we once again become captives of the concept, it would be wise to consider how a free world foreign policy functioned the first time around.”

238: Putin’s Orange Obsession: How a Twenty-Year Fixation With Color Revolutions Drove a Disastrous War, submitted on 2022-05-06 23:33:26+08:00.

—– 238.1 —–2022-05-06 23:35:21+08:00:

[SS from the article by Lincoln Mitchell, Adjunct Associate Research Scholar in the Institute of War and Peace Studies at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University]

“The Kremlin has sought to portray the Ukrainian government as a dangerous, Western puppet in Russia’s historic heartland, ruled by a government that is the product of an American-backed coup rather than an expression of the democratic will of the Ukrainian people. It matters little that such claims have no grounding in fact or that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky won almost three-quarters of the vote in a 2019 election that was generally regarded as free and fair. For the Putin regime, the possibility that what has happened in Ukraine over the past two decades could be replicated in Russia itself has become an almost existential obsession.

But the Kremlin’s narrative of growing political interference by the West does not merely underpin Putin’s decision to pursue a maximalist invasion aimed at toppling the Ukrainian leadership. It also helps explain why the invasion has gone, from his perspective, so badly. Convinced by their own propaganda that the government in Kyiv was a creation of the West and the Ukrainian far right, Putin and those around him assumed that it would collapse almost as soon as Russian troops crossed the border and that the Russians themselves would be widely embraced. Instead, the Russian operation has quickly foundered, while unifying the Ukrainian population against Moscow more strongly than ever.

Paradoxically, in framing its own political opposition, and that of all of its allies in the surrounding region, in color revolution terms, the Kremlin has led itself to embark on a disastrous war that may ultimately do more to undermine Putin’s support at home than any other event in his two decades in power.”